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“In a crisis, be aware of the danger – but recognize the opportunity.” 
(John F. Kennedy, 1959)
“If organizations embrace the opportunity to acquire new knowledge and to enact new 
strategies, they can emerge from crises with renewed vitality” 
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1.1 CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CRISIS-INDUCED LEARNING
Although crises do not happen on a frequent basis, they have an enormous and long-lasting 
impact on the lives of citizens. Vast global challenges and complex technological systems 
have made modern-day societies increasingly vulnerable to crises (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2011; Muller et al., 2009). In recent decades, one thinks, for example, of, hurricane Katrina 
in the United States in 2005, the cyber-attacks in Estonia in 2007, the Q fever outbreak 
in the Netherlands in 2008, the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011, the MH17 
plane crash in Ukraine in 2014, and the earthquake in Nepal in 2015. These crises were 
triggered by different kinds of incidents, maybe caused by a safety or security issue, were 
natural or man-made, and impacted different policy fields. Yet, in essence, crises all share 
the same elements. We define the concept of a ‘crisis’ as a non-routine situation in which the 
core interests of a society are under severe threat with potentially devastating consequences 
(drawing on Rosenthal et al., 1989). A crisis is typically accompanied by high levels of 
perceived uncertainty, urgency, and surprise, and requires high-impact decisions under 
time pressure and stress (Rosenthal et al., 2001; Boin and ’t Hart, 2003). Crises differ from 
incidents and disasters in that incidents are disruptions with less potential loss and scale and 
can be dealt with by the normal system, but which, if not contained, could escalate into a 
crisis, while a disaster can be understood as a ‘crisis with a bad ending’ (Boin and Rhinard, 
2008, p. 3; Perry and Quarantelli, 2005). Crises are extraordinary and undesirable situations 
of disorder and collective stress that “defy widely held beliefs that such things must not and 
cannot happen ‘here’” (Boin et al., 2008, p. 3). Compared to ‘classical’ crises, modern-day 
crises are characterized by a high degree of technical complexity, mediatization, a large 
number and wide variety of actors involved, and a large-scale and often transboundary 
impact (Ansell et al., 2010).
Guaranteeing the security of citizens has traditionally been one of the core tasks and 
responsibilities of public organizations, and public organizations have extensive powers 
to safeguard security. A central component of safeguarding security consists of protecting 
citizens against crises. Public organizations therefore have to be involved in crisis 
management, that is, all activities that are aimed at preventing crises, managing crises, and 
recovering from crises (Pearson and Mitroff, 1993; Coombs, 2012). The sheer number of 
crises and their large-scale impacts upon society have resulted in increased attention and 
capacities being given to the field of crisis management in recent decades. However, academic 
research in this field is lagging behind practice and needs a more solid grounding. Studying 
crisis management is important because the adequacy of crisis management directly 
affects the well-being of citizens. Organizational learning is one of the central processes in 
crisis management (Boin et al., 2005; Boin et al., 2008; Pearson and Clair, 1998). Together 
with sense-making, decision making, meaning making, and terminating, it is one of the 
1
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most critical tasks for public leaders in times of crisis (Boin et al., 2005). Organizational 
learning is of such importance because, through the process of organizational learning, 
public organizations can improve their crisis management (Cooke and Rohleder, 2006). 
Crises tend to expose organizational failures, which subsequently need to be addressed by 
implementing organizational changes. Public organizations must learn from crises to be 
capable of preventing future similar crises from occurring (Carley and Harrald, 1997) and, if 
a crisis has not been avoided, to improve the crisis response during the crisis so as to mitigate 
the consequences, rebuild reputations, and return to normality. In other words, through 
crisis-induced learning, public organizations build resilience, both for the organization and 
for society at large (Crichton et al., 2009). Learning is the fundamental process for creating 
high performing organizations that are able to carry out complex and high-risk tasks in a 
demanding environment while maintaining a high level of safety (La Porte and Consolini, 
1991; Sagan, 1993). 
1.2 PROBLEM DEFINITION
1.2.1 The difficulties in achieving crisis-induced learning
In the present study, we examine crisis-induced learning by public organizations. 
Organizational learning is a key process in the practice of crisis management and achieving 
organizational learning in response to a crisis can be considered one of the major challenges 
in crisis management (Boin et al., 2005; Moynihan, 2008; Stern, 1997; Roux-Dufort, 2000). 
We observe, however, that learning by public organizations from crisis situations is often 
limited. This is reflected in recent evaluation reports on crises, of which we highlight 
some examples. On September 18th 2017, in an investigation report on a mortar accident 
during a Dutch army operation in Mali, the Dutch Safety Board concluded the following: 
“The Board identifies serious deficiencies in the care for security of Dutch soldiers during the 
operation in Mali […] previous investigations of the Board exposed similar patterns. Therefore 
the Board is concerned regarding the lack of apparent motivation of the defense organization 
to learn from the events”1 (2017, p. 100). In their report on a Turkish Airlines plane crash 
near Schiphol airport in 2009, the Dutch Safety Board concluded that government had 
failed to learn important lessons regarding the provision of medical assistance, lessons that 
had already been raised after five previous crisis investigations. The Board observed that 
significant problems identified after the Turkish Airlines crisis appeared to largely resemble 
the problems that materialized after the Hercules plane disaster in Eindhoven in 1996, the 
Dakota incident above the Wadden Sea in 1996, the fireworks disaster in Enschede in 2000, 
and the fire in the Schiphol airport detention center in 2005 (Dutch Safety Board, 2010). A 
large and increasing number of academic studies confirm that public organizations tend 
1 Translated from Dutch.
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to have major difficulties in learning from a crisis (Smith and Elliott, 2007; Stern, 1997; 
Deverell, 2009; Toft and Reynolds, 2005; Moynihan, 2009; Senge, 1990; Carley and Harrald, 
1997). Some are even stronger in their views, arguing that learning from crises by public 
organizations is often barely achieved if at all (Roux-Dufort, 2000; Boin et al., 2005; Elliott, 
2009; Birkland, 2009). As Roux-Dufort puts it, organizations “are very reluctant to learn 
from crises […] The organization’s priority is to come back and maintain the status quo as soon 
as possible, rather than exploring the extent to which the crisis is a privileged moment during 
which to understand things differently” (2000, p. 26). 
1.2.2 Variation in crisis-induced learning
In addition to the difficulty that public organizations in general have in learning from crises, 
studies also point to the great variation in the degree to which organizations learn (Birkland, 
2006; Deverell, 2009; Boin et al., 2016). Taking a closer look at some of the major crises in the 
past, we observe that while public organizations often learn little from a crisis, suddenly they 
seem to learn extensively from another, similar, crisis. For example, after the swine fever 
outbreak in 1997, the Dutch food safety services (NVWA) demonstrated extensive learning: 
renewing crisis protocols, introducing a crisis archiving system, and laying the foundations 
for an internal crisis management division. Differences in learning outcomes between crises 
can be observed across different types of crises and across different policy fields. We observe 
this phenomenon, for example, in the field of maritime safety, particularly in the prevention 
of oil-spill disasters in European waters. In response to the Sea Empress disaster off the 
Welsh coast in 1996, the European Union did not adopt any major legislation (Krämer, 
2007). However, only a few years later, after the Erika oil-spill disaster off the Brittany coast 
in 1999, the European Union adopted major policy reforms. These reforms were reflected 
in the “Erika I” and “Erika II” legislative packages that established the European Maritime 
Safety Organization, strengthened port state control and classification societies that control 
the technical safety standards of ships. The packages further established a comprehensive 
compensation fund and initiated the phasing out of single-hull oil tankers (EC 2003; Wene 
2005). The reforms, literally named after the crisis, demonstrate that the European Union 
learnt profound lessons from the Erika disaster. The major difference in learning outcomes 
between the two oil-spill crises is striking given their remarkable similarity: both took place 
in the European Atlantic; were caused by an oil tanker breakdown; had dramatic and long-
term impacts on the marine environment and the fishing and tourist industries; led to great 
social and political turmoil; and were transboundary in nature (CEDRE 2018; ITOPF 2018). 
1
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1.2.3 Lack of theoretical explanation
The observation that differences in learning outcomes recur in many crisis contexts, across 
different policy fields, and across different types of crises, draws attention to underlying 
factors, operating according to deeper mechanisms, that could explain this variation. To 
date, the literature on crisis management does not provide a clear and satisfying answer to 
the question as to why there is variation in crisis-induced learning. The process of crisis-
induced learning has remained poorly understood (Carley and Harrald, 1997; Deverell, 
2009). Compared with the vast number of studies on organizational learning in regular, 
non-crisis, situations (e.g., Bennett and Howlet, 1992; Crosson et al., 1999), the process of 
crisis-induced learning by public organizations has remained understudied (important 
exceptions are Van Duin, 1992; Carley and Harrald, 1997; Stern, 1997; Dekker and Hansén, 
2004; Deverell, 2010; Birkland, 2006; Smith and Elliott, 2007). The gaps in the knowledge 
center around questions concerning what factors drive the crisis-induced learning and 
what mechanisms underpin this process, with a solid theory yet to be developed (Smith 
and Elliott, 2007; Deverell, 2009; Stern, 1997). In the present study, we aim to unravel the 
main factors and mechanisms that explain crisis-induced learning. This is the main goal 
of the present study, which leads to the following main research question: “How do public 
organizations learn from crises; and what factors and mechanisms explain this process of 
crisis-induced learning?” 
1.3 RESEARCH DESIGN
The present research consists of an explorative study into the factors and mechanisms that 
affect crisis-induced organizational learning by public organizations. Given the complexity 
of the learning process, we aim to provide insights into underlying mechanisms that work 
in different policy and crisis contexts. By unravelling the mechanisms linking variables, 
one can create a better understanding of the fundamental processes that work in various 
contexts (Pawson and Tilly, 1997; De Vaus, 2001). The main objective of this study is to 
gain an understanding of the crisis-induced organizational learning process through a 
systematic empirical analysis of data from multiple crises. On the basis of these insights, we 
aim to build an initial theoretical model of public organizations’ crisis-induced learning and 
the main factors that explain it. This will provide a basis for further research on the topic and 
form the first step towards creating a solid theory on why, or why not, public organizations 
learn from crises. 
The present study is predominantly explorative in the sense that the empirical data 
are leading. However, although the empirical data have a leading role, we also use crisis 
management, public administration and organizational learning literature to create a general 
basis for understanding factors, concepts, and processes (see Dubois & Gadde, 2002). In line 
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with the recommendation of Dekker and Hansén (2014, p. 141), we take an open, dynamic, 
and integrated approach to crisis-induced learning in public organizations. This means that 
we do not, in advance, exclude any organizational learning processes and/or factors. We 
use theoretical insights to create a general framework for crisis-induced learning (section 
1.6) and to understand factors potentially related to crisis-induced learning (chapter 2). The 
units analyzed in this study are public organizations, which we assume to be entities that are 
capable of drawing lessons. The approach we take in identifying organizational learning is 
to look at changes made by an organization in response to a crisis, and subsequently trace 
back the cognitive basis for these changes (cf. Birkland, 2006). In the present research, we 
study organizational learning by analyzing specific lessons drawn by public organizations. 
The present study is broken down into four sub-studies, which are discussed in the final 
section of this chapter. Each sub-study focuses on a particular aspect of crisis-induced 
learning. We used a combination of different research designs, determined by which best 
fitted the goal of each sub-study. We used both qualitative (systematic case studies; Yin, 
2014), quantitative (statistics), and mixed-method designs. Data were collected using in-
depth interviews [sub-studies 1 and 3], a survey [sub-study 4], and secondary sources [sub-
studies 1 and 2]. Data analysis methods include latent coding (Babbie, 2014) [sub-study 
1] political claims analysis (Koopmans and Statham, 1999), pattern-matching (Trochim, 
1989) [sub-study 2], research synthesis (Cooper et al., 2009) [sub-study 3], and factor and 
regression analysis [sub-study 4]. These methods allowed the collection and analysis of a 
large volume of data from a significant number of crises. For each sub-study, cases were 
selected that best suited the goal of the sub-study. The cases selected for sub-study 1 were 
the learning by the Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (‘Nederlandse 
Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit’, NVWA) from the swine fever crisis (1997–1998), the foot-and-
mouth disease crisis (2001), the avian influenza crisis (2003), and the Q fever crisis (2007–
2010). Sub-study 2 considers the learning by the European Union after the Braer (1993), the 
Sea Empress (1996), the Erika (1999), and the Prestige (2002) oil-spill disasters in European 
waters. Sub-study 3 investigates learning by the Dutch crisis management organization 
during 60 crises in the Netherlands. Finally, sub-study 4 considers the learning orientations 
of the 209 Dutch municipalities in response to a hypothetical crisis. The advantages of basing 
the first two sub-studies on the NVWA and on the EU is that both these organizations 
have faced several crises, allowing us to keep the organization constant in each study. We 
collected data from various sources: 16 in-depth interviews with key experts [sub-study 1], 
1,449 political claims in newspaper articles and in parliaments [sub-study 2], 114 post-crisis 
evaluation reports [sub-study 3], and survey data from 209 mayors [sub-study 4]. 
1
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1.4 THEORETICAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND PRACTICAL 
RELEVANCE
1.4.1 Theoretical relevance
The public management literature mainly reports studies on processes in public organizations 
in their regular stable environment. There is relatively little attention for organizational 
processes in complex turbulent periods, such as crises. This is perhaps surprising given 
that these turbulent periods have an exceptionally large impact on public management 
structures. As such, there is need for more research on processes in times of chaos, not least 
because of the disproportionate impact these periods have on public institutions and wider 
society. In the crisis management and public administration literature, the circumstances 
that explain the kind of impact that crises have are generally rather unclear. Therefore, “one 
of the mayor challenges for crisis analysis in the 21st century is to understand the conditions 
under which crises have different types of political and institutional impacts” (Rosenthal et al., 
2001, p. 43). Organizational learning can result in crises having a long-lasting institutional 
impact. Increasing knowledge on crisis-induced learning is especially relevant because it 
crosses all disciplines in social science (see Stern, 1997).
We have discussed the difficulties that public organization have with organizational 
learning from crises, and that the variation in crisis-induced learning is not explained well 
in the literature. Further, within the considerable literature on organizational learning 
(Bennett and Howlet, 1992; Crosson et al., 1999; Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2011), relatively 
little attention is given to organizational learning in the context of a crisis. Therefore, in 
the present study, we aim to provide deeper theoretical insights into the process of crisis-
induced organisational learning and, more specifically, increase knowledge on the factors 
and underlying mechanisms that drive crisis-induced organizational learning by public 
organizations. Deverell (2010) observed that “there is a [general] need to increase knowledge 
on the relation between crisis and learning” (2010, p. 126). Smith and Elliott similarly 
observed that “it is clear that considerable research is needed to ascertain the manner in 
which organizations can effectively learn to prevent crisis events” (2007, p. 533). Typical 
crisis circumstances seem to make general organizational learning theory only applicable 
to crisis-induced learning to a limited extent (Moynihan, 2008). Elliott identified this gap 
in the literature and claims that there is an “absence of an all-embracing framework of 
organizational learning from crisis” (2009, p. 158). More specifically, there is a theoretical 
gap as to what factors drive crisis-induced learning by public organizations and through 
which underlying mechanisms these operate in different contexts (Smith and Elliott, 
2007; Deverell, 2009; Stern, 1997). Currently, the literature lacks a theoretical model that 
adequately explains the observed variation in crisis-induced learning. The few theoretical 
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insights on factors potentially related to crisis learning available are scattered and not well 
grounded empirically (see sub-study 1). Moreover, the process of learning during crises 
has gained little attention in the literature, with most studies on crisis-induced learning 
examining post-crisis learning (Moynihan, 2009). 
1.4.2 Methodological relevance
A further reason for the lack of knowledge concerning the factors and mechanisms that 
drive the process of crisis-induced learning is the lack of systematic empirical foundations 
(Smith and Elliott 2007, p. 534). Scholars have noted that there is “a striking lack of empirical 
studies in the field of organizational learning” (Dekker and Hansén, 2004, p. 127). To date, the 
field of crisis management in general, and studies on crisis-induced learning in particular, 
are dominated by conceptual works and low-n case studies (Veil, 2011; An and Cheng, 2012). 
Most case studies on crisis management tend to amount to thick descriptions of individual 
crises. There is a striking need to build more extensive, and more systematic, empirical 
evidence. This would enable a more comprehensive understanding of the conditions and 
mechanisms that affect learning from a crisis (Smith and Elliot, 2007; Cooke and Rohleder, 
2006). Here, our use of systematic comparative qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods 
is innovative in the field of crisis management. Using these methods enables us to identify 
patterns in learning across different crises. Collecting data on public organizations that have 
experienced multiple crises is also rather unusual. We study organizational learning on the 
level of distinct lessons learnt (or not learnt) within a case context, which is rather novel in 
studies on organizational learning. Finally, one of the main reasons for the lack of empirical 
data on crisis-induced learning is the absence of both a framework and a measurement 
instrument to adequately operationalize the concept. Overall, we aim to contribute to the 
literature with rich empirical research and by taking a first step towards a framework for a 
more refined operationalization of crisis-induced organizational learning. 
1.4.3 Practical relevance 
There is a great practical relevance in gaining a better understanding of crisis-induced learning 
by public organizations because this can contribute to improving crisis management practice. 
Boin et al. (2005) speak of organizational learning as “one of the most underdeveloped aspects 
of crisis management” (p. 14). Crises can have devastating and long-lasting consequences for 
society, in social, political, physical, economic, environmental, and institutional terms. By 
learning during a crisis, public organizations can improve the effectiveness of their crisis 
response activities, which will contribute to reducing the damage and ending the crisis. In 
crisis situations, learning or failing to learn can literally mean a difference between life and 
death, since learning can ensure that crisis response activities are effective (Elliott, 2009). 
Learning after a crisis helps to restore the reputation of the organization and the system in 
1
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general. Implementing organizational changes helps to prevent the disastrous events from 
happening again in the future and, if they nonetheless happen, to respond better to them. 
The consequences of not being able to learn from a crisis can be very tangible. For example, 
after the Prestige oil-spill disaster in 2002 (one of the largest environmental disasters to ever 
hit Europe), the EU Energy and Transport Commissioner Loyola de Palacio explained in 
the European Parliament that “We could have avoided the Prestige oil spill.” (…) “Had the 
timetable proposed by the Commission been upheld, the Prestige would have had to be taken 
out of service on 1 September 2002” (EC, 2002, p. 1). 
In addition, crisis-induced learning is very relevant for public organizations in retaining 
their legitimacy because citizens, and all kinds of other actors in society, expect them to 
learn from crises. In contrast to the problems that organizations experience in learning, 
there is a widespread and persistent belief among citizens, the media, and within public 
organizations themselves, that they can and should learn extensively from crises (Birkland, 
2006). When a crisis occurs, demands from citizens, politicians, and the media typically 
coalesce around questions of accountability – that the people who are responsible for the 
crisis occurring should be identified and punished – and learning – that the causes of the 
crisis should be investigated and subsequently fixed (Boin et al., 2017). Strong claims are 
made in a range of formal and informal political forums, such as parliaments, television 
shows, and newspapers, with the recurrent narrative that ‘government’ should ensure that 
‘these awful events’ are prevented from ‘ever happening again’ and that it ‘should have 
learned’ from previous crises (Dekker and Hansén, 2004). For example, within hours of the 
start of a large fire in the Grenfell Tower in London on June 14th 2017, a newspaper article 
in the Guardian under the heading “Disaster was waiting to happen: fire expert slams UK 
tower blocks. Architect Sam Webb says breaches of fire safety standards in UK are common 
and lessons from Lakanal House have not been learned” suggested the crisis could have been 
prevented if lessons had been learnt.
1.5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRISES AND LEARNING
The link between a crisis and organizational learning is unclear and ambivalent (Deverell, 
2009; Stern, 1997; Carley and Harrald, 1997). Although studies on the impact of crises agree 
that crisis circumstances have a distinct impact on organizational learning and that crisis-
induced learning differs from learning in a regular context (Moynihan, 2008), they differ in 
how they see the relationship between crises and learning. On the one hand, crises are seen 
as facilitating organizational learning but, on the other hand, as impeding organizational 
learning.
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1.5.1 Crises as an opportunity for learning
On the one hand, crises are seen as creating excellent opportunities for learning by 
functioning as a catalyst for generating knowledge and implementing change, which are 
viewed as the two core aspects of learning (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). Punctuated equilibrium 
theory posits that public organizations tend to experience long periods of stability with only 
minor, incremental, or no changes at all in their structure or policies. These long periods 
of institutional lock-in are from time to time interrupted by sudden short periods of major 
organizational change (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). In the literature, these short periods 
that allow drastic organizational change are known as ‘windows of opportunity’ (Kingdon, 
2011) or ‘critical junctures’ (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). Crises can be interpreted 
as focusing events that are needed to open these windows by shaking the system up and 
bringing proposals for change to the agenda (Kingdon, 2011; Schein, 1972). 
The process of organizational learning from crises might appear rather straightforward: 
after a crisis, investigations and evaluations reveal its causes, which are subsequently 
addressed by adopting improvements in the organization to prevent such failures 
reoccurring (Birkland, 2006; Birkland, 2009; Carley and Harrald, 1997). Although crises 
are generally perceived as ‘terrible events’, crises can also be viewed as opportunities to 
improve a malfunctioning organization or societal system. Veil (2011) argues that “[a] crisis, 
when viewed as an opportunity to learn, can actually benefit an organization” (p.117). The 
premise here is that crises are symptoms of an underlying structural weakness. Crises direct 
attention to and reveal underlying flaws in a system that would otherwise have remained 
undetected (Birkland, 2006). Crises thus, by definition, generate a strong potential for lesson 
drawing. Several studies illustrate a crisis’s dual role using the Mandarin symbol for crisis, 
which suggests that a crisis is intrinsically an ambivalent situation since the symbol can be 
understood as not only meaning ‘dangerous’ but also ‘opportunity’ (Ulmer et al., 2015), 
although the correctness of this translation has recently been questioned.
Some typical aspects of crisis circumstances facilitate learning. For example, crises 
tend to create upsurges of information suddenly becoming available. All kinds of societal 
actors bring in information through different communication channels, such as through 
investigative journalism reported in television and newspapers, public inquiries, internal 
evaluations, judicial reports, and scientific studies (Dekker and Hansén, 2004). Extensive 
public scrutiny during a crisis puts pressure on public organizations to find solutions to the 
problems and act on the events. Crises typically create a political atmosphere that is focused 
on action in which divergent stakeholders become willing to cooperate and share a general 
recognition that things need to change, which in a regular context would be unlikely. 
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1.5.2 Crises as an impediment to learning: the crisis-induced learning 
paradox
However, despite the great relevance of crisis-induced learning and the theoretical 
opportunities that crises generate for learning, a substantive number of studies show that, 
in reality, crises create many barriers to organizational learning. That is, typical crisis 
circumstances can complicate organizational learning (Stern, 1997; Roux-Dufort, 2000; 
Elliott, 2009; Carley and Harrald, 1997) as we discuss below. Given that crises highlight the 
need for learning, one can observe a paradox in the relationship between crisis and learning: 
“the need for learning is regarded highest under circumstances in which it is most difficult 
to achieve” (Dekker and Hansén, 2004, p. 211). In other words, the very crisis that makes 
learning imperative – a situation of chaos, threat, and uncertainty – also impedes the ability 
to learn because the political and organizational capabilities to adopt lessons are limited. 
This paradox when it comes to crisis-induced learning has been recognized by several crisis-
management scholars (Dekker and Hansén, 2004, p. 211; Boin et al., 2005, p.120; Birkland, 
2006, p. 162; Roux-Dufort, 2000). Birkland explains that “whereas such [large] events provide 
significant fodder for learning, they are also likely to overwhelm the ability of a system to 
respond with routine procedures and therefore may limit learning” (2006, p. 162).
Typical crisis circumstances that complicate learning are that, in a crisis, there is shortage 
of time and the calm needed for adequate reflection on events. As a result, responses to a crisis 
are not based on well thought out and rational assessments of alternative courses of actions 
and consequences (Allison and Zelikow, 1999). Rather, there is limited understanding and 
oversight. The huge complexity and the unexpected and uncertain nature of crisis situations 
result in crisis responses being largely based on public leaders’ improvisation, expert intuition, 
trial-and-error, and ad hoc adjustments to changing circumstances (Gilpin and Murphy, 
2008). The understanding of what actually happened is limited because of the surprise, 
uniqueness of circumstances, rapid sequence of events, and blurring from the onslaught of 
unreliable, contradictory, and changing information (Dekker and Hansén, 2004; Rosenthal 
et al., 2001). There is little time to verify knowledge and consult expertise from outside the 
organization. Public leaders are preoccupied with dealing with the acute problems related to 
resolving the crisis, such as blame avoidance and external communication, more than with 
learning. The political component of a crisis can obstruct learning because many actors use 
the political vacuum to promote their own interests and end up in a political struggle of 
blaming and framing (Boin et al., 2008; Stern, 1997). Actors might not agree on how to make 
sense of the events and what lessons should be learnt (Olson, 2000). 
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1.6 TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR CRISIS-INDUCED LEARNING 
Before we discuss the structure and design of the four sub-studies, we now discuss a 
conceptual framework for crisis-induced learning. The aim of this framework is to clarify 
the focus of the present study, and the main assumptions that we build upon. In the present 
study, we take an integrated approach to organizational learning. In our framework, after 
first defining what we mean by organizational learning, we distinguish between “who learns”, 
“what is learnt”, “why it is learnt”, and “when it is learnt”, thus building upon commonly used 
distinctions in the organizational learning and crisis management literature (cf. Crossan et 
al., 1999; Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Moynihan, 2008; Deverell, 2009). 
1.6.1 Defining organizational learning
Since the initial works of Cyert and March (1963) and Argyris and Schön (1978), organizational 
learning has become an active field of study with a large body of literature developed around 
the process of learning by organizations (Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2011). Seminal research 
has been carried out by, for example, Argyris and Schön (1978), Fiol and Lyles (1985), Senge 
(1990), March (1991), Huber (1991), and Rose (1993). Although organizational learning 
is a frequently used concept that has been studied extensively, the concept has remained 
rather elusive. Scholars have defined and demonstrated organizational learning in a variety 
of ways (cf. Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Crossan et al., 2009; Fiol and Lyles, 1985). Studies 
have demonstrated learning by identifying changes in many organizational aspects, such as 
organizational strategies, ideas, beliefs, culture, routines, legislation, policies, protocols, and 
structures (Bennett et al., 1992; Carley and Harrald, 1997). 
However straightforward the term “organizational learning” might seem, in the literature 
organizational learning can be regarded as a ‘conceptual minefield’ (Levy, 1994) with 
scholars approaching learning by organizations from different angles. In the present study, 
we argue that many of the concepts used in the literature for learning by organizations, 
such as ‘lesson-drawing’ (Rose, 1993); ‘goal-based learning’ (Moynihan, 2005), and ‘policy 
learning’ (May, 1992) can be reduced to two core processes. In the literature, organizational 
learning is viewed either from a cognitive perspective (the acquisition of new knowledge by 
an organization) or from a behavioral perspective (the transposing of new knowledge into 
improved organizational actions) (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Argyris and Schön, 1978; Argote, 
2013). In the present study we integrate these two perspectives and define organizational 
learning as: the process of acquiring new knowledge and understanding (cognitive) and the 
transposing of this new knowledge and understanding into improved organizational actions 
(behavioral). This integrated approach covers the various definitions of organizational 
learning seen in the literature. Organizational learning thus is about the relationship 
between knowledge and action (Freeman, 2007).
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1.6.2 Who, what, why, when distinctions
Who learns? An important distinction with regard to learning is the entity that draws the 
lessons. Here, scholars distinguish between organizations, groups/teams, and individuals 
as entities that can learn (Argote, 2013). In the present research we study learning by 
organizations, but assume that these include an agglomeration of individuals and groups. 
One must recognize that organizational learning is to some extent an abstract process 
since it is the individuals within organizations that have the cognitive capacity to interpret 
knowledge, draw lessons, and translate these lessons into actual behaviors (Sabatier, 
1987; Busenberg, 2001; Van Duin, 1992). Although individuals are the building blocks of 
organizational learning, organizational learning is not the sum of what individuals learn. 
Organizations have cognitive systems and collective understandings that are shared by 
their members, which can be held in, for example, legislation, handbooks, and protocols 
(Hedberg, 1991). An important consequence of the micro-foundations of organizations 
is that information, in order for it to be understood and translated into actions, often 
needs to be transferred from one part of an organization to another. It is this process of 
knowledge dissemination among organizational members that constitutes the process of 
learning (Huber, 1991). Groups and teams are important in organizational learning because 
communication channels and implementation of decisions work on the level of groups of 
individuals. 
What is learnt? Organizational learning can be understood as adaptations to many 
different aspects of an organization, such as insights, protocols, organizational routines, 
norms, legislation, and policies (Carley and Harrald, 1997, pp. 105-106). In the present 
study, we do not focus exclusively on one type of lesson but take an integrated approach in 
which we combine organizational learning and policy learning that have developed as two 
distinct literature streams. We argue that, at their core, they consist of the same processes 
(Common, 2004). In the present study, we consider policy learning to be one aspect of 
organizational learning: organizations can change a range of organizational aspects, 
including their policies. Several scholars distinguish between different levels of learning, 
most commonly between “single-loop learning” and “double-loop learning” (Argyris and 
Schön, 1978). Single-loop learning occurs when organizations detect and improve existing 
organizational aspects, while double-loop learning refers to changing an organization’s 
underlying assumptions, objectives, and norms. However, we have decided not to adopt 
such distinctions since, as previous studies have shown, they are primarily theoretical and 
problematic to operationalize empirically (e.g., Van Duin, 1992). 
Why is it learnt? A public organization can learn from a crisis for different purposes. 
For example, crisis-induced learning processes could be aimed at preventing future similar 
crisis. This learning for prevention is about finding out what caused a crisis to happen, and 
what organizational actions could avoid these causes reoccurring. Crisis-induced learning 
26 | Chapter 1
processes can also be aimed at improving the response to a current or future crisis. This 
learning for response is about identifying inefficiencies in activities undertaken to manage 
a crisis and actions to improve these activities (Veil; 2011; Moynihan, 2008; 2009; Deverell, 
2009). 
When is it learnt? Related to the purpose of learning is the moment of learning. Several 
crisis management models view crisis management as a cyclical process and distinguish 
subsequent stages in crisis management. In the crisis management literature, it is common to 
distinguish between a pre-crisis phase, an in-crisis phase, and a post-crisis phase (Coombs, 
2012; Smith, 1990). These models assume that different conditions are present in each of 
these phases and that an organization is involved in different crisis management activities, 
which are also linked to different organizational learning processes (Smith and Elliott, 
2007; Veil, 2011). Pre-crisis learning takes place before a crisis and is considered to be about 
learning from signals and incidents to prevent these leading to a full-blown crisis – the 
incubation phase of a crisis (Turner, 1976). In-crisis learning takes place under complex crisis 
conditions, such as chaos, uncertainty, and stress, and is aimed at improving the response 
to the acute crisis. Given these complex conditions, in-crisis learning is generally thought 
to be more challenging than post-crisis learning (Moynihan, 2009). Post-crisis learning 
takes place when normal conditions have largely returned and is about reflecting upon crisis 
events and improving both prevention and response. The present study examines crisis-
induced learning, that is learning from a crisis, which implies that a crisis has occurred, and 
lessons are drawn based on the events. Therefore, in the present study, we exclude pre-crisis 
learning ex ante. 
Finally, distinctions in the purpose of learning and the moment of learning might seem 
to coincide: in-crisis learning to improve the crisis response, and post-crisis learning to 
improve crisis prevention. Note, however, that this is not the case, since improving the 
prevention of a future crisis can already be initiated in an ongoing crisis and responses to a 
crisis can be improved not only during a crisis, but also after a crisis has ended. 
1.7 RESEARCH PLAN
The study is structured as four sub-studies as shown in Figure 1.1. Each sub-study has 
a different focus. In the first sub-study, we explore the major factors that affect crisis-
induced organizational learning and through which mechanisms. The outcomes of the 
first sub-study provide a basis for Sub-studies 2, 3, and 4 of this research, which focus on 
the role of particular factors in crisis-induced learning. The results of Sub-study 1 showed 
that additional research was needed to gain an adequate understanding of the role of 
politicization in the crisis-induced learning process (Sub-study 2), the role of external 
experts in organizational learning during crisis situations (Sub-study 3), and the role that 
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public leaders’ characteristics play in the wake of a crisis (Sub-study 4). These sub-studies are 
presented as individual chapters, each containing a theoretical framework for the specific 
sub-study based on general insights from the crisis management and public administration 
literature, including the ‘who-what-why-when’ framework, and from several earlier studies 
on crisis-induced learning. 
Figure 1.1 Structure of the dissertation
Sub-study 1 explores the factors and mechanisms that drive the process of organizational 
learning from a crisis. The literature appears to lack a model that includes the various kinds of 
factors that influence crisis-induced organizational learning. We use concepts distilled from 
the general crisis management and public administration literatures: ‘politicization’, a ‘shared 
sense-making’ of what lessons to learn, ‘organizational culture’, ‘organizational structure’, 
the ‘stage in crisis management’, ‘post-crisis evaluation reports’, and ‘public leadership’. In 
this sub-study, we focused on learning by The Netherlands Food and Consumer Product 
Safety Authority (‘NVWA’) in response to four large veterinary crises that the organization 
has faced since 1997. The cases included in the study are the outbreaks of swine flu in 1997, 
foot-and-mouth disease in 2001, avian influenza in 2003, and Q fever in 2007. The NVWA 
was selected for this study as an exceptional case due to the multiple crises it has faced, the 
exceptional learning outcome, and its wide-ranging crisis-management authority. We use 
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an in-depth case study design based on 17 in-depth semi-structured interviews with ‘key 
experts’ in the NVWA crisis management organization (‘NVIC’)2 and a document analysis 
of internal and external crisis handbooks, emergency action plans, crisis protocols, internal 
memos, crisis evaluation reports, and general reports. The findings in this first explorative 
sub-study provide argumentation for more detailed research into the roles of politicization 
(Sub-study 2), of external expertise during a crisis (Sub-study 3), and of public leaders’ 
characteristics (Sub-study 4). The present sub-study, carried out together with scholars 
Daphne van Kleef and Trui Steen, is part of the ‘Double Bind’ VIDI research program of 
the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (‘NWO’)3. Sub-study 1 is presented in 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation and has been published in the Journal of Contingencies and 
Crisis Management (2017, volume 25, issue 4, December 2017, pp. 326–340); see Broekema 
et al. (2017). 
Sub-study 2 addresses the role of politicization in the crisis-induced organizational 
learning process. While the literature proposes that politicization can affect organizational 
learning, it is argued both as having a promoting and an impeding effect (May, 1992; 
Stern, 1997; Dekker and Hansén, 2004). In this study, we examine the relationship between 
issue politicization and learning by the European Union in response to four large oil-spill 
disasters: accidents with the oil tankers MV Braer in 1993, the MV Sea Empress in 1996, the 
MV Erika in 1999, and the Prestige in 2002. We chose to study these oil-spill disasters in 
European waters because of their great similarity in terms of geographical area, events, and 
consequences, but different learning outcomes. In this study, we conduct a political claims 
analysis (Koopmans and Statham, 1999) on newspaper articles (The Guardian and The 
Times for the Braer and Sea Empress cases, Le Monde and Le Figaro for the Erika case, and El 
Mundo and El País for the Prestige case) reporting debates in the national parliaments of the 
United Kingdom, France, and Spain, and on debates in the European Parliament. We also 
conduct a document analysis of the six evaluation reports published in response to these four 
oil-spill disasters and the subsequent new legislation adopted by the European Union. To 
understand the relationship between politicization and learning we use a pattern-matching 
technique (Trochim, 1989; Yin, 2009) and compare the subjects of politicized issues with 
the subjects of recommendations made in the evaluation reports, and with the legislation 
adopted by the European Union. Sub-study 2 is presented in Chapter 3 of this dissertation 
and was published as a single-authored article in the journal Public Administration (June 
2016, Volume 94, Issue 2, pp. 381–398); see Broekema (2016). 
Sub-study 3 explores the role that external experts play in the crisis management 
response to crises, and thus addresses in-crisis learning. Although the literature suggests 
an important role for experts in times of crisis (Rosenthal and ’t Hart, 1991; Grönvall, 
2  ‘NVWA Incident en Crisis Centrum’.
3  Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek.
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2001), this aspect does not seem to have been comprehensively studied empirically, that 
is, over a large number of crises. Sub-study 3 consists of two parts. In the first part, we 
examine the characteristics of external experts who are involved in crisis situations and the 
characteristics of their involvement. In the second part, we analyze how external experts 
affect the crisis response, and under what conditions their involvement contributes to 
adequate crisis management. Although external experts are in a position to contribute to an 
in-crisis learning process by the internal crisis management organization, their involvement 
has not yet been systematically studied empirically. For this study, we selected 60 crises that 
occurred in the Netherlands between 2000-2013. We conduct a research synthesis including 
data from the 114 post-crisis evaluation reports that were published after these crises. 
This method allows one to systematically identify general patterns over a large number 
of cases. We quantitatively analyze information on the characteristics of external experts 
and their involvement as detailed in the 114 reports. In addition, we qualitatively analyze 
the statements in the reports that refer to the relationship between expert involvement and 
adequate crisis management. Sub-study 3 builds on a larger research project undertaken 
with scholars Carola van Eijk and René Torenvlied that was conducted for the Research and 
Documentation Centre (WODC)4 of the Ministry of Security and Justice (Van Eijk et al., 
2013). This study is presented in Chapter 4 of this dissertation and has been published with 
the same co-authors in the International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction (2018, volume 
31, October 2018, pp. 20-29); see Broekema et al. (2018).
Sub-study 4 addresses the role of public leaders’ characteristics in the crisis-induced 
learning process. While the literature on crisis leadership seems disconnected empirically 
from that on crisis learning, public leaders’ characteristics are often suggested as affecting 
crisis-induced learning (De Vries, 2016). Sub-study 4 therefore examines the learning 
orientation of public leaders in the wake of a crisis and the influence of not only their public 
service motivation (PSM, see for example Perry, 1996) but also several other characteristics 
of public leaders. We expect that a public leader with a strong public service motivation 
to be oriented more towards instrumental learning than towards political learning in the 
immediate aftermath of a crisis. To investigate this, we sent out a survey to all Dutch mayors 
in the Netherlands with items probing their priorities regarding organizational learning 
processes from a hypothetical crisis situation occurring in their municipality. The items 
used were derived from previous surveys on organizational learning and from the general 
crisis management literature. Using data collected from 209 mayors, we conduct factor 
and regression analyses. An additional aim of this study is to provide an initial basis for 
a framework that enables a more refined operationalization of the crisis-induced learning 
concept. This sub-study was also part of the ‘Double Bind’ research program funded by 
the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (see sub-study 1) and carried out 
4  ‘Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum’.
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together with scholars Jan Porth, Trui Steen, and René Torenvlied. Sub-study 4 is presented 
in Chapter 5 of this dissertation and is currently under review (revise and resubmit) at an 
international journal. 
In a final Chapter 6, we integrate the findings of the four sub-studies and come to an 
overall conclusion. We propose a conceptual theoretical model outlining the main factors 
affecting crisis-induced organizational learning. Further, we discuss the present study’s 
theoretical contributions, and its limitations. Finally, we make suggestions for follow-up 
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2.1 ABSTRACT 
Although organizational learning has been studied extensively, empirical studies in relation to 
crises and theory building have remained scarce. This study explored what factors affect the 
learning process from crises of a public sector organization. We studied the responses of the 
Dutch food safety services (NVWA) to the veterinary crises classical swine fever (1997–
1998), foot-and-mouth disease (2001), avian influenza (2003) and Q fever (2007–2010). Data 
from in-depth interviews with key experts in the organization and from crisis management 
documents pointed to political–economic context, social–emotional understanding, 
organizational structure, organizational culture, crisis management stage and organizational 
forgetting as key factors. Remarkably, post-crisis evaluation reports, leadership and a shared 
sense-making of what lessons to learn were not found to play a central role.
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2.2 INTRODUCTION
Public organizations experience major difficulties in learning from crises. Contrary to 
a common assumption, many studies sustain that they often learn poorly or not at all 
(c.f. Smith & Elliott, 2007; Stern, 1997; Deverell, 2009; Roux-Dufort, 2000; Elliott, 2009). 
Learning from a crisis is a complex and challenging affair. Crises often are highly unique and 
unpredictable situations, in which complex circumstances of chaos and stress, politicization 
and a lack of reliable information make it difficult to distil clear crisis lessons (Boin et 
al., 2008; Dekker and Hansén, 2004). At the same time, it is of the utmost relevance that 
organizations learn from crises in order to prevent or adequately respond to future ones, 
because the consequences of crises are severe and the tolerance for mistakes is low. Effective 
government action can in some crises literally mean a difference between life and death. 
The Dutch food safety services, named the ‘NVWA’,5, 6 responsible for the management of 
veterinary crises in the Netherlands, is an exceptional case in that it seems to have actually 
learned extensively from crises over the past two decades. Among other things, it established 
a special crisis division, refined crisis protocols, created training and simulation programs, 
developed the use of personal protective equipment and created quick response teams. As a 
result, within the EU, many aspects of the NVWA’s crisis management organization are now 
used as best practice for food safety services in other EU member states (cf. FVO [Food and 
Veterinary Office] 2013, 2014). Why did the NVWA manage to learn extensively from crises, 
while public sector organizations in general have such difficulty with this process?
There is a large literature on organizational learning (cf. Argote, 2013; Crossan et al., 1999; 
Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2011), as it is the key process through which an organization can 
improve its performance. Only a limited number of these studies, however, have delved in a 
systematic way into the process of organizational learning in the context of crisis situations 
(some important exceptions are Birkland, 2006; Deverell, 2010; Smith et al., 2007; Stern, 
1997; Toft and Reynolds, 1994). So far the process of crisis-induced learning remains not 
well understood – especially with regard to what factors drive the process (Smith et al., 2007; 
Deverell, 2009). The building of theory on the basis of empirical research in this field has 
remained very scarce. Dekker and Hansén explain the complexity of learning in the context 
of a crisis: ‘the need for learning is regarded highest under circumstances in which it is most 
difficult to achieve’ (2004, p. 211). Aiming to clarify the process, we posed the question: What 
factors drive a public sector organization’s learning from crises?
The aim of this explorative study was to gain insight into the different factors that affect 
the process of organizational learning from crises and to provide a framework for further 
research on the subject. Recognizing both a cognitive and an action perspective (see Fiol and 
Lyles, 1985), we understand organizational learning in this study as the acquisition of new 
5  ‘Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority’.
6  If we mention ‘NVWA’ in this article, we refer to either the NVWA itself or one of its predecessors.
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knowledge and the translation of this knowledge into more effective organizational action. 
Using a structured single case study design (Yin, 2014), we studied the learning process 
of the NVWA from crises in the past two decades, by tracing back the factors behind the 
lessons learned (see Blatter and Haverland, 2012). In this period, the NVWA (or one of its 
predecessors) was faced with outbreaks of the classical swine fever (1997– 1998), the foot-
and-mouth disease (2001), the avian influenza in (2003) and the Q fever (2007–2010). The 
NVWA is a relevant object of study because it can be viewed as a ‘positive’ case due to the 
extensive learning it accomplished, the special authorities and responsibilities it holds in 
the Netherlands regarding the management of veterinary crises and the exceptional fact of 
having faced multiple crises in the past decades. We used data from internal and external 
crisis management documents – evaluation reports, emergency action plans, crisis protocols 
and internal memos – as a basis for 17 in-depth interviews with key experts in the crisis 
management division of the NVWA. Taking an explorative approach, we used general 
insights from the literature as a starting point, yet led the experts indicate how learning 
manifested itself and what factors influenced the process and how.
We will start with a description of useful insights from the literature on organizational 
learning, the link between crisis management and learning and general insights on 
concepts related to the process of learning from crises. We describe the context of the crisis 
management in the field of food and consumer safety and animal health in the Netherlands, 
followed by an explanation of the research design including our choice of the NVWA as an 
object of study, and a brief discussion of the four major veterinary crises investigated. We 
then discuss the factors we found that affect learning from crisis in the NVWA and end with 
a discussion of the findings.
2.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.3.1 Organizational learning processes
Although the concept of organizational learning has been studied extensively (cf. Argote, 
2013; Easterby-Smith et al., 2011), so far no generally accepted definition or framework has 
been developed. Organizational learning is defined and measured in many different ways 
(see Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Crossan et al., 1999; Howlett et al., 2009). We argue that the 
many perspectives on learning by organizations [e.g., ‘lesson drawing’ (Rose, 1991), ‘policy 
learning’ (May, 1992), ‘goal-based learning’ (Moynihan, 2005)] inherently boil down to the 
same core mechanisms. Some scholars understand learning as a cognitive process, while 
others see it merely as an action process. Following the approach of Fiol et al. (1985), who 
recognize both a cognitive and an action dimension, we define organizational learning as 
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the acquisition of new knowledge and the translation of this knowledge into more effective 
organizational action.
The concept of organizational learning is to some extent metaphorical because it is only 
individuals within organizations that have the cognitive capability to draw lessons, and 
not organizations as such (Sabatier, 1987). Linking individual learning to an organizational 
setting, we see that several important learning processes come at play that are related to 
communication, which are discussed by Huber (1991). First, after new knowledge has been 
acquired, it needs to be ‘distributed’ through the organization. Distribution of information 
is important, as ‘organizations often do not know what they know’ (1991, p. 100). Multiple 
studies show that within an organization, groups play an important role in the distribution of 
knowledge between individuals (see Argote, 2013; Crossan et al., 1999). Second, through the 
process of ‘interpretation’, individuals within an organization create a shared understanding 
of information. Finally, through ‘organizational memory’, new knowledge can be embedded 
in the organization, so that it can be retrieved when needed (see Argote, 2013; Levitt and 
March, 1988). 
In the literature, organizational learning has been demonstrated in many different ways: 
as changes in beliefs, ideas, culture, policies, knowledge, procedures, routines, structures, 
protocols, legislation and behavior (Bennett et al., 1992; Carley and Harrald, 1997). Taking 
an instrumental and open approach here, we do not exclude any of these in advance, but 
take into account those aspects that are perceived as representing learning by the employees 
of the organization studied. We will now link organizational learning to a crisis context, 
which brings in a new dimension. Or, as Moynihan explains, ‘the topic of learning during 
crises [also] needs special attention because it is different from learning in routine situations’ 
(2008, p. 350).
2.3.2 Learning as a challenge in crisis management
In the crisis management literature, organizational learning is generally viewed as one 
of the central processes as well as challenges in crisis management. Through learning, an 
organization can enhance its crisis management capabilities and build resilience (Crichton et 
al., 2009). Public organizations generally experience long periods of stability or incremental 
change, which are suddenly interrupted by unsettling events that create opportunities for 
major change (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 2014). Typically, crises – situations 
of high uncertainty and urgency, in which the vital interests of a society are under threat 
(see Rosenthal et al., 2001) – function as a trigger for organizational change. Because change 
is a central part of the concept of organizational learning, in theory, crises can be major 
initiators for learning as well. People also expect public organizations to learn from crises 
in order to safeguard them from future disaster. In theory, learning from a crisis is a rather 
straightforward process: the causes of the crisis event are revealed through evaluation, after 
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which flaws are addressed by the implementation of changes in the organization (Birkland, 
2006). Learning following a crisis, for example through readjustments in culture (Turner, 1978), 
leads to improved management processes within the organization. Improved management 
processes subsequently make an organization less vulnerable for the incubation of crisis – 
the process through which an incident evolves into a crisis (Turner, 1976; 1978). In theory, 
through a continuous process of learning from errors, a ‘high-reliability organization’ could 
be created – an ideal type of organization carrying out vital tasks in society that is resilient 
to crises as it adapts quickly to changes in a complex environment (see Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001). 
However, as Smith and Elliott explain, ‘despite contrary evidence, an underlying 
assumption of many studies is that organizational learning tends to follow a crisis’ (2007, 
p. 519). In reality, public organizations are found to experience major problems with crisis-
induced learning and often fail to learn (see Deverell, 2009; Elliott, 2009; Roux-Dufort, 
2000; Stern, 1997). Learning in the context of a crisis is an inherently complex affair for 
several main reasons. First, social and technological systems in modern society are complex 
and tightly coupled, which makes it hard to obtain a comprehensive view of potential causes 
of incidents (see Sagan, 1993). Second, crises are uncommon and highly unique occasions, as 
consequences of a contingent combination of events, which makes drawing general lessons 
difficult (see Crichton et al., 2009). Third, crises happen unexpectedly and are often largely 
unpredictable, so that it is difficult to prepare for them through adopting organizational 
changes. Finally, the evaluation of ‘latent’ crises – events with a potential of disaster that 
have turned out well or have been prevented from happening – is rather problematic as one 
does not know how events would have developed, although important as regards learning. 
Having outlined the key challenges of learning from crises and related characteristics of 
the process, we will now discuss what insights the literature offers on the potential factors 
affecting learning from crises.
2.3.3 Concepts related to crisis-induced learning
As discussed earlier, studies that have a main focus on organizational learning, explicitly 
addressing learning in a crisis context, are scarce and the factors that drive the process 
are as yet unclear (Deverell, 2009; Smith et al., 2007). However, the literature on public 
administration and management, particularly the streams of crisis management and 
organizational learning, do provide useful insights into factors that are potentially related 
to the crisis-induced learning process. In the current literature, we can distinguish the 
following seven broadly defined factors, that we used as theoretical background for our 
study and as a point of departure to formulate sensitizing concepts for the empirical data 
collection.
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Politicization 
Crises can become intensely politicized in a short time frame. Because the political stakes are 
high, various kinds of stakeholders struggle to push through their interests. Several studies 
suggest that politicization is an important factor influencing the organizational learning 
process (Dekker et al., 2004; Stern, 1997). However, what exact role politicization plays 
remains unclear, because both positive and negative roles are attributed to it (Broekema, 
2016). On the one hand, politicization puts pressure on an organization to adopt lessons 
from a crisis. On the other hand, because actors involved struggle over different interests 
through blaming and framing (Brändström and Kuipers, 2003), a situation is made more 
complex so that distracting clear crisis lessons becomes increasingly difficult (Boin et al., 
2008). In addition, political pressure creates an incentive for an organization to (quickly) 
adopt changes that are not firmly based on increased knowledge and thorough reflection and 
therefore reflect mere change rather than ‘real’ learning (see Broekema, 2016; May, 1992).
Shared sense-making (of what lessons to learn) 
Crisis can be seen as a social phenomenon strongly related to people’s perceptions of events. 
Typically, after a crisis, multiple interpretations circulate on what happened, the causes 
of the events, questions of responsibility and what lessons should be learned (see Olson, 
2000). Crises create a strong sense of chaos, disrupting people from their regular day-to-day 
routines (Torenvlied et al., 2015). ‘Sense-making’ is a central part of the process of returning 
to normality again, as meaning is given to events and a shared understanding is created 
(Boin et al., 2005; Weick, 1995). In this process, stories, emotions and symbols play a central 
role (see ’t Hart, 1993). Due to cognitive limitations, people are bounded in understanding 
the full complexity of the events. The many interpretations that circulate in the media 
together with large streams of subjective and ambivalent information make it difficult to 
formulate concrete crisis lessons (Dekker et al., 2004). A shared understanding of the causes 
of events and what changes should be made to prevent future crises might facilitate the 
effective implementation of crisis lessons.
Organizational culture 
In the literature, the culture of an organization is often related to organizational learning 
and crisis management (e.g., Reason, 1997; Turner, 1978; Wang, 2008). As outlined earlier, 
organizational learning largely takes place in groups of individuals. Shared ideas, values and 
norms influence the communication between individuals and hence the dissemination of 
knowledge (Huber, 1991). In a safe and open environment without any fear of blame, people 
are more willing to admit errors. In a safety culture, in which there is strong commitment 
to learning, people focus on detecting and communicating of errors (Weick et al., 2001). In 
particular, in times of chaos and stress, an informal culture with close personal ties might 
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contribute to an adequate exchange of knowledge. A reinforcing culture that motivates 
people to improve and innovate encourages people to acquire knowledge and actually 
implement changes (see Argote, 2013). Schein refers to this as the ‘learning culture’, in which 
‘members must hold the shared assumption that learning is a good thing worth investing 
in’ (2010, p. 366). However, a strong organizational culture can also be less open to change, 
for example because it increases a risk of group think, which limits a critical reflection of 
deviating information and viewpoints.
Organizational structure 
The structure of an organization generates the conditions in which learning can take place 
(Fiol et al., 1985). The capacity of an organization delimits the opportunity to actually 
acquire knowledge and implement changes based on that knowledge. The decision-making 
structures determine how an organization responds to drastic changes in the external 
environment (see Fiol et al., 1985). To accomplish learning, an organization needs to have 
sufficient capacity. Structuring processes, for example adopted in protocols and plans, can 
facilitate learning because they encourage people to take part in learning processes such as 
exchanging information (see Moynihan, 2009). At the same time, protocols can also inhibit 
learning, because learning from crisis requires change in regular behavior and flexibility 
(see Gilpin and Murphy, 2008), while people often have difficulties with departing from 
protocols. Lagadec (1997) explains that structured debriefing meetings and simulations 
contribute to reflection on events and to crisis preparation.
Stage in crisis management 
Crisis management models distinguish different stages in crisis management in which 
different processes take place, approaching crisis management as a cyclical process (cf. 
Smith, 1990; Veil, 2011). In the crisis response stage, the operational response to the crisis is 
organized, while in the revision stage, it is looked back on what went wrong, how and what 
changes are to be made (Coombs, 2012). In these different stages of crisis management, an 
organization can have different aims of learning, either prevention or response (Deverell, 
2009). Moynihan (2008) distinguishes between intercrisis learning, that is learning from 
one crisis in order to prevent or more effectively respond to a next one, and intracrisis 
learning, that is aimed at improving the crisis response activities during the actual crisis. 
Learning during a crisis is generally considered a much more challenging process than 
learning post hoc, because of the complexities of crisis dynamics such as time limitation, 
political pressure, chaos and media scrutiny.
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Post-crisis evaluation reports 
Many studies point to post-crisis evaluations as playing an important role in the crisis-
induced learning process (e.g., Elliott, 2009; Turner, 1976). From a technical perspective on 
learning (commonly adopted, especially in early studies on learning), evaluation studies 
are essential to learning, as they are the means through which an organization acquires 
feedback on previous actions (Howlett et al., 2009). The rationale is that public inquiries 
reveal the causes of a crisis and the flaws in the organization, which can then be addressed 
by implementing changes. However, many scholars are critical of the actual role of post-
crisis evaluation reports in the learning process, often emphasizing political influences 
and context (e.g., Birkland, 2009; Elliott and McGuinness, 2002). Furthermore, post-crisis 
evaluation reports are found to vary widely in such respects as design, standards and 
evaluation organization.
Crisis leadership
Finally, leadership is related to crisis-induced learning through the prominent role public 
leaders have in crisis management, especially during a crisis (Boin and ’t Hart, 2003; Boin 
et al., 2005). In an organization, public managers decide what to focus on in the learning 
process, who is involved and what interventions are taken at what specific time (Crossan et 
al., 2011: 452–453). Leaders committed to learning can have an encouraging role and provide 
the conditions for people to learn (Schein, 2010). They can provide vision and establish 
contacts between people from different parts of the organization. Instead of being focused on 
learning, during and after a crisis, public leaders can also get caught up in political aspects of 
the crisis such as the struggle over accountability and responsibility (Boin et al., 2003, 2008). 
We now provide some fundamental background information on the Dutch food safety 
services’ crisis management organization, which in the Netherlands is nationally entrusted 
with crisis management tasks in relation to animal disease outbreaks, and which served as 
the case to explore the factors that drive organizational learning from crises.
2.4 THE NETHERLANDS FOOD AND CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 
AUTHORITY AS A CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION 
Intensive livestock breeding in the Netherlands covers a relatively large share of the national 
economy compared to other countries and is heavily entwined with other parts of the Dutch 
economy. Despite its small territory, the Netherlands is the largest exporter of live animals 
in Europe, and one of the largest in the world, with more than 40,000 livestock breeders 
in the country and more than 12 million pigs alone (CBS, 2016). The Netherlands Food 
and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA) is a government agency operating for 
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the Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ) and the Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and 
Sports. The NVWA is responsible for monitoring the safety of food and consumer products, 
safeguarding the health of animals and plants, animal welfare and nature legislation in 
the Netherlands. The main tasks of the NVWA are supervision, risk assessment and risk 
communication regarding these aspects (NVWA, 2014). 
Every year, the NVWA has to deal with multiple incidents that threaten the safety of 
food and consumer products or the health of animals and plants, and typically have the 
potential to quickly arouse intense public attention and debate. Recent examples are the 
bluetongue outbreak in 2006–2008, the E. coli outbreak in 2011 and the horse meat affair 
in 2013, all classified as ‘incidents’ by the NVWA. The NVWA’s Incident and Crisis Centre 
(NVIC) – part of the Veterinary and Import Division – is entrusted with incident and 
crisis management tasks related to notifiable animal diseases. The NVIC is tasked with 
the coordination of the first response to animal disease notifications and the prevention, 
preparation, risk assessment and handling of suspected outbreaks. In addition, the NVIC 
provides support regarding serious incidents in other areas under the NVWA umbrella 
(NVWA, 2014). The NVIC has a permanent staff of 16 experts and is led by the Chief 
Veterinary Inspector (CVI). It is a matrix organization that in times of crisis recruits the 
vast majority of its manpower from other sections of the NVWA. The NVIC can draw upon 
60 specialized animal disease experts, which are all official veterinarians. When a suspected 
case of a notifiable animal disease is reported, a trained ‘expert team’ – consisting of an 
animal disease expert, a veterinarian of the GD Animal Health7 and the private veterinarian 
– is sent to the location for investigation. Subsequently, if the notifiable disease is confirmed, 
the operational response in the first three days of an outbreak is handled by what are called 
the ‘front teams’. Each of the 16 front teams available consists of six people from different 
divisions of the NVWA: one coordinating veterinarian, one veterinarian, one assistant to 
the veterinarian, one health and safety worker, one administrator and one enforcer. Before 
and during a veterinary crisis, the NVWA/NVIC works within a large network of public, 
semi-public and private actors at different administrative levels, such as mayors (local), the 
Public Health Services (‘GGD’) (regional), agricultural interest groups, such as ‘LTO’, and 
the National Institute for Public Health and Environmental Protection (‘RIVM’) (national), 
the SCoPAFF8 and the European Food Safety Authority (‘EFSA’) (EU), and the World 
Organization for Animal Health (‘OIE’) (global) (FVO, 2013; NVIC, 2014).
7  Gezondheidsdienst voor Dieren (Dutch animal health services).
8  Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed, formerly known as SCoFCAH.
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2.5 METHODS
In this study, we used a structured single case study design (Yin, 2014), taking a causal-
process tracing approach (Blatter et al., 2012) to qualitatively study the NVWA’s learning 
regarding crisis management in response to veterinary crises. We conducted an explorative 
study into the factors that affect organizational learning from crises. Although we used 
the literature as a general basis for understanding related concepts and potential factors of 
influence, the empirical data were the leading element in our study (see Dubois and Gadde, 
2002). We concluded the analysis by aligning the empirical results with theoretical insights, 
approaching it as an iterative process (Dubois et al., 2002; Yin, 2014). An in-depth case study 
design was chosen to do justice to the complexity of the process of organizational learning 
in relation to crisis, with (potentially) multiple factors at play which are strongly embedded 
in the specific crisis contexts. 
We selected NVWA’s crisis management organization as our object of study on the basis 
of several criteria. First, we identified the NVWA as an exceptional or ‘positive’ case. Blatter 
and Haverland explain that ‘in the ideal-typical form of the CPT [causal-process tracing 
approach], those cases that show a strong positive result with respect to the outcome of 
interest are selected’ (2012, p. 25). This approach is intended to reveal what factors (X) made 
outcome (Y) occur. Contrary to the usual situation reflected in the recent studies discussed 
earlier, the NVWA seems to have learned extensively from crises in the past decades. On 
EU level, the FVO [Food and Veterinary Office]9 evaluated the NVWA crisis management 
organization in relation to animal health very positively: ‘the competent authorities are 
well prepared for handling minor and major outbreaks of epizootic diseases’ (2013, p. 16), 
and many aspects of the NVWA crisis management organization are used as ‘best practice’ 
among food safety services of other member states10 (FVO, 2013, 2014). Second, the NVWA 
provides a unique opportunity to analyze organizational learning behavior in relation to 
different crises for one and the same organization. Rarely does an organization have to face 
as many large crises as the NVWA did. Third, the NVWA holds important authorities and 
autonomy specifically regarding the crisis management of outbreaks of animal diseases in 
the Netherlands. Part of the organization is continuously active in preventing, preparing 
for, responding to and evaluating incidents and crises. Finally, the NVWA as a case provides 
rich empirical insights into the dynamics of a crisis management organization in the 
food safety sector, a type of ‘high-reliability organization’ – facing dozens of incidents a 
year that potentially have devastating societal consequences – that is not studied often. 
Generally, primary data from this sort of organization are available on only a very limited 
9  Currently the DG Health and Food Safety. As part of the Health and Consumers Directorate-General of the 
European Commission.
10  Based on the conclusions from FVO audits.
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scale.11 Within the NVWA, we focused on the crisis management organization including 
the ‘NVWA Incident and Crisis Centre’ (NVIC), responsible for crisis management tasks 
in the field of food and consumer safety and animal health on a daily basis. As cases for 
analysis, we selected those crises that (1) were officially announced by the government as 
‘crisis’, that is with a large-scale societal impact in the Netherlands, (2) concerned animal 
disease outbreaks and (3) took place after 1995. The four crises that meet these criteria are 
the outbreaks of classical swine fever in 1997– 1998, foot-and-mouth disease in 2001, avian 
influenza in 2003 and Q fever from 2007 to 2010. 
The primary data for this study were derived from 17 in-depth semi-structured interviews 
with ‘key experts’ in the NVWA crisis management organization: senior (veterinary) 
inspectors working at the NVIC or in the front teams. We selected employees for interviews 
on the basis of their organizational function, level and involvement in the crisis response 
for at least two of the four crises analyzed. We interviewed seven front-line workers, six 
operational managers12 and four managers (see Table 2.1). Each interview was conducted 
by two researchers, lasted between an hour and an hour and a half, and was recorded 
and transcribed. At the start of the research project, a working protocol was established, 
including agreements with the NVWA regarding confidentiality, of which we informed the 
interviewee at the beginning of each interview. Two senior officials of the NVWA checked a 
draft version of this article for factual inaccuracies. 
Our knowledge base for the in-depth interviews was secondary data from internal and 
external documents: crisis handbooks, emergency action plans, crisis protocols, internal 
memos, crisis evaluation reports and general reports (see Table 2.1). We questioned each 
respondent on the crisis lessons learned by the NVWA and the factors that he or she thought 
induced these lessons. As a point of departure, we used the broad categories distilled from 
the literature, as discussed in the theory section, treating the main concepts as ‘sensitizing 
concepts’ (Van den Hoonaard, 1997), but let the empirical data define them. We used latent 
content analysis and coded the interview transcriptions per sentence on (1) interviewee, 
(2) topic of crisis lesson, (3) crisis context and (4) factor categories: ‘politicization’, ‘shared 
sense-making’, ‘organizational culture’, ‘organizational structure’, ‘crisis management stage’, 
‘post-crisis evaluation reports’, ‘leadership’ and ‘other’. In a second round of coding, we 
recoded the data in new categories that better fit the empirical data: ‘political–economic 
context’, ‘social–emotional understanding’ and ‘organizational forgetting’ emerged. The 
coding was done by one researcher, and coding was discussed within the research team in 
cases of doubt. Note that we did not aim to ‘measure’ any ‘effects’, but to provide a first 
insight into the factors that drive organizational learning from crises.
11  Because the researchers were part of a long-term research project (2011–2016) at the NVWA, they had a 
unique access to internal data.
12  Within the organization called ‘operational crisis consultants’.
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Table 2.1 Data collection




7 Senior (veterinary) inspectors; senior inspector who is front team coordinator; 
(veterinary) inspectors who are front team members
Operational 
management
6 Crisis coordinator NVWA; senior policy advisor; senior staff members NVIC; 
senior veterinary officer
Management 4 Chief veterinary inspector; deputy chief inspector NVWA; head of NVIC; head 




Crisis handbooks 3 NVWA handbook for incident and crisis management (2014); Departmental 




4 Policy emergency action plan CSF and ASF (2013); Policy emergency action 
plan FMD (2013); Policy emergency action plan AI, NVWA (2013); Policy 
emergency action plan AI, Ministry of Economic Affairs (2014)
Crisis protocols 3 Emergency action plan handling suspicions of animal diseases and zoonoses, 
NVIC (2014); Emergency action plan AI (2007); NVIC emergency action plan 
animal disease control AI, CSF/AVP and FMD (2014) 




4 CSF evaluation (SEV and D&T, 1998); FMD evaluation (Abbas et al., 2002); AI 
evaluation (Den Boer et al., 2004); QF evaluation (Van Dijk et al., 2010) 
General reports 11 CSF reports (LNV, 1997; Alterra, 2007); FMD reports (LEI, 2002); AI reports 
(Impact, 2004; RIVM, 2004); QF reports (National Ombudsman, 2012; RIVM 
2011; PWC, 2012); Reports on zoonoses (RIVM, 2010); Reports on NVWA 
(FVO, 2013, 2014)
Note: CSF: classical swine fever; FMD: foot-and-mouth disease; AI: avian influenza; QF: Q fever.
2.6 FOUR VETERINARY CRISES IN A ROW 
We studied four crises with a high societal impact: outbreaks of the classical swine fever in 
1997–1998, the foot-and-mouth disease in 2001, the avian influenza in 2003 and the Q fever 
in 2007–2010. 
2.6.1 Classical swine fever crisis, 1997–1998 
The outbreak of the highly infectious classical swine fever (CSF) in the Netherlands between 
February 1997 and May 1998 (end of the epidemic) had a dramatic social and economic 
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impact in the Netherlands. Thousands of farms were affected by export and transport bans, 
buy-out and take-over measures and culling measures. Four hundred and twenty-nine 
livestock holdings saw their animals culled because these holdings proved to be infected 
and another 1,286 livestock holdings have been culled pre-emptively; in total, more than 
10 million pigs were killed. The crisis took hundreds of thousands of man-hours and cost 
society billions of Dutch guilders (SEV and D&T, 1998). 
2.6.2 Foot-and-mouth disease crisis, 2001 
The foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in the Netherlands between 21 March and 25 June 
2001 had far- reaching social, economic and political consequences. At the end of the foot-
and-mouth disease outbreak, the first time under the European ‘nonvaccination policy’, 
a total of 26 infected holdings had been confirmed. A total of 2,974 holdings were culled 
pre-emptively. Measures taken by the government included a transport ban, an export ban, 
suppressive vaccinations and culling of livestock holdings. Around 270,000 (cloven-hoofed) 
animals were culled on infected farms or pre-emptively, of which almost 200,000 had been 
vaccinated. Another 119,000 animals were culled for welfare reasons. The total economic 
damage of the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak was estimated at 900 million euros. The 
large-scale culling of healthy animals met with enormous resistance in society, especially 
among farmer communities. In the farmer village of Kootwijkerbroek, emotions became so 
tense that three officials were held as hostages by farmers and the riot police was needed to 
restore order (Abbas et al., 2002). 
2.6.3 (highly pathogenic) Avian influenza crisis, 2003
Avian influenza – also known as bird flu – had broken out in the Netherlands for the last time 
in 1926. In subsequent decades, it occurred in Europe in the United Kingdom, Germany and 
Italy. In February 2003, an outbreak of the highly pathogenic avian influenza variant hit the 
Netherlands, and lasted until August of that year. This avian influenza crisis had a large-scale 
social and economic impact in the Netherlands. A total of around thirty million animals – 
30% of all poultry in the Netherlands at that moment – were culled on infected holdings, 
pre-emptively or for welfare reasons. This involved more than 1,400 livestock holdings and 
fifteen thousand small backyard flocks. At 241 locations, the presence of the avian influenza 
virus was confirmed. Measures taken by the government were a transport ban, an export 
ban, mandatory indoor housing of poultry and a ban on gatherings of poultry. On 17 April 
2003, a veterinarian active during the crisis died as a consequence of the virus. The costs of 
the crisis were estimated at 270 million euros, with the economic damage at another several 
hundred million (Den Boer et al., 2004).
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2.6.4 Q fever crisis, 2007–2010
The outbreak of Q fever in the Netherlands in the period of 2007 until the summer of 2010 
– the greatest Q fever epidemic in the world until today – had a dramatic impact on Dutch 
society, both socially and politically. The Q fever is a zoonotic disease which means that it is 
contagious from animals to humans. The government decided to cull 62,500 pregnant goats 
and sheep at 88 holdings in an attempt to contain the disease. Other measures taken included 
the vaccination of goats, a transport ban for infected holdings and hygiene regulations for 
the whole goat sector (Van Dijk et al., 2010). Over the period 2007 until 2010, around 4,000 
infections of humans were reported, and a registered 19 people died as a result of the disease 
(RIVM, 2016).
2.7 ANALYSIS: FACTORS DRIVING LEARNING
We found that the NVWA has learned many lessons in the field of crisis management since 
the outbreak of classical swine fever in 1997. These relate to external communication (with 
farmers, the livestock sector, the public), work safety (protective equipment, psychological 
care, vaccination, working hours), organizational structure (centralization, establishing 
an incident and crisis centre, front teams), cooperation with other parties (public/private 
experts), organizational routines (crisis protocols, culling and rendering methods, education 
and training programs), public safety (hygiene measures, intake of used materials) and 
animal welfare (culling methods, inspections in the sector). We identified six key factors 
that drove the learning of these lessons, shown in Table 2.2. Below, we discuss each of these 
factors in more detail.
2.7.1 Political–economic context
The NVWA’s learning from crises is strongly affected by its political–economic context, 
more specifically political pressure and budget cuts. The experts explain that political 
pressure works in two directions. On the one hand, politics, as the higher authority, puts 
pressure on the NVWA to actually draw crisis lessons. As an expert explains, ‘if you do 
not learn lessons, you will quickly receive a hundred parliamentary questions’.13 Political 
attention is needed if decisions for change are to be taken and to obtain the means and 
capacity for implementation. On the other hand, political pressure can prevent lessons from 
being incorporated or lead to changes that do not reflect learning. An expert explains that 
in the Q fever crisis, because of its controversial nature, politics opted quickly for large-scale 
destruction of animals, despite the recommendation of the NVWA to adopt a vaccination 
policy partly on the basis of experiences from previous crises. They also mention political 
interests of the large farming economical sector in cases inhibiting learning.
13  All interview quotes were translated from Dutch.
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The experts identify the drastic budget cut by the EU after the swine fever crisis 
(1997–1998) as a major breakthrough for learning by the NVWA, functioning as a basis 
for most lessons learned afterwards. The European Commission decided to cut the Dutch 
government’s compensation budget for the crisis by about 100 million euros, largely for not 
having adequately archived their actions and for working with inadequate and outdated crisis 
protocols. This received heightened political attention and criticism at national level. The 
immediate result was that the Dutch food safety authority learned extensively. It completely 
renewed its crisis protocols and set up an adequate archiving system. As a result of these 
improvements, the European Commission was much milder on the NVWA’s response in 
the foot-and-mouth disease crisis in 2001, hardly cutting the budget for the Netherlands. 
Finally, in relation to budget issues, the experts also note that austerity cabinets make it 
financially hard to implement changes in the organization.
Table 2.2 Key factors found to drive organizational learning from crisis and their aspects
External Political–economic context Social–emotional understanding
1. Political pressure
Political attention, decision-making 
authority, political–economic interests
2. Budget cuts
Budget cuts (e.g., the drastic cut from the 
EU after the classical swine fever crisis), 
austerity cabinets 
1. Social–emotional events
Specific social–emotional events (e.g., riots 
in Kootwijkerbroek in the foot-and-mouth 
disease crisis; the death of a veterinarian in 




Internal Organizational culture Organizational structure
1. Intercollegial relations
Open atmosphere, mutual trust, personal 
contacts, discussion, consensus on crisis 
lessons 
2. Motivation 
Intrinsic motivation, pride in working for 
the team, challenge, professionalism
1. Structure of organization 
Capacity, crisis management division 
(creation of NVIC and structure of front 
teams), limited team size, reorganizations 
2. Structuring processes 
Crisis protocols, training and education 
programs, post-crisis evaluations 
Process-
related
Stage in crisis management Organizational forgetting
1. Crisis cycle 
Crisis response stage vs. post-crisis 
revision stage 
2. Sequence of events 
Recurrence, incrementality, fine-tuning 
(e.g., working hours, destruction methods, 
improvements of crisis protocols) 
1. Outflow of expertise 
Retirement, reorganizations, forgetting 
2. Retaining of knowledge 
Crisis experience, knowledge 
dissemination, protocols, training, 
simulations 
2
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2.7.2 Social–emotional understanding
A number of events had a large social–emotional impact on the public and on employees in 
the NVWA, which led to the adoption of large-scale improvements. All the experts point to 
the dramatic events that took place in the farming village of Kootwijkerbroek in 2001 during 
the foot-and-mouth disease crisis. Angry farmers, not agreeing with NVWA measures, 
used violence against veterinary inspectors, taking some of them hostage and hanging 
dead animals, with the names of crisis managers on them, from trees. The anti-riot police 
were called in to restore order. For NVWA inspectors, the events were a social–emotional 
drama; they experienced it ‘no longer as a crisis, but war’. Even though the riots happened 
a long time ago, the events are still fresh in the minds of team members. ‘Kootwijkerbroek’, 
as the experts refer to the events, directly led to drastic improvements in the NVWA’s 
external communication to the public in general and specifically to farmers. Farmers were 
kept informed, during a crisis but also already in noncrisis time, employees were trained 
in communication with farmers, and spokespersons for the media were installed. In 
addition, the NVWA showed it had directly learned from ‘Kootwijkerbroek’ by introducing 
psychological support for its workers. Another social– emotional event that led to learning 
on the part of the NVWA was the death of a veterinarian during the avian influenza crisis as 
a direct result of the virus. This event led to improvements in the field of personal safety. The 
organization developed the use of personal protective equipment such as protection suits 
and masks and, already during the crisis, the NVWA started providing antiviral drugs and 
carrying out vaccinations of team members in the field.
Media attention increases the impact of social–emotional events by magnifying emotions 
and involving the wider public. During the Q fever crisis, not only the preventive culling of 
large numbers of healthy pregnant animals but especially the many human victims received 
extensive media coverage. An expert explains that the extensive media attention for the 
issue of public health contributed to the NVWA closing an agreement of cooperation with 
the Public Health Services (‘GGD’) and including them in their crisis management plans, in 
order to effectively involve their expertise and cooperate with them in times of crisis. 
2.7.3 Organizational culture 
Intercollegial relations function as a condition for sharing information and knowledge within 
the organization. The experts explain that an open atmosphere within the team facilitates 
internal communication through exchange of information and openness about mistakes 
made. Good personal contacts, where ‘almost everybody in the team of around 100–120 
people [in the front teams] knows everybody else personally’ and the team ‘is functioning 
like a real family’, create a climate of mutual trust and a feeling of companionship which 
are felt to be essential for organizational learning. In an environment of trust, crisis events 
can be discussed openly, also across different levels of the organization. In this respect, 
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the respondents emphasize the importance of meetings, both formal (e.g., training) and 
informal.
The experts also point out that the high motivation of employees in the crisis organization 
means that much effort is put into learning processes to improve the organization’s 
performance. The experts explain that members of the crisis management team have an 
intrinsic drive towards increasing their knowledge and doing things better, and relate this 
to the fact that only highly motivated and competent people are selected from other parts 
of the organization, which creates professionalism. People sign up for the front teams on 
their own initiative and work on a voluntarily basis, getting paid only for their extra hours 
during crises. They are therefore proud to work in the crisis management team, which holds 
a high status within the NVWA. To stimulate motivation and challenge employees to learn, 
trainings and simulations provided by the NVWA are considered important.
2.7.4 Organizational structure
As regards the structure of the organization, the presence of a crisis management division 
and the human and financial capacity make it possible that time and effort are spent on 
evaluation and drawing lessons. With the establishment of the NVIC in 2003, a team was 
created that deals with crisis management tasks full-on. An expert explains that this allowed 
the implementation of larger changes and hence more extensive learning. Expertise was 
built to enable people to actually draw lessons and retain these within the organization. At 
the same time, experts point to the downside of a large team size: it makes the dissemination 
of knowledge through the team more challenging, especially because personal contacts are 
weakened. Also, reorganizations are felt to be disastrous for learning, because replacing 
people makes them preoccupied with getting used to their new tasks and role in the team 
and disrupts the learning culture.
We found structuring processes in the organization to shape behavior in such a way 
that learning processes can actually take place. Employees in the crisis management 
organization need to follow crisis protocols that were established and adjusted in the course 
of the different crises. Since the avian influenza crisis, the NVWA has installed general 
crisis protocols besides disease-specific ones. The protocols affect learning, for example 
because they include a debriefing–briefing principle: during a crisis, at the end of every 
day, team members meet and share their experiences with other team members and team 
leaders (debriefing). This principle ensures that lessons are drawn and communicated to 
the management level, which can then carry through changes in the crisis response for the 
following day (briefing). At the same time, however, experts explain that crisis protocols can 
also inhibit learning, because people are less inclined to alter their behavior if the situation 
requires it. Crises typically demand a quick adaptation to unexpected circumstances that 
can hardly be included in protocols. Since the avian influenza crisis, the learning process 
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has been stimulated by another structuring process: the training and education program 
provided by the crisis centre.14 Team members learn the theory on specific animal diseases 
through lectures from external experts, making them better prepared for an outbreak. On 
training days, team members work on solving a practical problem in a simulation setting, 
learning by experience and feedback, so that crisis response actions are improved.
2.7.5 Stage in crisis management
In the response stage of the crisis cycle, when the crisis response activities take place, there is 
a great urgency for the organization to optimize its actions, because during this period, the 
consequences of the crisis can still be contained. This urgency has stimulated the NVWA 
to quickly adapt its response to the crisis events in order to restore normality as quickly 
as possible. An expert explains: ‘We start learning from the first day of the crisis onward’. 
Lessons learned during a crisis are focused on improvements of actions during that crisis. 
Because of the urgency, lessons are generally not institutionalized within the organization 
during a crisis. In the post-crisis revision stage, when normality has been restored, there is 
time for reflection and more structural changes can be implemented, such as changes in 
protocols. For example, the NVIC needed a quiet period to sign contracts15 with around 
15 external specialist parties for their support in crisis time. In this way, external expertise 
and capacity – ranging from a catering company and a disinfection service, to assistance in 
catching the fowl for culling – can be deployed quickly at the crisis location, which improves 
the crisis response and reduces the costs. In the revision stage, learning is focused not only 
on the response but also on the prevention of future crises. The ‘scarce times of calm between 
crises’, that is what the team members often call ‘peacetime’, are essential to reflect on events 
and incorporate lessons for the longer term. At the same time, paradoxically, if lessons are 
to be learned, the crisis events should not be too long ago and still fresh in the minds; as an 
expert explains, ‘learning from crisis is striking while the iron is [still] hot’.
Most extensive lessons learned by the NVWA have required a specific sequence of events 
and recurrence of urgency to be fully adopted. Crisis lessons are often learned incrementally 
over time, through a process of adapting, fine-tuning and ripening over different crises. In 
the classical swine fever, crisis members of the crisis team made long working hours, from 
early morning till late at night for several weeks. Exhaustion regularly led to safety incidents. 
In the foot-and-mouth disease crisis, the working hours were improved; they were further 
refined in the avian influenza crisis when a rotation system for both team members and team 
leaders was introduced; and even further improved in the Q fever crisis, when stricter rules 
were set and the substitution of complete teams was introduced. Another example regards 
the animal culling methods. In the swine fever crisis, the culling and disposal process was 
14  Three days a year for the animal disease experts; one day a year for front team members.
15  Convenants.
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perceived as suboptimal, because initially there was no clarity about the culling method 
and there were not enough vehicles to transport the carcasses. One expert explains about 
the initial situation: ‘We had to cull around two hundred thousand animals, but we had no 
exact idea how to do that yet’. In the avian influenza crisis, culling methods were gradually 
improved, but the disposal of carcasses was not considered efficient yet. In the Q fever crisis, 
although having to handle different numbers of animals16 and the major improvements 
were made by now, the NVWA further adjusted lessons regarding the culling and disposal 
process.
2.7.6 Organizational forgetting
Finally, the experts point to organizational forgetting, that is the outflow of crisis expertise 
and experience, as an important factor affecting organizational learning. Retaining and 
disseminating knowledge and experience within the organization are considered crucial 
if the NVWA is to learn over a longer period of time. If knowledge acquired in some parts 
of the organization is lost, it means that organizational changes will not be implemented 
either. People with expertise, knowledge and skills acquired from previous crises are needed 
to be capable of drawing lessons in the first place. Experienced team members leaving the 
organization (often through retirement), as well as reorganizations, induce organizational 
forgetting. It is particularly the older team members who have been involved in multiple 
crises, often in different roles. The experts explain that most crisis lessons are stored in the 
brains of specific people. An expert explains ‘there is just so much experience; it is terrifying, 
because these people are also getting older’. Retirement creates the main knowledge drain 
from the organization. Also, when people are placed in other divisions, group learning 
structures are affected. When responding to the outbreak of classical swine fever in 1997–
1998, for example, the crisis management team lacked the knowledge of experts who had 
experienced the earlier swine fever outbreak. After the earlier swine fever crisis, the team 
members went quickly back to their regular work and did not come together anymore 
to share their knowledge. Also, meanwhile experts had left the organization. An expert 
explains that, as a consequence, some important knowledge needed during the foot-and-
mouth disease crisis was not available and ‘the wheel needed to be reinvented again’.
Crisis lessons can be retained within the organization only partially by including them in 
emergency plans and protocols and regularly updating them. The NVWA attempts to forestall 
the process of organizational forgetting by actively sharing knowledge through training, 
exercises and crisis simulations for personnel. Every year, five to 10 young veterinarians are 
newly recruited and receive training so that the lessons are transferred to them. Younger, 
inexperienced personnel is linked to and accompanied by older, experienced team members. 
16  Note that the logistics needed for the culling and disposal process largely differs between the crises due to the 
large differences in number and kind of animals.
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The experts state, however, that crisis lessons can be acquired through training and exercises 
outside crisis time to only a limited extent. For extensive learning, people need to actually 
experience real crisis situations. Paradoxically, for an organization to learn to prevent crises 
and not to forget the lessons learned, crises do need to take place every now and then, or, 
‘knowledge is only built if it is actually used’. An expert explains that if the avian influenza 
broke out now, ‘everything will start working automatically’, due to recent experiences with 
it. In contrast, if classical swine fever or foot-and-mouth-disease broke out now, he/she 
suspects that ‘it would be much more of a hassle to organize the response activities’, as the 
last crises happened much longer ago.
2.7.7 Leadership, post-crisis evaluation reports and a shared sense-making
Remarkably, some concepts from the literature that we discussed as related to the crisis-
induced learning process were not found to play a central role in the case of the NVWA. 
Experts do not explicitly emphasize the role of leadership in the learning process of the 
organization. An expert explains that he/she is not fully aware of the managers’ role in the 
learning processes, because these take place at a different organizational level. A case that 
the experts identified in which the manager directly facilitated learning – by defending 
changes proposed by the NVIC at a higher organizational level – was considered more of a 
political–economic aspect. A plausible explanation for this finding might be related to the 
kind of organization studied, which we will discuss in the Section 7.
The role of public evaluation reports, published after every crisis and carried out by 
an external team of researchers, in the learning process is brought forward as ambiguous 
and limited. The experts explain that the external post-crisis evaluations to a large extent 
serve political purposes, which especially at the operational level is generally considered 
as opposed to learning. One expert explains that when an evaluation report is published, 
most learning in the organization has taken place already, and refers to the reports as ‘too 
little, too late’. At the same time, higher managers and policy advisors used the evaluation 
reports as a ‘checklist’ to see whether important lessons have actually been picked up by 
the organization and to draw attention to issues at a higher – political – level, which can 
be necessary for achieving and legitimizing the larger changes. We saw that attempts had 
been made to learn from reports on different types of crises in other sectors, but this was 
experienced as rather difficult.
Finally, remarkably a shared sense-making of lessons to learn is not explicitly recognized 
by the experts as important in the learning process. At the same time, employees of the 
crisis management organization generally do have similar views on what lessons should be 
learned. The large shared understanding might be related to the strong external pressures 
on the organization from both the public, politics and the sector, the required technical 
expertise for the job and the largely executive tasks of the crisis management team. Within 
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the crisis organization, shared narratives of events and of lessons learned play some role 
in processes of communication and organizational memory. However, the large shared 
understanding in the crisis management organization could also be understood as creating 
a threat of group think.
2.8 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The concept of organizational learning is widely theorized and applied in academic research. 
In view of the increased attention for crisis management, it is remarkable that studies focusing 
on the conditions for learning in relation to crises have so far remained rather scarce. 
Previous research has shown that public sector organizations experience major difficulties 
with learning from crises (c.f. Smith et al., 2007; Stern, 1997; Deverell, 2009; Roux-Dufort, 
2000; Elliott, 2009). In our study, we explored which factors drive organizational learning 
from crises. We applied a structured case study analysis to the Dutch food safety services’ 
response to four veterinary crises, based on empirical data from in-depth interviews with 
key experts within the organization and of crisis management documents.
The NVWA has learned extensively from crises over the past two decades. Major lessons 
were learned in the areas of external communication, cooperation with other parties, work 
safety, organizational structure and routines, public safety and animal welfare. The study 
showed that organizational learning from crises is a highly complex process, in which 
many factors are at play that are often interrelated and of a very different nature. From the 
empirical data, we identified six key factors that drive organizational learning from crises: (1) 
political–economic context, (2) social–emotional understanding, (3) organizational culture, 
(4) organizational structure, (5) crisis management stage and (6) organizational forgetting. 
Remarkably, in this study, we did not find public post-crisis evaluation reports, leadership 
and a shared sense-making of lessons to learn to play a central role.
2.8.1 Discussion of factors
The first two factors political–economic context and social–emotional understanding lead 
in a direct way to the learning of tangible crisis lessons, although – in line with earlier 
findings (Broekema, 2016; Stern, 1997) – we found that in some instances, political pressure 
also blocked the implementation of lessons. This is important as political pressure is typical 
for public sector organizations. The factor social–emotional understanding fits in with crisis 
management literature on the role of psychological aspect such as stories, emotions and 
symbols (e.g., see ’t Hart, 1993). While the first two factors are external initiators of learning, 
the next two factors identified are characteristics of the organization itself. Organizational 
culture and organizational structure function as fundamental conditions for facilitating 
learning within the organization, through enabling direct and positive relations in the 
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team, providing the necessary (professional) capacity and guiding learning behavior. The 
last two factors we identified are process-related. Being aware of the possible importance 
of the crisis management stage (Deverell, 2009; Moynihan, 2009), the data showed that it 
plays an ambiguous role. On the one hand, in the crisis response stage, there is the urge 
and pressure to (quickly) advance to adopting lessons. On the other hand, the organization 
needs the ‘calm’ periods in the revision stage to be able to thoroughly reflect on crisis 
events and implement larger organizational changes. Optimal for learning seems a balance 
between urgency and calm, and, paradoxically, a recurrence of similar crisis issues. Our 
findings support more a view of learning from crisis as a continuous process, rather than 
the idea that ‘organizations responding to disasters learn in leaps – disaster by disaster – 
rather than smoothly over time’ (Carley et al., 1997, p. 107). Finally, we found that a process 
of organizational forgetting, observed by all experts interviewed without exception, plays 
a fundamental role in organizational learning in the longer term. The organization is in 
a constant struggle to prevent the outflow of expertise and to transfer knowledge to the 
right place within the organization. Surprisingly, the process of organizational forgetting 
is discussed only rarely in the literature (important exceptions are De Holan and Phillips, 
2004; Argote, 2013) and studies that address it in a crisis management context seem to be 
absent. Organizational forgetting is closely related to processes of organizational memory 
and knowledge distribution (see Huber, 1991; Levitt et al., 1988). Ironically, to improve its 
crisis management capabilities over the longer term, an organization seems to need crises 
happening.
Remarkably, three other factors that are prominent concepts in crisis management 
literature were not found to play a central role in the process of learning from crises in 
this study. The role of post-crisis evaluation reports in the organizational learning process 
was generally perceived as limited. In some cases, managers used the reports as a checklist 
for lessons learned and to legitimize changes at a political level. Our findings support the 
idea that public post-crisis evaluations largely serve political purposes (see Birkland, 2009; 
Elliott et al., 2002). Furthermore, we saw that it is indeed challenging for organizations to 
adopt lessons from a different sector (Crichton et al., 2009). A shared sense-making of what 
lessons to learn, although strongly present in the crisis management organization, was not 
explicitly brought forward as an important factor in the learning process. Shared narratives 
play some role in communicating and storing crisis lessons. One could argue that a large 
shared understanding creates a threat of group think, which limits a critical discussion of 
deviating information and viewpoints. Remarkably, contrary to what other studies suggest 
(e.g., Crossan et al., 2011; Schein, 2010), in this study leadership was not explicitly brought 
forward as playing a central role in the learning process. This finding might be explained by 
the fact that the experts interviewed are part of a large executive agency, often working in 
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the field during a crisis, meaning that they often have limited insight into the managers’ role 
in learning processes.
2.8.2 Challenges
This study faced two main challenges with regard to its validity. The dependent variable 
organizational learning remains difficult to grasp due to the many interpretations that 
circulate in the literature and the great complexity of the process. Defining learning in a 
different way, for example as mere acquirement of knowledge or as mere organizational 
changes, instead of a combination of the both, could generate completely different results. 
In addition, the concept of learning is inherently susceptible to normative and measurement 
problems (Birkland, 2006, p. 22; Carley and Harrald, 1997; Fiol et al., 1985), due to the fact 
that its definition assumes increased ‘effectiveness’.
This is problematic as goals in the public sector are often complex, diverse and ambiguous 
(Rainey, 2014). This applies even more to the context of a crisis, given the inherent political 
dynamics of the phenomenon (Boin et al., 2005). We aimed to solve this challenge by to 
a large extent letting experts in the field indicate learning and so decrease a potential 
researcher bias. We are nonetheless aware – also because of a potential hindsight bias – that 
we did not ‘measure’ learning in a hard and irrefutable way.
A second challenge is the interrelatedness between factors that influence learning and 
their often ambivalent and indirect roles in the learning process, which creates a risk of 
oversimplification. The outcome of learning can be a factor that in turn influences further 
learning. The budget cut by the EU in 1998, for example, contributed to the founding of 
the NVIC and the creation of front teams. The NVIC and the front teams in turn provided 
learning routines and a capacity to actually be able to learn. The major reorganization in 
2006 indirectly affected learning, as it was perceived by the experts as affecting the learning 
culture by reducing personal ties between people, which in turn influenced the distribution 
of expertise through the organization. Interestingly, organizational culture and structure 
can be factors that facilitate learning, but adjustments in culture and structure can also 
be outcomes of learning (see also Fiol et al., 1985, pp. 804–805). Ambivalent factors, for 
example, are political pressure and crisis protocols, which were found to both facilitate and 
inhibit learning through different mechanisms.
2.8.3 Final remarks
Effective learning from crises is becoming increasingly relevant, given the rising trend in 
number and scope of crises globally. This study provides a framework to serve as a basis for 
further research on the subject. However, more empirical substantiation over more types 
of crises and organizations is needed to further build theory on organizational learning 
from crises. The generalizability of this study might be limited, as we studied one type of 
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organization facing one type of crisis only, which covered a relatively long time span. It 
would be interesting to, for example, study the role of leadership, post-crisis evaluations 
and shared sense-making of lessons to learn in other types of crises with different contexts. 
Furthermore, taking into account the complexity of the issue at hand, such studies should 
clearly distinguish in learning as a cognitive process, as an action process or as a combination 
of the two. Finally, we specifically recommend further study on the process of ‘organizational 
forgetting’ because, while receiving little attention in the literature, it plays a fundamental 
role in long-term organizational learning processes.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research was carried out as part of the Research Program ‘Double Bind’, financed by the 
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (grant number 452-10-001). We thank the 
Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority for its support for the research 
project and providing access to internal data. We would also like to thank René Torenvlied 
and Monique de Jong for their support at different stages of the research process.

Crisis-induced learning and issue 
politicization in the EU: the Braer, 
Sea Empress, Erika, and Prestige oil 
spill disasters
ChAPTER 3
this chapter is single-authored and has been published as: 
Broekema, W. (2016). Crisis-induced learning and issue politici-
zation in the eu: the Braer, Sea empress, erika, and prestige 
oil spill disasters. Public Administration, 94 (2): pp. 381-398.
60 | Chapter 3 learnIng and ISSue polItICIzatIon | 61
3.1 ABSTRACT 
This article explores the relation between issue politicization and crisis-induced learning by 
the EU. We performed a political claims analysis on the political response to the four major 
oil spill disasters that have occurred in European waters since 1993. Political claims that we 
observed in three arenas (mass media, national parliaments, and the European Parliament) 
were compared with recommendations in post-crisis evaluation reports and the EU’s 
legislative responses. For all three political arenas our findings indicate that politicization of 
issues either promotes or impedes crisis-induced EU learning, which points to the existence 
of determining intervening factors. EU legislation that is adopted in response to oil spill 
disasters appears to a large extent grounded in crisis evaluation reports. Characteristics of 
crisis evaluation reports, especially the degree of international focus, seem to offer a more 
plausible explanation for variance in crisis-induced learning outcomes than politicization.
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3.2 INTRODUCTION
On 15 January 1996, the Liberian-registered oil tanker Sea Empress ran aground on the rocks 
at the entrance to Milford Haven, releasing 72,000 tonnes of oil into the sea in the following 
days. Only three years later, on 12 December 1999, a very similar accident occurred in the 
European Atlantic when the Maltese-registered tanker Erika sank due to rough weather 
conditions off the Brittany coast, causing an oil spill of 20,000 tonnes. Both accidents had a 
dramatic long-term environmental, social, and economical transboundary impact (EMSA, 
2004; Wene, 2005). In the aftermath of the Erika disaster the EU achieved major policy 
reforms by adopting the legislative packages Erika I and II (EC, 2003; Wene, 2005). These 
seem to indicate that the European Union has learned substantially from the Erika disaster 
as regards preventing similar events in the future. In contrast, in response to the Sea Empress 
accident only three years earlier, the EU seems not to have drawn major lessons: no legislative 
package was adopted (Krämer, 2007). This difference in learning outcomes is quite remarkable 
given the great similarity of location, events, and consequences of both cases (CEDRE, 2014; 
ITOPF, 2014).
The literature confirms the observation that learning from crises on the part of public 
organizations varies substantially from case to case (Birkland, 2006; Deverell, 2010). 
However, so far the theory has not come up with a satisfying explanation for this variation in 
lesson drawing. The process of learning from crises is not well understood in the literature, 
as hardly any theory on the subject seems to have been developed (cf. Smith and Elliot, 2007; 
Deverell, 2009). At the same time, there is a lack of empirical studies on the subject. In 
particular, the factors that determine whether learning takes place are as yet unknown: 
what drives organizations’ learning after a crisis? Politicization is often put forward as an 
important factor in the learning process (e.g. Stern, 1997; Dekker and Hansén, 2004; Birkland, 
2006). However, the exact role that politicization plays remains unclear because scholars 
simultaneously claim a promoting and an impeding effect for it. As politicization remains 
outside the main scope of these studies (except for Dekker and Hansén, 2004), clarification 
of the underlying processes and empirical substantiation of the theoretical suppositions are 
still lacking.
The aim of our study was to explore and clarify the relation between politicization 
and learning from crises through an analysis of European oil spill disasters. Our research 
question was: To what extent does issue politicization affect crisis-induced learning by the 
EU? We adopted a political conflict perspective on politicization, as reflected in our use 
of political claims analysis. In the study we focused on ‘policy learning’, here defined as 
the enhancement of policies based on increased knowledge, and indicated by evaluation 
investigations and new EU directives and regulations. Taking an innovative approach, 
we mainly studied politicization and learning at the issue level, in terms of responses to 
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the Braer (1993), the Sea Empress (1996), the Erika (1999), and the Prestige (2002) oil spill 
accidents. We examined to what extent the contents of political claims in mass media, 
national parliaments, and the European Parliament (EP) resembled the recommendations 
made in crisis evaluation reports and new EU legislation. In combination with an in-depth 
case study analysis we used the technique of pattern-matching (Trochim, 1989; Yin, 2009) to 
systematically analyze a large set of empirical data (1,449 claims) while taking into account 
the specific disaster contexts.
In the next section the main theoretical concepts and the key mechanisms that connect 
politicization and learning are discussed, followed by an explanation of the current 
relevance of studying oil spill disasters. After an outline of the methodology, an in-depth case 
description is presented of the patterns found per disaster case, concluded by a discussion of 
our findings.
3.3 THE EFFECT OF POLITICIZATION ON CRISIS-INDUCED 
LEARNING
Citizens expect governments to protect them against disaster. If disaster nonetheless strikes, 
government organizations are expected to respond adequately and subsequently ensure that 
similar terrible events do not occur again. In theory, organizational learning is conceived to 
be the process through which an organization can enhance its performance (Fiol and Lyles, 
1985; Huber, 1991). In contrast to the idea prevalent in society and often implicitly assumed 
in the literature (Smith and Elliot 2007), learning is not a natural reaction of organizations 
to crises. There is increasing evidence that government organizations experience difficulties 
with learning from crises (Stern, 1997; Smith and Elliot, 2007). As noted above, very little 
theory has been developed so far on the relation between crisis and learning. The number of 
studies on the subject has been rather limited (notable exceptions are Carley and Harrald, 
1997; Stern 1997; Dekker and Hansén, 2004; Birkland, 2006; Smith and Elliot, 2007; Deverell, 
2010).
In current work it is especially the question of what factors help to explain the presence or 
absence of learning that remains unanswered. Although sometimes individual characteristics 
(e.g. crisis experience), organizational characteristics (e.g. organizational culture), or crisis 
characteristics (e.g. type of crisis) are proposed as influential factors, an explanation of the 
processes and systematic empirical studies clarifying the supposed effects are generally still 
lacking (e.g. Smith and Elliot 2007). In the literature, politicization is systematically put 
forward as a key factor in the learning process. However, it is striking that the exact role 
politicization plays remains unclear and ambiguous. In some instances, scholars argue that 
politicization has a promoting effect, whereas on other occasions they argue that it has an 
impeding effect (cf. May, 1992; Stern, 1997; Dekker and Hansén, 2004; Birkland, 2006; Boin 
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et al. 2008; 2009; Moynihan, 2009). The implicit roots of these conflicting suppositions on the 
effects of politicization are different theoretical mechanisms that are assumed to connect 
politicization and learning. Before going into these mechanisms, we will first discuss the 
main concepts of study.
3.3.1 Learning from crises
Although the concept of organizational learning is often discussed in the literature, there is 
no generally accepted definition as yet; Levy (1994, p. 279) speaks of a ‘conceptual minefield’. 
Because it is understood, measured, and applied in many different ways (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; 
Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Crosson et al., 1999) the construct remains rather elusive. We do 
not aim to become involved in the ongoing theoretical discussions, but instead use the various 
approaches as a useful framework for studying the concept and to make clear what we did 
and did not study.
In the literature, organizational learning is viewed from both a cognitive perspective 
(acquiring knowledge; cf. Argyris and Schön, 1978) and a mere behavioral perspective 
(transferring new insights into improved actions; cf. Levitt and March 1988). We have 
combined the two perspectives (Fiol and Lyles, 1985) by defining learning as the enhancement 
of organizational performance (behavior) based on newly acquired knowledge (cognition). 
Although the theory on organizational learning and policy learning developed as two 
separate streams, we have here taken a more integrated approach (cf. Common, 2004). The 
core processes of the learning concept in both streams fit our definition of learning. We 
approach policy learning as one form of how an organization can learn: besides adapting, for 
example, organizational culture, norms, skills, or routines, an organization can also improve 
its policies.
The essence of policy learning as part of the policy cycle and in reaction to external 
changes is quite straightforward: evaluation exposes the flaws in an organization’s policy, in 
response to which the organization improves its policy (Howlett et al., 2009). Or, as Birkland 
points out, ‘learning can be said to have occurred when the proximate causes of the policy 
failure revealed by the event are subsequently addressed by changes in policy’ (Birkland 
2006, p. 166). This ties in with what May (1992) calls ‘instrumental policy learning’, defined 
as ‘new understanding about the viability of policy interventions or implementation designs’ 
(p. 335). He explains that policy failure provides major opportunities for policy learning. 
Instrumental learning has occurred if new policies are adopted that stem from increased 
understanding about the policy design. May explains that improved understanding about 
a policy design can be derived from either direct or indirect experience (through formal 
evaluations) with a given policy.
Scholars of organizational learning theory distinguish not only between who learns and 
what is learned, but also between when it is learned, and for what purpose (cf. Bennett and 
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Howlett, 1992; May, 1992; Deverell, 2009). Moynihan (2009) clarifies the last two aspects by 
distinguishing between ‘intercrisis’ learning and ‘intracrisis’ learning. Intercrisis learning 
concerns the process of learning in the post-crisis period, and is aimed at the prevention 
of and response to future crises. When the period of chaos is over and normality has been 
restored, organizations can start to look back and address the things that went wrong.
Crises typically create major opportunities for the adoption of policy changes 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 2011). Policy changes as such, however, do not have 
to reflect policy learning, as they might not address the actual policy failures revealed by a 
crisis. Policy changes can be induced by a variety of political reasons that are unrelated to 
improved understanding. It is especially post-crisis policies that are vulnerable to political 
self-interests, as the interests at stake are high. When new policies are not based on increased 
knowledge, we speak of ‘quasi-learning’, because learning is pretended but did not actually 
take place. These or similar processes of mere adaptation instead of learning are recognized 
by several scholars in the field (cf. Fiol and Lyles, 1985, p. 811; May, 1992, p. 336; Carley and 
Harrald, 1997, p. 122). Distinguishing ‘real’ learning from quasi-learning requires tracing 
back the line to the origins of new policies. ‘Real’ learning is demonstrated by evidence of new 
legislation or regulation, together with evidence that this was based on thorough (formal) 
investigation (Birkland, 2006).
3.3.2 Politicization
In the wake of a crisis, political conflict can arise very quickly. However, the intensity of 
politicization in response to critical incidents varies widely (Brändström and Kuipers, 2003), 
depending on multiple factors such as policy domain, actor mobilization, issue salience, 
and actors’ framing capacities. Normality can suddenly change into crisis politics in which 
major interests are at stake (Boin et al., 2005). Politicization stems from disagreement on 
interpretations of, in particular, (1) the course of events, (2) the underlying causes and effects, 
(3) questions of responsibility and accountability, and (4) what lessons should be drawn 
(adapted from Olson, 2000; Boin et al., 2008). Political conflict often results in a blame game 
between the actors involved, in which the positions of public leaders are put into question 
(Boin et al., 2005).
In theory, the concept of politicization is defined in many different ways and is used in a 
wide range of studies. Often, politicization is defined as increased political attention. This 
definition, however, ignores the ‘disagreement’ component often central to definitions of 
politics. An upsurge of attention does not necessarily correspond to people’s dissatisfaction 
with a situation. In our study we take a ‘political conflict’ perspective (De Wilde, 2011). We 
consider an issue ‘politicized’ when it has become subject to increased political conflict. 
This definition implies that politicization is not restricted to politics in a narrow sense, but 
can also occur outside the formal political institutions. Crisis issues are contested by means 
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of political claims made by multiple actors in different political arenas at different levels 
(Koopmans, 2007; De Wilde, 2011), including both formal democratic institutions, such as 
parliaments, and more informal ones, such as mass media. Therefore, although politicization 
is usually studied at the level of formal political institutions, studying politicization at the 
level of the public could provide additional useful insights. As the ‘barrier’ model (Bachrach 
and Baratz, 1970) explains, issues become political when they are formulated as ‘demands’ 
on governments.
3.3.3 Proposed effects of politicization
Describing the mechanisms between variables creates a better understanding of the 
underlying processes (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; De Vaus, 2001, pp. 34–36). Theory helps us to 
distil two general mechanisms that connect politicization and learning but exert contrary 
effects. Both these mechanisms can be viewed as consisting of the same main processes 
(concern, informing, understanding, pressuring), but working towards different outcomes. 
These processes should not be viewed as steps following each other in an orderly fashion, 
but rather as working towards a specific outcome, with each process partially responsible for 
that outcome.
The first mechanism exerts a promoting effect. Politicization draws attention to certain 
issues. Because awareness and concern grow, different actors in public and government 
become involved. This leads to increased public assessment and scrutiny of government 
responses (Dekker and Hansén, 2004) (concern). The concern of actors in society triggers 
exploration of these topics, creating an increase in information in the form of evaluative 
investigations, academic studies, hearings, parliamentary questionings, investigative 
journalism, and judicial reports (Van Duin, 1992; Birkland, 2004) (informing). By comparing 
the ample information available, decision makers are able to acquire reliable information 
(Smith and Elliot 2007). In this way decision makers gain insight into the causes of the 
crisis and policy failures are exposed (Birkland 2006). The new knowledge acquired makes it 
possible to distil clear lessons (Argyris and Schön, 1978) (understanding). Political demands, 
increased scrutiny and concern, a sense of urgency, and the presence of possible solutions then 
pressure and motivate decision makers into changing policies (pressuring). New policies are 
adopted based on increased knowledge and insights: learning has taken place. As Deverell 
(2009, p. 186) proposes, ‘if there is external critique toward the organization and credibility 
loss, then implementation of crisis-induced lessons will be carried out at a greater rate’. This 
mechanism leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Political conflict promotes policy learning, as conflict over an issue facilitates 
the adoption of policy change based on increased understanding about that issue.
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In contrast, the second mechanism exerts an impeding effect. Politicization creates 
awareness and concern on the part of actors in society. Multiple actors with different interests 
become involved (concern). Actors’ concern stimulates exploration into these topics, creating 
a mass of information from all kinds of sources. The actors involved try to frame the situation 
in their own interests or beliefs (Stone, 2002; Brändström and Kuipers, 2003). Information 
is subjective and conflicting (Carley and Harrald, 1997) (informing). Actors encounter 
difficulties processing and making sense of the information, especially given the limitations 
of human cognitive abilities. The overload of interpretations makes it impossible for decision 
makers to make sense of causes and distil straightforward lessons (Boin et al. 2008). Because 
of this chaos and stress there is no fruitful context for lesson drawing (understanding). As a 
result of crisis politics and the lack of agreement on causes and solutions, decision makers are 
forced to occupy themselves with avoiding blame and securing their own position (Boin et 
al. 2005). Actors demand of public leaders that they make quick decisions. Seizing political 
opportunity, different actors try to press different interests (Kingdon, 2011). At the same 
time, public concern and scrutiny generate public pressure ‘to do something’ (Birkland, 
2006) (pressuring). Increased scrutiny and concern, political pressure for change, and the 
lack of clear solutions create an incentive for decision makers to adopt policies that are not 
based on increased knowledge: quasi-learning has taken place. This mechanism leads to the 
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Political conflict impedes policy learning, as conflict over an issue facilitates the 
adoption of policy change that is not based on increased understanding about that issue.
In our study we explored which of these two hypotheses is the more plausible. After a 
short background sketch we will explain our methods of data analysis.
3.4 EU MARITIME SAFETY
The European economy is largely based upon maritime transport, which comprises around 
40 per cent of trade within and 90 per cent outside of its territory (EC 2006, p. 2). Daily, 
hundreds of oil tankers pass through European waters that are characterized by a combination 
of tough shipping conditions and a high density of ecologically and economically vulnerable 
areas (Frank 2005). For quite a long time, the decline in oil spill accidents in Europe was only 
moderate, compared to other parts of the world. It could be considered the ‘oil spill hotspot 
worldwide’ (Vieites et al., 2004, p. 535). In recent decades, disasters have induced the EU to 
develop a substantive common maritime safety policy, starting with the communication ‘A 
common policy on safe seas’ in 1993 (cf. Krämer, 2007; Liu and Maes, 2009). Although safety 
seems to have increased substantially in recent years there is a continuous risk of tanker 
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accidents, as serious oil spills keep occurring in European waters (cf. CEDRE, 2014; ITOPF, 
2014). The threat of oil spills was again demonstrated by the TK Bremen oil spill accident of 
16 December 2011, despite its limited scope, and the potentially devastating consequences of 
recent events in other parts of the world, such as the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe of April 
2010.
3.5 RESEARCH DESIGN
We explored the relation between politicization and EU learning mainly at the issue level, 
that is, through the responses to four European oil spill disasters, while taking into account 
the different disaster contexts. The analysis was structured in three steps. First, a content 
analysis was conducted on claims in newspaper articles, debates in national parliaments and 
the EP, and recommendations in crisis evaluation reports and new EU legislation. Second, 
the results of the content analysis were matched with pre-established patterns, derived from 
the theory, resembling different effects (Trochim, 1989; Yin, 2009) (see Table 3.2). Finally, the 
patterns found were compared with each other within the context of the specific disasters.
For the empirical analysis four oil spill disaster cases were selected that (1) occurred as 
a result of tanker accidents, (2) were considered a ‘disaster’ by EU expert organizations 
(EC 2006; EMSA 2004), (3) saw at least 15,000 tonnes of oil spilled (EMSA, 2004, p. 34); the 
volume of an oil spill is an indicator of its impact (Vieites et al., 2004), and (4) took place 
since 1993, the year the Maastricht Treaty came into force. These are the accidents with the 
MV Braer in 1993, the MV Sea Empress in 1996, the MV Erika in 1999, and the Prestige in 
2002. The cases turn out to be remarkably similar in terms of both the actual turn of events 
and their consequences, or ‘history repeats’, as Vieites et al., (2004, p. 536) aptly put it.
3.5.1 Operationalization of variables
As indicators for the dependent variable ‘policy learning’ we used evaluation reports and 
legislative responses from the EU. Evidence of learning can be obtained by examining new 
legislation and tracing back the line to the origins of the legislation (Birkland, 2006, p. 16). 
We assumed that the recommendations in evaluation reports are an indicator for cognitive 
learning, as they demonstrate the new knowledge acquired, and that new legislation is an 
indicator for behavioral learning, as it demonstrates the actions taken (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). 
Scholars agree that evaluation reports play an important role in the crisis-induced learning 
process (Moynihan 2009). We adopted the current generally accepted view of policy evaluation 
as ‘an inherently political activity … with a technical component’ (Howlett et al., 2009, p. 
179). We took evaluation reports of oil spill disasters as an indicator of learning for several 
reasons. First, the evaluation reports are rather technical in nature and were published in 
the post-crisis phase, when major political upheaval had ended. Second, the investigations 
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evaluating the oil spill disasters were comprehensive, combining many and varied kinds of 
information sources and interpretations of the crisis, for example via hearings of actors with 
divergent interests. Third, the evaluation reports hold a certain status and legitimacy, since 
the investigations were carried out by independent teams of renowned experts, weighing 
different interpretations.
Table 3.1 Main data sources for measurement of politicization
Global Factiva archive
House of Commons archive








To obtain an indication of policy learning, we first conducted a content analysis of legal 
documents, that is, EU directives and regulations of legislative packages adopted by the 
EU in response to the selected disasters (derived from Eur-Lex). Every main topic of a 
new directive or regulation was considered a separate group. These were binary coded: ‘0’ 
meaning no legislation, and ‘1’ meaning legislation. Second, for every topic of new legislation 
we examined to what extent it was also discussed in the recommendations in crisis evaluation 
reports. This was also binary coded: ‘0’ meaning not discussed or only cursorily, and ‘1’ 
meaning discussed substantially.
To obtain an indication of the independent variable ‘politicization’, we used political claims 
analysis (cf. Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Koopmans, 2007; De Wilde, 2011). We defined a 
‘claim’ as a political demand for government action made by an individual or organization. 
Examples of typical verbs indicating a claim are ‘demanded’, ‘should’, ‘must’, and ‘criticized’ 
(cf. Koopmans, 2002). An example of a claim is ‘Next should come the establishment of 
oil tanker exclusion zones to protect coasts and vulnerable areas’ (The Guardian, 1 August 
1993). The benefit of using political ‘claims’ to indicate crisis politicization is that the unit of 
analysis is small, which makes the study more concrete and precise.
Political conflict over issues was measured in three different political arenas at three 
different levels: mass media, national parliaments, and the EP. To measure political conflict in 
mass media we analyzed newspaper articles from The Guardian and The Times for the Braer 
and Sea Empress cases, from Le Monde and Le Figaro for the Erika case, and from El Mundo 
and El País for the Prestige case. These are generally considered quality (daily) newspapers, and 
with this selection both the left and right wings of the political spectrum were represented. 
Articles were selected and retrieved from Global Factiva by searching on [disaster name] 
and the terms [oil] and [disaster] in the body of the text, and by restricting the search to those 
articles published within one year of the specific accident. For the same period, records 
of parliamentary debates were selected by searching on [disaster name] in the title of the 
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debate in the national parliament and EP online archives (see Table 3.1). Based on in-depth 
case knowledge, we included a small number of debates that were directly linked to the specific 
disasters. Minutes of EP debates on the Braer and Sea Empress disasters were obtained from 
the EP on request.
The selected articles and debate minutes were examined for political claims. A total of 
1,449 claims were found and analyzed. For each political arena claims were listed, analyzed, 
and subsequently categorized by topic, resulting in 57 groups or ‘issues’. As a starting point 
for the categorization of claims, we used the topics of new legislation as separate categories. 
Second, we clustered the claims that did not fit these first categories but did explicitly mention 
a specific topic. Third, we divided the remaining claims into the existing categories. For 
every ‘issue’ the degree of political conflict was binary coded on the basis of the number of 
claims made: ‘0’ meaning not politicized (≤5 claims), ‘1’ politicized (6≥ claims). We assumed 
an issue to be politicized in general if it became politicized in at least two of the three 
political arenas. All analysis and coding work in this study was carried out by the same 
researcher.
Table 3.2 Pre-established patterns between politicization, evaluation reports, and EU legislation
Pattern Politicization Learning Interpretation of 
pattern [in terms of 





















3 0 1 1 - -
4 0 0 1 - -
5 0 0 0 - -
6 0 1 0 - -
7 1 0 0 Moderate impeding 
effect, or no effect
H2
8 1 0 1 Strong impeding effect 
(quasi-learning)
H2
0: absent, 1: present.
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3.5.2 Pattern matching
To systematically analyze the large set of empirical data while taking into account the 
specific disaster contexts we used the technique of pattern matching (Trochim, 1989; Yin, 
2009), described by Yin (2009, p. 136) as ‘one of the most desirable techniques [for case study 
analysis]’. The logic of pattern matching consists in examining whether the empirical patterns 
found correspond to pre-established patterns derived from theory or experience (Almutairi 
et al., 2014). On the basis of the theory described above, we established eight different patterns 
between politicization of issues, discussion in evaluation reports, and adoption in EU 
legislation, representing different effects (see Table 3.2). Subsequently we matched the results 
of the content analyses with these patterns.
Patterns 1, 2, 7, and 8 are especially relevant, as they support one of the hypotheses to 
different degrees. If an issue became politicized and corresponded to both recommendations 
in evaluation reports and new EU legislation, we inferred that politicization strongly promoted 
EU learning (see pattern 1). This inference was based on the assumption that the politicization 
of an issue led to the adoption of that issue in expert recommendations, and to the adoption 
of that same issue in new legislation (see mechanism 1). The result was behavioral learning, 
since a new policy was adopted that was based on increased knowledge (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). 
If an issue became politicized and resembled recommendations of evaluation reports, but 
not new EU legislation, we inferred that politicization moderately promoted EU learning 
(see pattern 2). This was based on the assumption that politicization of an issue led to the 
adoption of that issue in expert recommendations. The result was only cognitive learning: 
new knowledge was acquired, but not adopted as a new policy.
If an issue became politicized and corresponded neither to recommendations in 
evaluation reports nor new EU legislation, we inferred that politicization either moderately 
impeded EU learning or had no effect (see pattern 7). This was based on the assumption 
that the politicization of an issue did not lead to adoption of that issue in either expert 
recommendations or new legislation. If an issue became politicized and corresponded to new 
EU legislation, but not to expert recommendations, we inferred that politicization strongly 
impeded EU learning (see pattern 8). This was based on the assumption that politicization of 
an issue led to the adoption of new legislation that was not based on increased knowledge 
(see mechanism 2). The result was quasi-learning (cf. Fiol and Lyles, 1985; May, 1992; Carley 
and Harrald, 1997): a change of policy that was not based on increased knowledge. None of 
the other combinations (patterns 3–6) points to an effect of politicization on EU learning. 
Note again here that we did not aim to ‘measure’ an effect in this study but merely aimed at 
exploring a relationship.
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Subsequently, the patterns found were compared with each other within their specific 
disaster context. In an in-depth case description of the patterns found we included ‘technical 
feasibility of claims’ and ‘characteristics of evaluation reports’ as possible intervening factors. 
If the technical feasibility of claims to be adopted in legislation was restricted, that is, these 
were primarily aimed at the specific crisis response or at intervention in the private realm, 
learning was restricted as well. Likewise, varying characteristics of the evaluation reports 
might also have affected the learning outcome.
3.6 FINDINGS
3.6.1 The Braer disaster
On 5 January 1993, the 17-year-old Liberian-registered oil tanker MV Braer got into trouble 
on its way from Mongstad in Norway to Quebec City in Canada due to water in its bunkers, 
in heavy seas ten miles off the Shetland coast. The loss of its entire cargo of 85,000 tonnes 
during the ensuing days severely affected the local sheep, salmon, and tourist industries, and 
had a devastating impact on wildlife (CEDRE 2014; ITOPF 2014). In response to the Braer 
accident, political conflict arose in the British mass media, the House of Commons, and the 
EP. An evaluation report by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB 1993) into 
the Braer disaster was followed by an investigation report from Lord Donaldson (1994), set 
up by the UK Department of Transport. In response to the Braer disaster, the EU issued the 
communication ‘A common policy on safe seas’ (COM/93/66 final), initiating major new EU 
policies on oil tanker accident prevention (Plant, 1995; Krämer, 2007).
In the Braer case, our findings support both hypothesis 1, ‘politicization promotes EU 
learning’ and hypothesis 2, ‘politicization impedes EU learning’ (see tables 3 and 4). Here, we 
found substantially more support for a promoting effect. The legislation adopted by the EU 
on vessel requirements (Directive 93/75/EEC), ship inspections (Directive 94/57/EC), training 
of seafarers (Directive 94/58/EC), segregated ballast tanks (Regulation EC 2978/94), and port 
state control (Directive 95/21/EC) was strongly grounded in the evaluation reports. This 
indicates extensive EU learning from the Braer disaster. In response to the Braer accident 
intense political conflict arose, especially on tanker exclusion zones (32 claims found), an 
issue that became politicized in three different political arenas. However, with the exception 
of vessel requirements, none of the issues that became politicized were adopted in new 
EU legislation. The issue of vessel requirements became politicized, was discussed in Lord 
Donaldson’s recommendations, and was adopted in new legislation, indicating a strong 
promoting effect on learning (pattern 1).
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We found no evidence of quasi-learning (pattern 8), as the topics of all policy changes were 
also discussed in the evaluation reports. The majority of issues politically contested in the 
mass media and parliaments were also adopted in evaluation reports, indicating a moderate 
promoting effect on learning (pattern 2). Examples are the issues of salvage tugs, flag state 
requirements, and victim compensation that both became politicized and were extensively 
discussed in Lord Donaldson’s inquiry. We found some evidence for a moderate impeding 
effect of politicization on learning. The issues health risks and accountability oil industry 
became politicized, but were not substantially discussed in evaluation recommendations 
(pattern 7). The technical feasibility of claims seems to have played a small intervening 
role: claims regarding the accountability of the oil industry were primarily aimed at the 
specific crisis response rather than at future disasters. The extensiveness of the evaluation 
reports after the Braer disaster is striking: Lord Donaldson’s report alone delivered as many 
as 103 recommendations. The majority of these recommendations were directed at the UK 
government, but a substantial part was also internationally focused.
3.6.2 The Sea Empress disaster
On 15 January 1996, the single-hull Liberian-registered oil tanker Sea Empress ran aground 
before it reached the port of Milford Haven, Wales. Despite the efforts of tugboats it repeatedly 
hit the rocks, resulting in the spill of 72,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil in the following days. 
The accident (taking place in the Pembrokeshire National Park) had a devastating impact on 
the environment as well as on the regional economy (a fishing ban was implemented) and 
the tourist industry, which suffered a considerable loss of income (Wene, 2005; CEDRE, 2014). 
In response to the Sea Empress disaster, political conflict arose in the British mass media, the 
House of Commons, and the EP. In 1997 an evaluation report was published by the MAIB 
(1997). No legislative package was adopted by the EU in response to the Sea Empress disaster.
In the Sea Empress case our findings support both hypothesis 1, ‘politicization promotes EU 
learning’, and hypothesis 2, ‘politicization impedes EU learning’ (see tables 3 and 4). Here, 
we found similar support for a promoting effect and an impeding effect of politicization. 
The fact that no major new legislation was adopted in response to the Sea Empress accident 
indicates that learning was restricted and explains why we did not find evidence for either a 
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strong promoting effect (pattern 1) or a strong impeding effect (pattern 8). In response to the 
Sea Empress accident, intense political conflict arose, especially on the issues salvage operation 
(34 claims found), liability oil industry (27 claims found), and pilotage performance (23 claims 
found), all politicized in three different political arenas. The politicization of issues shows no 
clear relation with cognitive learning.
The issues double hull tankers, government response, pilotage performance, and salvage 
operation became politicized in the political arenas and were adopted in evaluation 
recommendations, indicating a moderate promoting effect (pattern 2). At the same time 
the issues adoption Donaldson’s recommendations, competence shipping crew, form public 
inquiry, liability oil industry, compensation to industry, and transport toxic fuels were not 
substantially discussed in the MAIB report, despite intense political conflict, which indicates 
a moderate impeding effect (pattern 7). The technical feasibility of claims seems to have played 
a moderate intervening role: claims regarding the public inquiry and the liability oil industry 
were aimed primarily at the specific crisis response and the private realm, respectively. It 
is notable that the recommendations in the MAIB report in response to the Sea Empress 
disaster had only a limited international focus, as they were mainly directed at the national 
and subnational level.
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3.6.3 The Erika disaster
On 11 December 1999 the Malta-registered oil tanker MV Erika encountered bad weather 
and faced severe structural problems en route from Dunkirk in France to Livorno in Italy, 
carrying 31,000 tonnes of oil. The following day the oil tanker broke near the Brittany coast, 
spilling an estimated 20,000 tonnes of oil in the sea, which contaminated 400 kilometres 
of French coastline. The accident severely affected the fisheries sector, the tourist industry, 
and the regional ecological structure (EMSA 2004; CEDRE 2014). In response to the Erika 
accident, political conflict arose in the French mass media, the Assemblée Nationale, and 
the EP. Evaluation reports on the Erika disaster were published by the vessel flag state’s 
Maltese Maritime Authority (MMA, 2000) and the Permanent Commission of Enquiry into 
Accidents at Sea (CPEM, 2000). In response to the Erika disaster, the EU adopted major new 
legislation on the prevention of future oil spill disasters in 2002, in the form of the Erika 
Package I and Erika Package II (EC, 2003; Wene, 2005).
For the Erika case our findings moderately support both hypothesis 1, ‘politicization 
promotes EU learning’, and hypothesis 2, ‘politicization impedes EU learning’ (see tables 3 and 
4). Here, we found substantially more support for an impeding effect than for a promoting 
effect of politicization. Most of the EU legislation adopted in response to the Erika disaster, 
on classification societies (Directive 2001/105/EC), double hull tankers (Regulation (EC) No 
417/2002), and vessel traffic monitoring (Directive 2002/59/EC), was strongly grounded in 
the evaluation reports. This indicates that extensive learning took place. In response to the 
Erika accident intense political conflict arose, especially on liability oil industry (31 claims 
found) and knowledge development (17 claims found), issues that became politicized in three 
different political arenas. In the Erika case we found no evidence for a strong promoting 
effect (pattern 1). Liability oil industry is the only issue that points to a moderate promoting 
effect of politicization (pattern 2), as it became politicized and was discussed in the CPEM 
recommendations. The issues knowledge development and response operations did become 
politicized, but were not adopted in evaluation recommendations, indicating a moderate 
impeding effect (pattern 7).
As exceptional cases we found that the issues of new EU legislation on the European 
Maritime Safety Agency (Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002) and on port state control (Directive 
2001/106/EC) were not substantially explicitly included in the evaluation recommendations. 
Because the latter issue did become politicized, it provides the only support we found for 
quasi-learning in all four disaster cases (pattern 8). However, as the issue of port state control 
was partly included in recommendations on classification society inspections, one can 
question whether quasi-learning is really represented here. The technical feasibility of claims 
seems to have played only a small intervening role: only claims on the response operation were 
primarily aimed at the specific crisis response. The recommendations of the CPEM and MMA 
evaluation reports were clearly internationally focused.
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3.6.4 The Prestige disaster
Bahamas-registered single-hull oil tanker Prestige encountered a heavy storm on its way 
from Latvia to Singapore, suffered severe structural failure, and began to leak oil. After six 
days, with some changes in course, the Prestige broke in two on 19 November 2002 and sank 
130 miles off the Galician coast, spilling an estimated 63,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. The accident 
had dramatic consequences for the local fisheries sector, the tourist industry, and the sensitive 
ecosystem of the area (EMSA, 2004; ITOPF, 2014). In the wake of the Prestige accident, 
political conflict arose in the Spanish mass media, the Congreso de los Diputados, and the 
EP. In 2004 investigation reports on the Prestige disaster were published by the Bahamas 
Maritime Authority (BMA 2004) and by the Temporary Committee on Improving Safety at 
Sea (2004) (also known as ‘MARE-committee’). In 2005, in response to the Prestige disaster, 
the Third Maritime Safety Package (COM(2005)585 final) was created, containing major new 
legislation aimed at the prevention of oil spill disasters (Ringbom, 2008).
In the Prestige case the findings support both hypothesis 1, ‘politicization promotes EU 
learning’, and hypothesis 2, ‘politicization impedes EU learning’ (see tables 3 and 4). Here, 
we found substantially more support for a promoting effect of politicization. Most of the EU 
legislation adopted in response to the Prestige disaster, on vessel traffic monitoring (Directive 
2009/17/EC), classifications societies (Regulation (EC) No 391/2009 and Directive 2009/15/
EC), ship owner insurance (Directive 2009/20/EC), accident investigation (Directive 2009/18/
EC), and port state control (Directive 2009/16/EC) was strongly grounded in the evaluation 
reports. This indicates that extensive learning took place. The only legislation we did not find 
substantially discussed in the MARE and BMA reports was that on quality of flags (Directive 
2009/21/EC). In response to the Prestige accident, intense political conflict arose, especially 
on response operations (73 claims found), political response (54 claims found), and accident 
investigation (51 claims found), issues that became politicized in three different political 
arenas. The issues accident investigation, classification societies, and port state control 
became politicized and were also discussed in evaluation recommendations and adopted in 
new legislation, which indicates a strong promoting effect (pattern 1).
The politicization of issues shows no clear relation with cognitive learning. The issues 
implementation legislation, ports of refuge, response operations, victim compensation, 
and knowledge development became politicized and were discussed in evaluation 
recommendations, which indicates a moderate promoting effect (pattern 2). At the same 
time the issues liability oil companies and political response became politicized but were 
not substantially discussed in evaluation recommendations, indicating a moderate impeding 
effect (pattern 7). The technical feasibility of claims seems to have played only a modest 
role in explaining the absence of EU legislation: the claims on the political response and 
the liability oil companies were primarily aimed at the direct crisis response and the private 
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realm, respectively. The MARE report, created by a committee set up by the EP, stands out 
from the other reports by its largely EU-oriented recommendations.
3.7 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Within the literature scholars have identified politicization as an important factor in the 
crisis-induced learning process (Stern, 1997; Dekker and Hansén, 2004; Birkland, 2006; 
Smith and Elliot, 2007; Boin et al., 2008; 2009). However, exactly what role is played by 
politicization remains unclear, as this aspect is claimed simultaneously to have a promoting 
and an impeding effect. In an attempt to clarify this relation, we explored to what extent issue 
politicization affects EU learning by analyzing the four major oil spill disasters that have 
occurred in Europe since 1993. The study was conducted by comparing patterns between 
the contents of political claims made in the mass media, national parliaments and the EP, 
evaluation reports, and new EU legislation within the contexts of the different disasters.
The results of our study indicate that the politicization of issues either promotes or 
impedes crisis-induced learning by the EU. For every disaster case we found support for both 
hypotheses, which points to the existence of determining intervening factors explaining the 
variance in EU learning. Although contrary relations were indicated, we found substantially 
more support for a promoting role of politicization, contributing to both cognitive and 
behavioral learning. We found oil spill disasters creating strong political conflicts between 
actors on the question of what the government should learn from them. However, we found 
practically no evidence for politicization facilitating policy changes not based on increased 
knowledge, that is, quasi-learning. New EU legislation adopted in response to oil spill 
disasters appeared to be strongly grounded in evaluation reports.
Characteristics of the crisis evaluation reports, especially the degree of international 
focus, seem to offer a plausible alternative explanation for the variance in crisis-induced 
EU learning. As an example, the MARE report after the Prestige disaster was substantially 
more aimed at changes at the EU level than the MAIB report after the Sea Empress disaster. 
The ‘technical feasibility of claims’ seems to have played only a small intervening role; some 
claims were primarily aimed at the specific crisis response instead of learning for future 
disasters. Interestingly, we did not find a significant differentiation in the role of politicization 
in affecting learning between mass media, national parliaments, and the EP. This is notable, 
as one might rather have expected politicization at the formal political level (i.e. EP) playing 
a more prominent role in affecting learning than politicization at the level of the public (i.e. 
mass media), as the former is closer to the decision-making authority (e.g. Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1970). A possible explanation might be related to other aspects of the politicization 
process, as discussed in the next section.
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The main limitations of our study stem from difficulties in measuring the dependent and 
independent variables. Because in the literature a consensus on the definition of learning 
is lacking (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Crosson et al., 1999), and the 
concept is inherently subject to ontological, methodological, and normative problems (cf. 
Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Carley and Harrald, 1997; Stern, 1997; Dekker and Hansén, 2004), there 
are by definition threats to internal validity. We are well aware of this pitfall, and realize 
that we might not actually, or indisputably, have indicated learning here. As Birkland rightly 
notes: ‘the operationalization of learning cedes a great deal of judgment to the researcher’ 
(Birkland, 2006, p. 22). However, by some simplification, that is, by using evaluation reports as 
an indicator, we were able to systematically analyze a large amount of empirical data. We 
recognize that in reality learning is a very complex process instead of a ‘quick fix’ of often 
deep-rooted problems (Common, 2004, p. 1).
The other main limitation stems from the measurement of politicization, on which there is 
no consensus on the definition in the literature. Given the unconventional approach of this 
study and the large amount of data used (1,449 claims), we had to narrow down our research 
focus. We started with the basic research question that needed to be answered. At the same 
time, we are aware that this excluded actor-related aspects in the politicization process, such 
as type of actor making the claim, decision-making power, and their position relative to each 
other, and claim-related aspects, such as the weights and specificity of the claims.
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, our findings may have multiple implications. 
First, the results provide insight into the relation between politicization and learning by 
public organizations from crises, which so far has remained empirically under explored. 
Second, they demonstrate the necessity of differentiation when the concept of politicization 
is studied. Research outcomes can be determined by the choice of a narrow or conflict 
perspective, and formal political arena or public. As we have seen in this study, issues can 
simultaneously become politicized in the mass media but not in parliament, or vice versa. 
Third, our study introduces an innovative approach to measuring both crisis politics and 
learning in the field of crisis management. Analysis on an issue level adds considerable value 
to the abundance of case descriptions on crises in this field. Finally, the results point to the 
seemingly important role of evaluation reports in the process of learning from crises. It 
argues for further empirical research on the characteristics of crisis evaluation reports 
– such as explicitness/specificity, international focus, and appointment/type of evaluator – 
and their effects. Future research on the relation between politicization and crisis-induced 
learning can also expand our knowledge by looking at the role of actor-related and claim-
related aspects.
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4.1 ABSTRACT
This explorative study examines the role of external experts in crisis situations and the 
conditions under which their involvement contributes to adequate crisis management. 
Existing crisis management research tends to focus on stakeholder analysis, and the valuable 
input of experts during crisis preparation. Consequently, the role of external experts during 
the crisis response phase has been largely overlooked. This is somewhat surprising given the 
crucial role that is often attributed to external experts. To fill this gap, we have investigated 
the role of external experts by conducting a research synthesis of 114 post-crisis evaluation 
reports relating to 60 crises in the Netherlands between 2000 and 2013. The analysis shows that 
external experts are frequently involved and often play prominent roles in the crisis response. 
These external experts are often not actively recruited by the (strategic) crisis management 
response structure. In addition, the contributions and activities of external experts tend to 
be scarcely coordinated by the (strategic) crisis management response structure. Based on 
an in-depth analysis of the evaluation reports, we identify six opportunities and threats 
related to expert involvement in crisis situations, and ten conditions under which expert 
involvement contributes to adequate crisis management. 
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4.2 INTRODUCTION
On August 20th, 2002, a leak was discovered in a tank wagon, containing the hazardous and 
toxic acrylonitrile, that was part of a goods train temporarily halted at the busy central railway 
station in the city of Amersfoort in the Netherlands. Due to the risk of a possible explosion 
and potential health problems, the event quickly turned into a crisis situation with extensive 
media coverage. In line with the crisis-response plan the local crisis management response 
structure was activated, involving public officials and emergency services, which closed 
nearby roads and railways. There was great uncertainty as a result of a lack of knowledge 
of the cause of the leak, the chemical substances involved, and the potential consequences. 
In order to be able to adequately assess the situation and determine appropriate courses 
of action, the crisis management organization involved three external experts to provide 
advice: the chemical company DSM, and two railway companies NedTrain and Railion. 
Based on their expertise, the situation was classified as safe and the train shunted to a safe 
area, thereby putting an immediate end to the crisis. The official crisis evaluation report 
concluded that the external expertise brought in had strongly contributed to effective 
crisis management. The report recommended that the involvement of external experts was 
essential in preventing incidents with hazardous materials in rail transport (Geveke et al., 
2002). 
In last decade, in crisis management research there has been a growing interest in the 
more immediate crisis response phase (Pan et al., 2012; Coombs, 2006). Research shows 
that modern crisis management has a strong networking component: a large number and 
variety of actors collaborate to accomplish highly complex tasks while under time pressure 
(Pramanik et al., 2015; Stephens et al., 2005). Yet, although many studies analyze network 
collaboration among actors during a crisis (e.g. Comfort and Kapucu, 2006; Kapucu, 2006; 
Moynihan, 2008; Waugh and Streib, 2006; Drabek and McIntire, 2002), little attention is 
paid to the role of external experts in bringing and transferring expertise to these networks. 
To our knowledge, there is no systematic empirical study on external experts in crisis 
response situations (Van Eijk et al., 2013). 
The use of expertise is seen as crucial for organizing an adequate crisis response (Rosenthal 
and ’t Hart, 1991; Grönvall, 2001; Baekkeskov and Rubin, 2014; Baekkeskov, 2016). The 
complexity of a crisis, which results from time constraints, a lack of reliable information, large 
uncertainty, and political pressures, together with the potentially dramatic consequences of 
inadequate decisions (Boin et al., 2005), creates an immediate demand for expertise (Weick 
and Sutcliffe, 2015; Grönvall, 2001; Rosenthal and ’t Hart, 1991). If sufficient expertise is 
not available in the (strategic) crisis management response structure, it should be drawn 
from elsewhere: from external experts. What, then, are the roles that external experts fill 
in real-life crisis situations? They could provide specialized knowledge to inform crisis 
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decision-making. They might bring in specialized skills needed to execute highly complex 
tasks. Their reputation may legitimize decisions and, hence, avoid potential blame games 
in the aftermath. At the same time, the involvement of external experts might result in 
a decrease in the unity of control and decisiveness. External experts might also bring in 
private interests, thereby jeopardizing the legitimacy of the crisis management. 
In this explorative study, we provide initial systematic insights into these questions. 
Our central research question is: What role do external experts play in crisis situations and 
under what conditions does their involvement contribute to adequate crisis management as 
reported in evaluation reports? We explore the nature of external experts; how, and how 
often, they are involved; their roles in the crisis response; and the consequences of their 
involvement. We predominantly address the research question empirically, and produce a 
research synthesis of 114 evaluation reports that were published concerning 60 crises that 
took place in the Netherlands between 2000 and 2013. Drawing on all these reports enables 
us to systematically analyze a large amount of empirical data from a large number of crises 
while, at the same time, taking account of the specific crisis contexts. This is an innovative 
approach that adds value to the field of crisis management, which has been dominated by 
conceptual studies and single case studies (Veil, 2011; Smith and Elliott, 2007). Each of the 
evaluation reports included has been published by a recognized evaluation organization and 
based upon an in-depth investigation of a single crisis. Our study consisted of two parts. 
In the first, we coded the reports in terms of the experts involved and their characteristics, 
thereby providing an overview of the involvement of external experts in crisis situations. 
In the second part, we coded the statements in the reports that address the relationship 
between expert involvement and reported adequacy of crisis management. Based on this, we 
were able to identify six main threats and opportunities linked to expert involvement, and 
ten conditions under which expert involvement contributes to adequate crisis management. 
4.3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A crisis is seen as a situation in which the vital interests of a society are abruptly threatened 
with potentially dramatic physical, economic, and/or social consequences (Rosenthal 
et al., 2001). When a crisis occurs, decision-makers in charge of the crisis management 
organization must make decisions under very complicated circumstances, and ones with 
potentially far-reaching consequences for society (Boin and ’t Hart, 2003; Boin et al., 2005; 
Sayegh et al., 2004). Typically, a crisis situation involves uncertainty about what happened, 
its causes, and what might happen next (Rosenthal et al., 2001). Since crisis situations are 
rare, and often hit unexpectedly, they are difficult to prepare for. Decision-makers often face 
a crisis while lacking previous relevant experience, and typically lack reliable information. 
The information available is often blurred by streams of biased and subjective input (Dekker 
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and Hansén, 2004). Despite all this, decision-makers are expected to provide meaning and 
sense to the event. Add in the potential for politicization (Broekema, 2016) and blame games 
(Boin et al., 2005), and it soon becomes clear that a thorough assessment of alternative 
decisions and their consequences is limited (Gilpin and Murphy, 2008 Weisæth et al., 2002). 
Often, when a crisis occurs, a (strategic) crisis management response structure is activated, 
which typically consists of a cluster of ‘regular’ crisis management response organizations 
(see the section on the research design for a more detailed description of this structure in the 
Netherlands) and can be complemented with external actors relevant in the specific crisis 
context. The exact level of decision-making is likely to vary depending on the specific crisis 
and supposed impact. The ‘internal’ members of the (strategic) crisis management response 
structure may decide to involve ‘external’ experts to support decision-making and improve 
the adequacy of crisis management. In this study, we broadly define an expert as a person 
or organization that: (1) has specialized knowledge and/or skills in a particular field or area; 
(2) is considered to be an expert by the professional community or the broad public; and 
(3) has distinguished authority derived from their expertise (Mengis, 2007; Hoffman, 1998; 
Jasanoff, 1990; Ericsson et al., 2006). The external element refers to whether or not actors are 
an integral part of the crisis management response structure; what actors are regularly (and 
sometimes formally) involved is often specified in crisis emergency plans and varies with 
the specific crisis. 
The extensive experience in a certain domain external experts have, typically makes their 
judgements both highly accurate and reliable, and enable to deal effectively with unusual 
and ‘tough’ cases (Hoffman, 1998). Literature on emergency responses acknowledges the 
valuable input external experts potentially have (Perry and Lindell 2003); not only when it 
comes to providing solutions to solve the acute crisis but also to define the actual problem 
(Massey and Wallace 1996). This valuable input is even more prominent when preparing 
for a disaster or crisis: effective response strategies are key to control harmful effects of 
unforeseen disasters, and the effectiveness of these strategies partly depends on the quality 
of expert knowledge on which the response strategies are based (Mendonça et al., 2008). Yet, 
studies in this brand of literature also show that strategic crisis response groups considerable 
vary in the aspects of and approaches to preparedness they actually emphasize, and that 
preparedness activities are fragmented across different organizations and sectors (Tierney 
et al., 2001: 47-48). 
Although incorporating expert knowledge might be valuable, it might also be challenging. 
The frontline response teams know how to perform domain-specific tasks (like firefighting 
and rescue) and are trained to coordinate these tasks (Chen et al., 2008). When experts 
become involved, new coordination mechanisms might be required. In times of crisis, 
with increased time pressures and urgency, a fit between task requirements and personnel 
expertise, as well as a smooth functioning of task flows are even more crucial; making the 
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coordination issue even more prominent (Chen et al., 2008). Eliciting expert knowledge 
is further complicated when experts (and the actors of the crisis management response 
structure) are geographically separated, and when expert knowledge is difficult to cohere 
(Mendonça et al., 2008). In particular when multiple alternative perspectives are added to 
the crisis decision-making process, this can hinder an effective decision-making process 
(Massey and Wallace, 1996). 
However, although valuable, these studies provide limited insight in what actors actually 
are involved as experts, and what role they have during the crisis. Moreover, as this body of 
literature is mainly (though not exclusively) concerned with how to prepare for a crisis, the 
main focus is on those actors that are involved in a more structural manner. Consequently, 
actors that are involved as expert in a more ad hoc manner during a particular crisis, are 
beyond the main scope of interest. Yet, we can assume that a (strategic) crisis management 
response structure in the ‘heat of the moment’ can also rely on experts on a more incidental 
basis. Rosenthal and ’t Hart (1991) advise adopting an open stance regarding what are 
experts that become involved in crisis situations because these can cover a wide range of 
actors: “Experts may be part of the bureaucracy or they may be outsiders asked for ad hoc 
advice. They may or may not be obliged to give detailed feedback to their constituency. They 
may have experience in giving advice in a crisis context or may be doing so for the first time” 
(p. 352). 
Crisis management literature furthermore report various roles taken on by experts in crisis 
management. Studies mention supporting decision-making (Baekkeskov, 2016; Rosenthal 
and ’t Hart, 1991), reducing uncertainty (Grönvall, 2001; Rosenthal and ’t Hart, 1991), and 
providing legitimacy (Grönvall, 2001; Baekkeskov and Rubin, 2014). The expertise input can 
be viewed as a process of learning during a crisis (Broekema et al., 2017). Herek et al. (1987, 
p. 204) stress the important ‘pieces of information’ that experts can provide during a crisis. 
Some studies refer to particular policy fields that require inputs from external experts in 
crisis situations (Grönvall, 2001; Baekkeskov and Rubin, 2014).
However, many questions remain. Little is known about the background of external 
experts (public, non-profit/voluntary, semi-government, private, or academic). Moreover, it 
is not evident from the literature how external experts become involved in crisis management 
(Majchrzak et al., 2007). Crisis management often has an informal, ad hoc networking 
character (Scholtens, 2008; Schraagen et al., 2010). Little is known about the types of crisis 
and the typical crisis dynamics in which external experts become involved. Neither is it 
evident that expert involvement is always of useful value or without challenges (Chen et al., 
2008; Grönvall, 2001; Rosenthal and ’t Hart, 1991). Experts may also have different views, 
which may threaten the adequacy and legitimacy of crisis management. Despite all this, the 
link between expert involvement and adequacy of crisis management has not been studied 
systematically and empirically.
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Professional practice similarly provides little evidence. In the Netherlands, crisis 
handbooks and crisis-response plans generally provide very little guidance about 
collaborating with external experts (Scholtens, 2008). Some crisis-response plans, organized 
along functional chains, type of crisis, and policy domain, do mention a few potential 
external partners that the crisis organization might involve (e.g., Ten Dam, 2015). However, 
there is little or no reference to how to organize a collaborative process involving external 
parties and experts. As such, an explorative but comprehensive study is appropriate, and 
needed, to shed more light on the questions discussed above.
4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN
The empirical context for the present study is the Dutch crisis management system which 
is based upon consensus and cooperation between different layers of government. Local 
governments (provinces and municipalities) have delegated authority and independence, 
while central government can impose certain tasks upon them. The Dutch crisis 
management response system consists of a ‘regular’ temporary crisis management response 
structure, including national crisis management bodies, inter-municipal ‘safety regions’, 
and municipalities, possibly complemented by (a variety of) external actors, depending 
on the specific crisis context (NCTV, 2013; Torenvlied et al., 2015). When a crisis occurs 
in a municipality, often the local executive (the board of mayor and aldermen) has prime 
responsibility for organizing the response. For dealing with transboundary and complex 
incidents, twenty-five safety regions have been defined. Their executives are responsible 
for coordinating collaboration between municipalities, fire departments, the police, and 
medical assistance at the regional level (Safety Regions Law, 2010). For the crisis response by 
organizations at the national level, the tasks, responsibilities, and guidelines are included in 
a national crisis decision-making handbook (NCTV, 2013). 
We study the role of external experts in crisis situations through a ‘research synthesis’ 
using 114 post-crisis evaluation reports related to 60 crises that occurred in the Netherlands 
between 2000 and 2013. A research synthesis systematically reveals, from secondary 
sources, general patterns in infrequent events that are complex in nature (Cooper et al., 
2009). Syntheses of evaluations provide better generalizable insights compared to single 
case studies (Mayne and Rist, 2006). Post-crisis evaluation reports are a rich source of 
information on crisis management since these reports are based on in-depth investigations 
by a team of professional and formally independent experts17 and aimed at learning lessons 
17 We do acknowledge that also evaluation reports might be (politically) ‘colored’, or might become part of a 
political debate. Yet, given the independent position of the research teams/institutes and the authority of many of 
these research teams/institutes, we can assume that these reports in itself are relatively non-politicized and are a 
reliable source of information. 
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after a crisis (Moynihan, 2009; Elliott, 2009). By taking context into account, lessons from 
one report can usefully inform later crisis responses (Crichton et al., 2009). 
4.4.1 Inclusion criteria
Given that there is no comprehensive list of crises in the Netherlands, we aimed to create 
this list of crises by integrating databases from several crisis management authorities and 
institutes: the Dutch National Crisis Centre (‘NCC’), the Dutch Association of Mayors 
(‘NGB’), the Dutch Safety Board, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice, COT Institute for 
Safety and Crisis Management, Safety Region Authorities, and the Dutch Safety Council 
(‘Veiligheidsberaad’). 
In this, we applied several inclusion criteria. We selected the year 2000 as a starting year. 
This year was chosen because it saw the introduction of major reorganizations to the Dutch 
crisis management system that define the current practice and procedure for how crises are 
evaluated. We selected 2012 as the last year for inclusion because that was the year in which 
we started data collection. We excluded purely political or financial-economic crises because 
of their distinct nature. On the further condition that evaluation reports were available, a 
list of 58 crises was derived. Subsequently, we discussed this list extensively with a panel of 
ten Dutch crisis management experts (researchers and practitioners). This resulted in the 
inclusion of eight further crises and the exclusion of six of the original based on the criterion 
of having a substantial impact on vital societal interests. Table 4.1 lists the resulting 60 crises 
(most recent first).
For each of the 60 crises, we retrieved all the relevant evaluation reports published by 
recognized, authoritative evaluation organizations. In this process, we identified a total 
of 114 post-crisis evaluation reports and identified 131 times an evaluation organization 
was involved in these 114 evaluations. Note that some crises were evaluated by more than 
one organization and that some reports were published by more than one organization. 
Evaluations were carried out by the Dutch Safety Board (‘OvV’) (n = 14), ad hoc commissions 
(n = 13), the Inspectorate of Security and Justice or its predecessor (‘IVenJ’/’IOOV’) (n = 
13), other functional government inspection agencies (n = 20), such as the Health Care 
Inspectorate (‘IGZ’), COT Institute for Safety and Crisis Management (n = 17), other 
consultancy firms (n = 16), municipalities (n = 7), safety regions (n = 5), and others (n = 26), 
which consist of expert institutes in a specific area, such as the Institute for Safety (‘IFV’) 
or the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (‘RIVM’), and 
‘traditional’ crisis management organizations, such as water boards [‘waterschappen’], the 
police, or fire departments.
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Table 4.1 Research population of crises that took place in the Netherlands between 2000 and 2013 
Year Date* Crisis 
2000 00/05/13 Explosion fireworks warehouse, Enschede
00/12/16 Den Bosch riots
2001 01/01/01 Café fire ’t Hemeltje, Volendam
01/03/21 Foot-and-mouth disease outbreak
01/05/07 Fire entertainment center De Bonte Wever
2002 02/05/06 Assassination Pim Fortuyn
02/07/12 House fire, Roermond
02/08/20 Fuel wagon leak Amersfoort train station 
2003 03/02/28 Avian Influenza outbreak
03/03/23 Fire King’s Church, Haarlem
03/08/26 Dike inundation, Wilnis
03/09/28 Scaffolding collapse Amercentrale power station
2004 04/11/02 Assassination Theo van Gogh
04/11/13 Mosque fire, Helden
2005 05/09/20 Grounding Fowairet container ship, Westerschelde
05/09/28 High mortality Radboud hospital
05/10/27 Fire detention center Schiphol
05/11/25 Power outage, Haaksbergen
2006 06/05/06 Oranjefeesten riots, Pijnacker
06/09/28 Fire operating room Twenteborg hospital 
06/11/21 Emergency landing helicopter, North Sea
2007 07/01/30 Ship fire, Velsen
07/04/04 Release and spread of white substance, Spijkenisse
07/06/13 Q fever disease outbreak
07/09/17 Drinking water supply failure, Noord-Holland
07/10/22 Fire Armando Museum, Amersfoort
07/11/05 Acute health problems pet store, Hoogeveen
07/11/12 Senseless violence, Lottum
07/12/12 Power outage, Apache helicopter crash, Bommeler- en Tielerwaard 
2008 08/01/13 Asbestos fire, Vroomshoop
94 | Chapter 4 the role oF external expertS | 95
08/02/14 Crash emergency vessel, Ooij
08/05/09 Fire shipyard, De Punt
08/05/13 Fire Delft University of Technology
08/07/07 Explosion bunker, Bilthoven
08/12/24 Stabbing incidents Jack de Prikker
2009 09/02/09 Death threats schools, Weesp
09/02/25 Plane crash Turkish Airlines 
09/04/15 Stomach surgery Scheper hospital
09/04/24 Mexican flu pandemic
09/04/30 Assault Queen’s day, Apeldoorn
09/06/08 Den Bosch sex crimes case swim teacher
09/08/22 Hoek van Holland beach riots
2010 10/03/08 Fire fighter casualty, Veendam 
10/07/02 Wildfire Strabrecht’s Heath
10/12/07 Day-care sex crimes case, Amsterdam 
2011 11/01/05 Fire chemical firm Chemie-Pack Moerdijk
11/03/12 Fire GGZ healthcare facility Rivierduinen
11/04/09 Shooting Alphen aan den Rijn shopping mall 
11/05/31 Klebsiella outbreak Maasstad hospital
11/07/07 Roof collapse Grolsch Veste stadium 
11/07/27 Breakdown KPN network Waalhaven
11/09/02 Diginotar cyber security hack
11/09/17 Riots Maasgebouw
11/11/07 Natrium fire, Farmsum
11/12/02 Sinking of ‘t Loon shopping mall, Heerlen
2012 12/01/02 High water Groningen
12/01/04 High water Friesland
12/04/21 Westerpark train accident
12/07/22 Asbestos discovery Kanaleneiland
12/09/21 Project-X Facebook riots Haren
* Date refers to the incident(s) that initiated the crisis.
Year Date* Crisis 
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4.4.2 Operationalization and coding 
The research synthesis consists of an in-depth analysis of each of these 114 reports. This 
study addresses the crisis response stage only (Coombs, 2014; Veil, 2011), a period which 
we found was usually discussed in a distinct section of a report. In nine reports, this was 
not the case, and here we determined the crisis response stage on the basis of the time 
period that the temporary crisis management structure was activated. We found that crisis 
evaluation reports are generally organized in a similar way. We read the summary and 
introduction of every report, and the sections that addressed the crisis response stage, the 
analysis, conclusions, and recommendations, and also scanned the parts on preparation 
and the aftermath to gain a fuller impression of the context of the crisis. In checking and 
supplementing the coding, we systematically searched for thirteen terms to identify the 
involvement of external experts such as: ‘expert’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘external’. 
We assumed an expert was external if it was not part of the ‘regular’ (strategic) crisis 
management response structure (in Dutch: reguliere crisisbeheersingsorganisatie). The 
‘regular’ (strategic) crisis management response structure in the Netherlands is described 
in the National Crisis Decision-Making Handbook and consists of a cluster of organizations 
(NCTV, 2013; Torenvlied et al., 2015). This structure includes temporary crisis management 
bodies, such as a Ministerial Crisis Management Committee (‘MCCb’), an Interdepartmental 
Crisis Management Committee (‘ICCb’), and a National Communication Team (‘NKC’), 
and (activated parts of) permanent crisis management bodies, such as the National Crisis 
Centre (‘NCC’), responsible ministries, safety regions, and local governments. 
To answer our research question, we explored the role and impact of external experts in 
the adequacy of crisis management in two ways. In part I, we used a standardized coding 
scheme to develop an overall picture of the involvement of external experts. In part II, we 
integrated the specific crisis contexts through an in-depth analysis of the evaluation reports, 
as we recognized that the context can have a strong explanatory value in itself (Johns, 2006; 
Pierce and Aguinis, 2013). We coded individual statements in the reports that explicitly link 
the specific role of experts involved in a crisis to the reported adequacy of management of 
that crisis. 
Part I
We used a standardized coding scheme to code characteristics in the reports on two levels 
of analysis: (a) the level of external experts and (b) the level of crises (see Table 4.2). The 
coding scheme classifications were developed based on preliminary research: a pre-study 
of ten crises and ten in-depth interviews with crisis management experts. In coding the 114 
evaluation reports, we identified 302 external experts who were involved on 436 occasions 
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in the 60 crises. Some of these experts were thus involved in multiple crises. As such, n = 302 
for variables measuring external expert characteristics, n = 60 for variables measuring crisis 
characteristics, and n = 436 for variables measuring crisis-expert relational characteristics. 
The coding process was carried out by two researchers independently, and the average inter-
coder reliability was 85 percent. After discussing differences, the two researchers agreed 
final codes. 
After identifying the external experts, we coded them based on the five characteristics 
that we were interested in. First, for the background of the expert, we used five categories: 
public, non-profit / voluntary, semi-government, private, and academic. For the initiative 
for involvement, we established three categories: crisis organization, other expert, and 
own initiative. For the moment of connection characteristic, we had two categories that 
were intended to tap the ad hoc versus pre-crisis established nature of the relationship 
with the external expert. The reason for involvement characteristic aimed to capture the 
primary relevance of the external expert for the crisis response. Here, we differ between four 
categories, including independent expertise and proximity to the crisis location. Finally, the 
term of involvement characteristic aimed to capture the duration of the expert’s involvement 
with the crisis management organization, which can be either on (an) occasional moment(s), 
for a longer period of time; or during the largest part of the crisis.
Table 4.2 Coding scheme for characteristics of expert involvement and crisis
Level Characteristic Categories








Expert already present in network; became involved during crisis
Reason for 
involvement
Material threat to existence; threat to task performance; proximity to 
crisis location; specific knowledge
Term of involvement Occasional; longer period(s); structural
Crisis Number of external 
experts 
[number]
Type of crisis Natural; traffic and transport; infrastructural; public services; public 
health; veterinary crises; technological crises; public order; terrorism; 
foreign
Crisis dynamic Fast-burning; average; slow-burning
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When it came to coding the crises, we included the number of external experts as a simple 
count variable by totaling the number involved in each crisis. Two characteristics, type of 
crisis and crisis dynamic, were determined using existing categories as a basis (Muller et al., 
2009; Rosenthal et al., 2001). 
Part II
In order to obtain a better understanding of the relationship between expert involvement 
and adequacy of crisis management, in part II we qualitatively checked the evaluation 
reports on reported aspects of adequacy of crisis management. We coded statements in 
the reports that explicitly refer to a relationship between the involvement of an expert and 
adequate crisis management processes. Given that an aim of the evaluation reports was 
to assess the crisis management process, such qualitative judgements and interpretations 
were generally clear and explicit. For example, the report after the 2007 petstore crisis in 
Hoogeveen concluded: “If a liasion of the RIVM were included in the Regionaal Operationeel 
Team [crisis management response structure] at the time the RIVM was at the incident 
location, the information provision [...] would have been more effective” (Bos et al., 2008b, p. 
39). We uncritically accepted the conclusions in the evaluation reports rather than making 
our own judgements on what was ‘adequately managed’ or not. 
After carefully analyzing all the statements, the two researchers separately grouped the 
statements to create recurring themes. After comparison and discussing their groupings, 
this resulted in 27 themes, such as ‘involving experts to provide a second opinion’ and ‘the 
maintenance of an expert network in non-crisis times’. Some of the themes turned out to be 
closely related, or to have quite similar meanings, such as ‘as a second opinion’ and ‘consulting 
crisis managers that have experienced similar crisis events in the past’. Given this situation, 
we further grouped these 27 themes to provide a final list of six main opportunities and 
threats linked to expert involvement, and ten conditions under which expert involvement 
contributes to reported adequate crisis management.
4.5 RESULTS 
4.5.1 Part I – The role of external experts in Dutch crisis situations
Background of experts and frequency of involvement 
Frequency of involvement. The data show that external experts are frequently involved in 
crisis response activities. In 56 of the 60 crises, we identified the presence of at least one 
external expert. There is little restraint on involving experts: on average almost seven experts 
were involved in each crisis. In 40 percent of the crises, fewer than five external experts were 
involved; in 10 percent of the crises 15 experts or more. There is also a striking variation 
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in their involvement between crisis types and crisis dynamics. For example, a total of one 
hundred external experts were involved in the three veterinary crises in our dataset. One 
possible explanation is that this is due to the slow-burn nature of these crises combined with 
the strong need for specialized technical knowledge and skills. Of all the external experts in 
our dataset, 90 percent were organizations rather than natural persons. 
Background of expert. Table 4.3 provides the backgrounds of the experts and the types 
of crisis they were involved in. The specific context of a crisis determines which experts are 
‘internal’ and which are ‘external’ to the (strategic) crisis management response structure 
(as explained in the research design). For example, in the 2010 Strabrecht’s heath wildfire, 
the affected municipality viewed the Ministry of Defense as an external actor, due to their 
irregular contact in normal times. Similarly, the German fire brigade involved in the crisis 
response to the 2000 fireworks factory explosion in the city of Enschede was perceived as 
external. Clearly, external experts are a heterogeneous group of actors including people acting 
on their own (such as an individual explosives expert), private companies (Microsoft), non-
profit healthcare organizations (Red Cross), academic institutions (Architecture Department 
at Delft University of Technology), semi-public organizations (Institute for Applied Science 
(‘TNO’), and public organizations (Department of Waterways (‘Rijkswaterstaat’)). 
Table 4.3 Public-private background of external experts per type of crisis
Background of expert









Natural 16 7 0 12 3 38
Traffic and 
transport
21 8 4 15 1 49
Infrastructure 20 24 2 25 3 74
Utility services 6 1 3 14 0 24
Public health 24 24 9 20 7 84
Veterinary 20 51 0 14 15 100
Technological 5 1 0 2 0 8
Public order 10 12 1 5 2 30
Terrorism 2 3 0 0 0 5
Total 124 131 19 107 31 412
Note: the backgrounds of 24 experts were not provided in the reports.
4
the role oF external expertS | 99
Predominantly, the external experts involved were either private companies (30 percent), 
non-profit / voluntary organizations (32 percent), or public sector organizations (26 percent). 
Examples are, respectively, Shell’s fire brigade which became involved in the 2011 fire at the 
Chemie-Pack chemical industry at Moerdijk; the Institute for Psychological Trauma (IVP) 
involved in the 2011 Alphen aan den Rijn shooting in a shopping mall; and the Municipality 
of Amsterdam in the 2011 sinking of the ‘t Loon shopping mall. Fewer than 8 percent of 
the experts were scientific organizations such as the Utrecht University Veterinary Science 
Department that was involved during the 2007 Q fever outbreak. Table 4.3 shows how 
the background of the external experts varied by the type of crisis. Private sector experts 
were, for instance, relatively over-represented in infrastructure and utility services crises 
responses. 
Why are external experts involved?
Initiative for involvement. In the majority of cases (60 percent), the crisis management 
response structure actively involved the external expert in its crisis response activities. 
Active recruiting of external experts might be in line with expectations. However, we found 
that in more than 25 percent of the cases, the experts took the initiative to become involved. 
For example, the energy consultancy company KEMA became involved, as it was already 
present on the Amercentrale energy plant site when scaffolding collapsed within the power 
plant in 2003. During the 2009 crash of Turkish Airlines flight 1951 at Schiphol Airport, a 
traumatologist was by coincidence present and stepped in to help. A further 13 percent of the 
external expert involvement was as a result of being invited by another expert. For example, 
after the 2009 bunker explosion in Bilthoven, the Dutch Labour Inspectorate engaged EOCKL 
and TNO who were specialists in the making safe of explosives. 
Moment of connection. In 67 percent of the cases relations with the external experts 
were established ad hoc. This implies that most external experts were recruited by the crisis 
management response structure at a certain moment during the crisis response phase (for 
example as result of a search for specific knowledge needed in the crisis) or that an expert 
introduced itself. Only in a one-third minority of cases the experts were already present in 
the network of the crisis management structure and relations were established before the 
crisis occurred, for example as a result of preparations or as a result of collaboration during 
a previous crisis or crisis training.
Reason for involvement. On the basis of the mainstream crisis literature, one would expect 
the main motivation for involving external experts stems from their specialized ‘technical’ 
expertise and skills and, indeed, in many instances this was true. For example, when the 
2003 Avian Influenza outbreak was suspected, samples were sent to the Central Veterinary 
Institute (‘CVI’) in Lelystad for laboratory testing, which a day later confirmed that there 
was indeed an outbreak. 
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Although being a technical expert is a common reason for involvement, this only seemed 
to be the case in half of the crises we studied (see Table 4.4). Involvement of an expert can also 
be a consequence of proximity to the crisis location. For example, in the 2011 Chemie-Pack 
fire at Moerdijk, Shell’s private fire brigade provided direct assistance due to its proximity to 
the fire location. In 36 percent of the cases, experts are involved because of their tasks and 
responsibilities in such situations. For example, the Royal Netherlands Sea Rescue Institution 
(‘KNRM’) was logically involved in the search-and-rescue activities after the 2006 Emergency 
landing of a helicopter in the North Sea. In 8 percent of the cases, involvement was the result 
of a direct material threat to the organization concerned. Organizations hit by a crisis seem 
often automatically to qualify as experts. For example, during the 2011 Natrium fire at a 
chemical plant in Farmsum, the crisis management response structure quickly involved Dow 
Chemical, the plant owner, in its crisis team and at the press conference. 
Table 4.4 Typology of external experts in crisis situations 
Type of expert Frequency Primary reason for involvement
Technical expert 49% Outstanding technical knowledge and/or skills
Proximity expert 7% Proximity to crisis location; easy to connect to and quickly deployable
Task expert 36% Responsibilities for accomplishing certain tasks 
Threatened expert 8% Expertise on processes in own organization threatened with material 
losses
Term of involvement. Finally, we saw that around half of the external experts were involved 
only occasionally during the crisis. For example, during the 2009 death threats at schools in 
the city of Weesp, a specialized company was asked to provide camera images and make them 
appropriate for further investigation. Over a third of the external experts became involved 
over a longer period during the crisis response phase. For example, Foundation Juvans 
continued to provide mental healthcare after the immediate response to the 2009 exposure 
of long-term sexual abuse of children in a Den Bosch swimming pool. Only 15 percent of the 
experts were involved on a structural basis, during the largest part of the crisis response, 
establishing a close cooperative relation with the (strategic) crisis management response 
structure. For example, the energy network operator Continuon became involved during 
the 2007 Power outage at Bommeler- en Tielerwaard when an Apache helicopter crashed and 
hit several power lines. 
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4.5.2 Part II – Conditions under which expert involvement contributes to 
adequate crisis management 
In order to integrate the specific crisis contexts, we carried out an in-depth analysis of the 
evaluation reports. This analysis resulted in the identification of six opportunities and 
threats and ten conditions under which expert involvement contributes to adequate crisis 
management. 
Opportunities and threats in external expert involvement
The rich content and thick descriptions in the evaluation reports provide considerable 
information about factors that stimulate or impede the successful involvement of external 
experts in crisis responses. From the reports, we distilled three main opportunities and 
three main threats to adequate external expert involvement in responding to a crisis (Table 
4.5).
Table 4.5 Main opportunities and threats of external expert involvement in crisis response
Opportunities Threats
Knowledge acquisition Loss of consensus and decisiveness
Use of operational skills Loss of control
Increase of legitimacy Interference of private interests
Opportunities: integrating knowledge, skills, and reputation
Knowledge acquisition. Typically, in times of crisis, reliable information is scarce. Expert 
knowledge can reduce uncertainty and chaos by providing sense and meaning to events. 
It enables a better assessment of the causes and consequences of an event, and may offer 
appropriate courses of action. Based on their previous experience and specialized knowledge, 
experts are able to recognize patterns quickly. Especially in technologically advanced 
domains, such as in ICT, chemistry, and transmittable diseases, the crisis management 
response structure needs to rely heavily on external experts. External experts not only 
provide general and highly specialized advice, but second opinions to evaluate the reliability 
of existing information. This role of the chemical company DSM and the NedTrain and 
Railion railway companies was demonstrated in the 2002 tank wagon leak at Amersfoort 
railway station (Geveke et al., 2002) discussed in the introduction.
Use of operational skills. Sometimes external experts’ specialized operational skills enable 
them to carry out highly complex tasks where operational errors could have dramatic 
consequences. For example, in the 2001 foot-and-mouth outbreak (in which around 270,000 
cloven-hoofed animals were culled), the crisis management response structure collaborated 
with Rendac, a company specializing in animal disposal. Rendac carried out a variety of crisis 
response operations, such as retrieving animal carcasses from infected farms, destroying 
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the carcasses, and collecting manure and milk from the vaccinated areas. The report states 
that Rendac “played a crucial role in the operational response” (Abbas et al., 2002, p. 179).
Increase of legitimacy. The crisis management response structure can use the reputation 
of external experts to build trust, integrating the expert’s reputation into the organization’s. 
Neutrality can be a crucial asset in the de-politicization of crises – especially when deployed 
in crisis communication. Engaging experts can bring broader societal values and interests 
into the crisis organization. For example, during the 2007 Q fever outbreak (a highly 
contagious zoonotic disease found in goats), the crisis organization established an expert 
council which held periodic meetings with a broad range of experts (including, among 
others, animal health services ‘GD Animal Health’, the Public Health Services (‘GGD’), the 
Dutch Federation of Agriculture and Horticulture (‘LTO Nederland’), Utrecht University 
department of veterinary science, Centre for Infectious Disease Control (‘CIb’), and the 
National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (‘RIVM’). The function of this 
council was to provide the crisis organization with general advice, new strategies, and 
estimates of likely effects regarding their response to the Q fever outbreak. This consultation 
increased the legitimacy of the crisis response (Van Dijk et al., 2010).
Threats: loss of consensus, control, and public values 
Loss of consensus and decisiveness. Involving external experts often brings additional views 
and opinions to the table, which makes crisis management more complex. External experts 
may also make decision-making processes unclear because their role, and the formal status 
of their advice, is often undefined. Involving multiple experts also creates a risk of receiving 
contradictory expert advice. For example, in the 2005 grounding of the container ship 
Fowairet (carrying hazardous substances) in the Westerschelde estuary, two external experts 
(RIVM, the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, and DCMR, the 
joint environmental protection agency) were involved in calculating effect distances. Their 
conclusions, and also those of an internal study by the fire department, differed widely, and 
this complicated the decision-making process. The evaluation report concluded that there 
should always be either an unambiguous outcome of expert advice that is not susceptible 
to discussion, or a sound explanation for any differences (Hartman and Schweden, 2006). 
Loss of control. By involving external experts, the crisis management response structure 
gives away a certain degree of autonomy and influence. An external expert may, for example, 
be provided with highly sensitive or classified information and yet, at the same time, use 
their own communicating channels to the media and involve their own network. Further, 
once consulted, it is often difficult for crisis managers to disregard an expert’s advice. For 
example, in the 2011 Diginotar cyber security hack, which posed a threat to the privacy of data 
of Dutch citizens and companies, the crisis organization closely collaborated with Microsoft. 
The crisis organization asked Microsoft not to implement a software update because this 
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would block the DigiNotar digital protection certificates. However, Microsoft implemented 
the update to emphasize its independent status. Microsoft also refused to collaborate with 
the (strategic) crisis management response structure on issuing a shared press report and 
released its own version of events (IVenJ, 2012).
Interference of private interests. The reports show that the private interests and private 
values of external experts are sometimes at odds with the interests of the (strategic) crisis 
management response structure. Private actors could themselves be viewed as stakeholders 
in the crisis and to some extent have their own agendas, which brings into question the 
democratic legitimacy and accountability of the crisis organization. For example, in 
the 2009 Mexican flu outbreak, the crisis organization worked together with Professor 
Coutinho of the Centre for Infection Disease Prevention (CIb) and Professor (of virology) 
Osterhaus of Erasmus Medical Centre. These two ‘super experts’ played an important role 
in communications with the media, even acting as the ‘public face’ of the (strategic) crisis 
management response structure. The involvement of Professor Osterhaus became highly 
controversial and was criticized when his interests in the pharmaceutical industry were 
discovered by the media (Helsloot and Van Dorssen, 2011). 
Conditions under which expert involvement contributes to adequate crisis 
management 
The stimulating and impeding factors, described above, are sometimes two sides of the 
same coin. Sound crisis management needs to balance these factors. Based on the analyses 
above, and other statements in the evaluation reports, we were able to identify ten conditions 
which, if met, lead to expert involvement contributing to adequate crisis management. 
Involve external experts only when actually needed. When a crisis breaks out, the crisis 
management organization should only involve external experts if the specialized knowledge 
and skills required are not sufficiently available within the organization itself. Working 
with experts that are part of the (strategic) crisis management response structure can 
reduce coordination problems. For example, in the 2011 mental healthcare facility fire at 
GGZ Rivierduinen, the crisis organization decided to not involve any external experts on the 
grounds that it had “sufficient housing capacity for calamities, both in terms of facilities and 
required expertise and treatment capacity. Rivierduinen itself plays a role in the psychosocial 
assistance during [regional] disasters” (Zannoni et al., 2011, p. 43).18
Maintain an expert network in non-crisis times. Maintaining a network of experts in non-
crisis time facilitates effective collaboration when a crisis arises. Through pre-established 
personal contacts, joint training exercises, and simulations, the crisis organization gains a 
clearer view of the functional areas and crisis scenarios covered by the external expertise. 
For example, in reaction to the outbreak of the 2008 Vroomshoop asbestos fire, collaboration 
18  Since all evaluation reports are written in Dutch, all quotes are translated. 
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was initiated with two asbestos removal companies, Hein Heun and RPS. Both these 
experts were asked for advice on a possible evacuation. The evaluation report concludes 
that collaboration commenced late because “the municipality and emergency services had an 
insufficient picture of the network of external partners that, in the event of an incident, could 
have a possible role”, and that this resulted in late crisis response measures (Bos et al., 2008a, 
p. 3). 
Be familiar with each other’s roles and plans. If the crisis management response structure 
and the experts are familiar with each other’s general and crisis-specific tasks and 
responsibilities, they will coordinate more effectively during a crisis. The availability of basic 
agreements and principles for the roles of external experts creates clarity and ensures that 
important expertise is not overlooked. At the same time, blueprints can leave insufficient 
room for flexibility, so an optimum needs to be found. In the 2006 emergency helicopter 
landing in the North Sea the collaboration with the Royal Marines, the Coast Guard, and 
the Dutch Oil company was suboptimal because the actors were insufficiently aware of each 
other’s roles and expectations, to an extent due to unclear plans. The report concludes that 
“ for good cooperation it is important that parties know each other, each other’s interests, and 
each other’s responsibilities, authorities, and tasks” (Bos et al., 2007b, p. 57).
Employ clear and close communication lines. Communication lines between the crisis 
organization and external experts are often inadequate, resulting in suboptimal sharing of 
information. Communication lines should be short and direct, which could be achieved by 
appointing liaison officers in the (strategic) crisis management response structure and in 
the expert organizations. Often effective communication is achieved through face-to-face 
contact. For example, in the 2007 regional failure of the drinking water supply in Noord-
Holland, information exchange was fast because a liaison officer from the drinking water 
specialist PWN had been included in the crisis management team. Nevertheless, the report 
notes that the communication lines would have been still better if the roles of the liaison 
officer were clear (Bos et al., 2007a).
Define clear mutual expectations. From the reports, it is apparent that, for adequate crisis 
management, it is important that experts know what is expected of them in terms of their 
role and expertise. Several reports conclude that if expectations had been set more clearly at 
the start of the cooperation, crisis response activities would have been better performed. For 
example, in the 2007 pet store crisis in Hoogeveen (people acquired acute health problems 
for unknown reasons), measurements were carried out by the environmental safety service 
‘MOD’, the National Poisons Information Centre (‘NVIC’), and Groningen University 
Medical Center (‘UMCG’). The evaluation report concludes that collaboration with the 
external experts was inadequate, because of the unclear status of the advice from the various 
experts (how to ‘weight/value’ it) and therefore uncertainty over how this advice should be 
included in decision-making (Bos et al., 2008b).
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Request specific information. Although there are cases where the crisis management 
response structure consults experts for general strategic advice, requesting specific technical 
information stimulates more effective collaboration. It reduces the probability of redundant, 
and sometimes contradictory, information and advice, and sets clear expectations. It 
emphasizes the autonomy of the crisis management response structure vis-à-vis the external 
expert. In addition, it enables better reflection on tasks in a later stage. For example, in 
the 2003 Wilnis dike inundation, the crisis organization requested GEO Delft, a technical 
research institute, to test the silt for harmful substances. The next day, GEO Delft concluded 
that the silt was not contaminated, providing an adequate basis for appropriate decisions 
(Houben et al., 2004). 
Consult crisis managers with experience; request second opinions. The reports show that 
seeking advice from crisis managers who had experienced a similar crisis proved very 
effective. For example, in the 2011 Alphen aan den Rijn shopping mall shooting incident, the 
crisis management organization received advice on external communication with victims 
from officials involved in the response to the 2009 Queens Day assault in Apeldoorn, 
which contributed to delivering adequate external communications (IOOV, 2011). The 
independent view of expert outsiders can further validate or question information and make 
decisions more reliable/credible. For example, in the 2011 sinking of the ’t Loon shopping 
mall, a professor of architecture pointed to specific weak construction parts. Another 
external expert was consulted to examine these parts, who confirmed their good condition 
(Engelbertink et al., 2012).
Anticipate conflicts of interest; build mutual trust in a dynamic process. (Strategic) crisis 
management response structures should anticipate differences in interest. However, the 
private interests of an external expert need not necessarily stand in the way of effective 
collaboration. The reports show that mutual trust is essential for effective collaboration. 
Nevertheless, if needed, the (strategic) crisis management response structure should always 
be willing to remove or exclude an expert from the crisis team. In the 2005 power outage 
in Haaksbergen, initial collaboration with the energy network provider Essent went well. 
However, mutual trust was damaged when Essent announced that, contrary to expectations, 
the energy supply would not be restored that evening. The evaluation report concluded that 
the debate on the exact agreements made between the parties hindered adequate crisis 
management (Dorst et al., 2006).
The (strategic) crisis management response structure should remain in the lead. The position 
of external experts vis-à-vis the (strategic) crisis management response structure differs 
between crises: they can be included in the crisis team, carry out tasks under the supervision 
of the (strategic) crisis management response structure, or act largely independently. It 
may sound obvious, but the reports stress that the (strategic) crisis management response 
structure must, at all times, hold onto its coordinating role and make the final decisions. 
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The ship fire specialist company, Svitzer Wijsmuller offered its services several times during 
the 2007 ship fire in Velsen, which is initially refused by the (strategic) crisis management 
response structure. At a later stage, when its expertise is needed, after internal discussions, 
the (strategic) crisis management response structure decided to involve the expert company. 
The evaluation report concludes that the way the company’s expertise was involved 
contributed strongly to the adequate crisis management (Zannoni et al., 2007).
Explicitly coordinate external communication. Many reports stress the importance 
of making clear arrangements with external experts regarding external communication. 
Experts may take part in external communications, either in a coordinated way or on their 
own initiative. Organizing specific moments, e.g. press conferences, to communicate pre-
agreed messages creates clarity and consistency. Here, it is also important that specialized 
knowledge and jargon are ‘translated’ to create a clear and understandable message. In 
dealing with the 2003 scaffolding collapse in the Amercentrale power station, the technical 
advice and skills of the energy company Essent and subcontractors Hertel and CMI were 
used. Due to a lack of pre-agreed arrangements, the subcontractors became involved in 
contacts with the media resulting in an inconsistent message being given to the public. The 
report concludes, “it would have been better if the municipality had clarified the arrangements 
regarding the spokesperson directly with all parties involved” (Helsloot et al., 2004, p. 80).
4.6 CONCLUSIONS
While the importance of integrating expertise in responding to crises has often been put 
forward in the literature, studies that empirically focus on the role of experts in the response 
to crisis have remained scarce (for exceptions see: Rosenthal and ‘t Hart, 1991; Grönvall, 
2001; Baekkeskov, 2014; 2016; Mendonça et al., 2008). Strikingly, systematic knowledge on 
the consequences of consulting external experts during crises seems absent; both in the 
literature and in crisis management practice. In this study, we examined external experts in 
crisis situations: how frequent they are involved, what role they play, how their involvement 
affects the quality of crisis management, and what conditions facilitate adequate collaboration 
with the (strategic) crisis management response structure. We analyzed data from 114 post-
crisis evaluation reports after 60 crises in the Netherlands. This research synthesis allowed 
us to provide systematic insights over a large number of cases based on a large amount of, 
well-grounded empirical data.
In our research synthesis, we observed that external experts are frequently, and sometimes 
in large numbers, involved in crisis responses. Their involvement in crisis responses not only 
stems from a demand for their technical expertise, but can also be a result of a threat to their 
organizations’ existence and responsibilities. The involvement of external experts during the 
crisis response phase provides crisis managers with opportunities to integrate knowledge, 
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carry out complex tasks, and increase their legitimacy, albeit with the downside that it can 
threaten a loss in consensus, control, and public values. From an in-depth analysis of the 
evaluation reports reviewed, we qualitatively distilled ten conditions under which expert 
involvement contributes positively to adequate crisis management. 
The systematic analysis of the empirical knowledge on the role of external experts in 
crisis situations points towards a number of interesting lessons for crisis managers and 
suggestions for further research. To start with, already in normal times (which in the Dutch 
context is labelled ‘the cold stage’), (strategic) crisis management response structures should 
put effort into identifying and collaborating with experts. Without ongoing crises, (strategic) 
crisis management response structures operate under less political and time pressure, and 
are better able to more ‘objectively’ judge what expertise is present in the organization and 
what is lacking and may need to be brought in. Based on this ‘risk analysis’, they can identify 
what external experts it might be useful to build up a relationship with. This research finding 
is in line with Perry and Lindell’s (2003) recommendation in the context of environmental 
threats. The authors state that, through vulnerable analysis, “planners and public can more 
readily recognize the limits of their expertise” (p. 341). In that way, the need for contacting 
experts who can bring in technical (e.g., geophysical or meteorological) knowledge becomes 
clear and is usually recognized. Further, since it will be easier to collaborate with someone 
you are familiar with, the cold stage can also be used to establish and maintain a network. 
In other words, effective expert involvement requires preparation and effort by the crisis 
management structure. We recommend future research in the areas of crisis preparation 
(e.g., building on Gilpin and Murphy, 2008; Scholtens, 2008) and on crisis networks and 
stakeholder collaboration (e.g., building on Comfort and Kapucu, 2006; Kapucu, 2006) to 
take this factor into account.
Another important lesson is that crisis managers should be aware of the consequences 
of involving experts. Although experts can help by filling important knowledge gaps, the 
study also points to potential negative consequences of expert involvement, an aspect which 
has, so far, not been extensively researched. In particular, involving external experts risks a 
loss in control and interference from conflicting interests. In that sense, expert involvement 
requires coordination to reduce these potential risks. The review shows that crisis managers 
sometimes have no choice other than to involve experts, and this strengthens the call to 
ensure that crisis managers have the guidance they need on how to manage the positive and 
negative consequences of expert involvement. Therefore, we recommend further studies that 
link the role of experts to the available theory on reputation and legitimization during crises 
(e.g., Christensen et al., 2016; Coombs and Holladay, 2006); on crisis communication and 
knowledge transfer/dissemination (e.g., Coombs, 2014; Majchrzak et al., 2007); sense and 
meaning making (Weick, 1988; Boin et al., 2005); and crisis learning (e.g., Moynihan, 2009; 
Broekema et al., 2017). A final suggestion for further research is to investigate the role of 
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experts in other, non-Dutch, institutional contexts to see if expert involvement might work 
differently under other governance systems with a different crisis management structure.
In the present study, we faced three main challenges. The first challenge relates to 
contingencies linked to the specific crisis situations (e.g, Rosenthal et al., 2001). Since the 
development and outcome of a crisis is highly context-dependent (Johns, 2006; Pierce and 
Aguinis, 2013), drawing general conclusions is difficult. Nevertheless, by systematically 
studying statements in evaluation reports, we were able to distill systematic and insightful 
lessons. The second challenge concerns the selection of crises. Situations that could easily 
have developed into a crisis – so called ‘latent crises’ – but did not, maybe because of adequate 
management or expert interventions, have not been included in this study but could have 
provided valuable lessons. We decided to include all ‘designated’ crises, not only large-scale 
ones with extensive media coverage, to minimize selection bias. Finally, although based on 
extensive post-crisis investigations by experts, evaluation reports might not always provide 
balanced narratives for reviewing crisis management, for example because of political 
influences diluting negative findings (cf. Birkland, 2006; Elliott, 2009). The reports might 
also overlook/exclude data on informal consultations and the roles of legitimization and 
actors’ private/individual interests. Overall, we found the reports to be rather similar in 
many respects, such as in their structures and methods of data collection. Hence, through 
our research synthesis, we have been able to report on an initial exploratory effort to collect 
and assess a relatively large amount of data on crisis management, which has enabled us to 
identify a number of key processes in expert involvement in crisis management, resulting in 
ten advisory points for crisis managers.
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5.1 ABSTRACT
This study explores public leaders’ organizational learning orientation in the wake of a crisis. 
More precisely, we study the association between public leaders’ public service motivation 
and their learning orientation (instrumental versus political). This research addresses the 
lack of systematic empirical data on crisis-induced learning and provides a first systematic 
operationalization of this important concept. We analyze survey data collected from 209 
Dutch mayors on their learning priorities in responding to a hypothetical crisis situation 
in their municipality. The mayors’ response patterns reveal (1) “cognitive”, (2) “behavioral”, 
(3) “accountability”, and (4) “external communication” dimensions of crisis-induced 
learning. We find that mayors with a stronger public service motivation put more effort 
into instrumental learning (dimensions 1 and 2), and surprisingly, also into political 
learning (dimensions 3 and 4). Mayoral experience in previous crises is positively associated 
with accountability-related learning after a crisis. However, mayoral tenure is negatively 
associated with crisis-induced behavioral learning.
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5.2 INTRODUCTION
Public leadership plays a central role in crisis management. In the wake of a crisis, public 
leaders are confronted with highly complex and challenging tasks. They have to engage in a 
variety of pressing activities at the same time (Boin and ’t Hart, 2003; Boin et al., 2016). One 
of the core crisis management challenges facing leaders is to foster organizational learning 
(Boin et al., 2008). Learning is a crucial process in achieving an adequate crisis response, 
a proper return to normality, and preventing future crises or, in other words, in creating a 
resilient organization. Thus, when under the strong political and media pressures brought 
about by a crisis, public leaders have to decide quickly which crisis-related learning activities 
to prioritize. 
On the one hand, public leaders need to put effort into instrumental learning: to develop 
deeper knowledge and understanding of the causes of the crisis and, where appropriate, 
adapt organizational aspects such as culture accordingly (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Huber, 
1991; Turner, 1976). On the other hand, public leaders are also occupied with political 
learning: refining their political crisis management strategy, allocating blame, limiting 
reputational damage, and improving the organization’s external communications (Boin et 
al., 2008; Birkland, 2006; May, 1992). In this paper, we explore the structural patterns in the 
organizational learning orientations of public leaders in the wake of a crisis, and seek an 
initial explanation for the differences in these orientations. 
There have been a considerable number of studies on public leadership in times of crisis 
(e.g., Boin and ’t Hart, 2003; Boin et al., 2016, Hadley et al., 2011; Comfort and Okada, 2013; 
Hale et al., 2006; Van Wart and Kapucu, 2011) but these tend to be somewhat empirically 
disconnected from the substantial number of studies on crisis-induced organizational 
learning (e.g., Birkland, 2006; Deverell, 2009; Carley and Harrald, 1997; Choularton, 2001; 
Toft and Reynolds, 1994). The extent that learning occurs differs from crisis to crisis and 
the literature has yet to clarify the factors that explain the extent of crisis-induced learning 
(Stern, 1997; Deverell, 2009; 2010). A recent study suggests a coherent pattern in public 
leaders’ orientations in their crisis-response activities (De Vries, 2016), of which crisis-
induced learning is a central one. Systematic empirical evidence on crisis leadership and 
crisis-induced learning needs to be established to address this knowledge gap (Smith and 
Elliot, 2007), including larger-n studies and more systematic operationalizations of crisis-
induced learning (Dekker and Hansén 2004, p. 141). This is a challenge because learning 
from a crisis is, by definition, different from the well-studied process of learning in normal 
situations (Moynihan, 2008).
The present study aims to contribute to this field by providing a more refined 
operationalization of public leaders’ crisis-induced organizational learning orientations. 
These learning orientations comprise cognitive learning, behavioral learning, accountability 
and external communication dimensions. We further argue that these leaders’ public 
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service motivation (PSM) – their motivation to pursue the public good (see Perry, 1996) – 
explains the variation in these orientations. Accordingly, we pose the research question: To 
what extent do public leaders’ public service motivation affect their organizational learning 
orientation in the wake of a crisis? We hypothesize that public leaders with relatively high 
levels of PSM will be more strongly oriented towards instrumental learning. Conversely, 
public leaders with relatively low levels of PSM are expected to have a stronger orientation 
towards political learning. 
To explore the organizational learning orientations of public leaders and test our 
hypotheses, we sent a survey to the mayors of all 391 Dutch municipalities with questions about 
a hypothetical crisis in their municipality since mayors have a key leadership function in the 
Dutch crisis management system. We asked the respondents to indicate the importance they 
would attach to several aspects of learning. We received 209 valid responses (response rate 
= 53 percent). The items included in the survey on specific aspects of crisis-induced learning 
were derived from previous surveys in the field of organizational learning (Garvin et al., 
2008; Goh and Richards, 1997; Chiva et al., 2007; Marsick and Watkins, 2003) and from the 
crisis management literature. We also included the public sector motivation measurement 
scale of Kim et al. (2013) plus a range of control variables tapping the characteristics of the 
mayor and the municipality. 
Below, we first discuss the literature on crisis-induced organizational learning, as a key 
challenge for public leaders, and how this might be associated with public leaders’ PSM. After 
a brief description of the context of mayors in the Dutch system of crisis management, we 
discuss our empirical design. After presenting the results of our descriptive and explanatory 
analyses, we conclude with a discussion on the relevance of our findings.
5.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
5.3.1 Leadership challenges in the wake of a crisis
Public leaders play a central role in the governance of crises, situations in which they are 
confronted with enormous challenges (Boin and ’t Hart, 2003; Boin et al., 2016; Comfort and 
Okada, 2013). Entrusted with extended responsibilities and competences – often far beyond 
the scope of their normal duties – public leaders are expected to guide their organizations 
through difficult times. In a crisis situation, public leaders represent government to the 
public and have to provide sense and meaning to events (Boin et al., 2016). Directing the 
crisis management organization, public leaders have to take decisions with potentially far-
reaching consequences under very complex circumstances (Boin et al., 2016; Comfort and 
Okada, 2013). They have to do this in a situation of chaos and stress, under time pressures, and 
often with only incomplete or unreliable information and few opportunities to consult other 
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parties (De Vries, 2016). In a crisis situation, the environment is often heavily politicized 
since political actors, the media, and a variety of stakeholders can create immense political 
pressure (Brändström and Kuipers, 2003). 
5.3.2 The challenge of organizational learning in times of crisis
In the immediate aftermath of a crisis, one of the key challenges facing a public leader is to 
initiate a process of organizational learning (Boin et al., 2008; Schiffino et al., 2016; Deverell, 
2010). Learning is of central importance because of the devastating and long-lasting physical, 
economic, ecological, and social consequences that crises can have. Through crisis-induced 
learning, a public organization can improve its crisis-response activities and incorporate 
measures to prevent future crises (Moynihan, 2008). Crisis-induced learning differs from 
organizational learning in regular times in many ways (Moynihan, 2008). The public, the 
media, parliament, and other stakeholders typically demand of government to learn lessons 
from a crisis and can put strong pressures on public leaders to initiate learning (Broekema, 
2016). In theory, a crisis can function as a catalyst for learning. A crisis can shake up a 
system, putting an end to long periods of institutional lock-in, and suddenly enable major 
organizational change. In the literature such situations are known as critical junctures, or 
windows of opportunity (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; Kingdon, 2003). Crises may reveal 
structural defects in a system that would otherwise have remained undetected, produce an 
upsurge in new information (Birkland, 2006), and establish the political consensus among 
stakeholders that is necessary to achieve change. 
Despite the merits of crisis-induced learning, a vast body of research reveals that, in 
reality, public organizations face major difficulties in learning from a crisis (see Smith 
and Elliott, 2007). Note that organizational change after a crisis should not be equated 
with learning, because change does not necessarily imply an improved performance (Fiol 
and Lyles, 1985; May, 1992). The context of a crisis also creates barriers and introduces 
complexities to learning (Roux-Dufort, 2000; Stern, 1997). Uncertainty, time pressures, a 
lack of reliable information, and disagreements on the causes and consequences of crisis 
events make it difficult to reflect adequately on events (Broekema, 2016). Moreover, in a 
crisis, organizations generally adopt a defensive attitude, making it difficult to identify 
errors and discuss improvements. Consequently, a ‘crisis learning paradox’ emerges: the 
very crisis situation that makes learning imperative also impedes the accomplishment of 
learning (Dekker and Hansén, 2004, p. 211).
5.3.3 Crisis-induced learning partitions
On the basis of the organizational learning and crisis management literature, we can 
theoretically distinguish between two dimensions of crisis-induced learning: (1) instrumental 
learning; i.e. a ‘technical’ process of adopting organizational adjustments based on the new 
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knowledge and understanding acquired, and (2) political learning; a process of finessing the 
organization’s political strategies and activities (drawing on May, 1992). We included the 
political learning dimension, because of the particular importance of political processes in 
the context of a crisis.
Instrumental learning
Instrumental learning is typically geared towards structural improvements in an 
organization. These embrace: (a) a cognitive process – the acquisition of new knowledge 
(cognitive dimension) and (b) a behavioral process – the transfer of this new knowledge 
into organizational adjustments (dimension learning) (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Broekema et 
al., 2017).
Cognitive dimension (knowledge acquisition). Acquiring new knowledge and 
understanding is a fundamental part of organizational learning (Argyris and Schön, 
1978). New information can provide an organization with insights into the underlying 
factors that caused the crisis and weaknesses in its crisis response activities (Birkland, 
2006). New knowledge can be obtained through reflecting on past events, among others by 
means of a public inquiry, evaluation studies, investigative journalism, and discussions in 
networks (Dekker and Hansén, 2004). Post-crisis evaluations are a common and accepted 
way of detecting organizational problems, despite some scholars questioning the actual 
contribution of evaluation reports to learning (Turner, 1976; Elliott, 2009). Organizational 
learning is not only about bringing new knowledge to the organization; it also concerns 
its proper dissemination within the organization (Huber, 1991). Processes of interpretation 
and sense-making are essential in making the knowledge appropriate for a transfer into 
organizational actions, and this is challenging from a crisis-learning perspective (Weick, 
1995; Boin et al., 2016).
Behavioral dimension (organizational adjustments). After an organization has acquired 
new knowledge, actions can be initiated through holding debates about new ideas in groups 
and teams within the organization. Subsequently, these ideas have to be translated into 
adjustments in the way the organization behaves (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Downe et al., 2004). 
This action part of learning can be considered as an implementation process that also has its 
related challenges (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Torenvlied 2000). One way to accomplish 
changes in peoples’ behaviors within an organization is through the top-down adoption of 
formal changes, such as creating or revising handbooks, protocols, procedures, or legislation 
(Birkland, 2006). However, top-down formal adjustments may not necessarily result in the 
desired behavioral changes (Birkland, 2006; Fiol and Lyles, 1985). Alternatively, changing 
the organizational culture can be a more profound way of learning, and this involves 
changing “beliefs and precautionary norms […] to fit the newly gained understanding of the 
world” (Turner, 1976, p. 381). However, this is recognized as a rather difficult process and 
“ full cultural readjustment [after a crisis] represents an ideal that is rarely achieved” (Smith 
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and Elliot, 2007, p. 520). As a further complication, organizational adjustment often takes 
place within a network of organizations (Moynihan, 2008).
Political learning
Political learning is the process of improving an organization’s political activities, and is 
typically geared towards the more short-term descaling and settlement of a crisis. Crises tend 
to politicize rapidly, with a range of actors competing intensively over various interests (Boin 
et al., 2008; Broekema, 2016), which can evolve quickly and unexpectedly (Brändström and 
Kuipers, 2003). In the immediate aftermath of a crisis, it is crucial that organizations deal 
adequately with its political aspects. This means they have to constantly adapt their political 
activities to the emerging context. Political learning requires “[…] a finely honed sense of the 
formal and informal rules of the political game and [to] know when such rules may best be 
invoked, stretched or ignored to best advantage” (Stern, 1997, p. 71). In times of high public 
scrutiny, organizations need to start dealing with processes of blame allocation, framing 
interpretations, and refining their political strategies in order to minimize reputational 
damage (Boin et al., 2009; Coombs, 2006). In the context of a crisis, a core part of the 
political process involves adequately organizing crisis communications to take account of 
stakeholder interests, map public support, and establish a dominant interpretation of the 
situation (Coombs, 2012). 
5.3.4 Public service motivation and crisis-induced learning 
The complex circumstances often turn crisis decision-making into a hurried situational 
judgement based on a leader’s intuitions, established before the crisis, rather than a profound 
analytical assessment of alternative courses of action (Gilpin, 2008). Strong political 
pressure, time constraints, chaos, stress, and insufficient information during a crisis result in 
a public leader’s personal characteristics playing a more important role in decision making 
than in more regular situations. That is, personal characteristics are an important factor 
in crisis decision making (Jong et al., 2016; Van Wart and Kapucu, 2011; De Vries, 2016; 
Deverell, 2010). Jong et al., in their study on mayoral leadership in times of crisis, concluded 
that ‘decision making is positively related to the level of intrinsic motivation to lead and the 
ability to motivate others in a crisis’ (2016, p. 54). It has also been suggested that the large 
variation in the decisions that public leaders take in response to crises is related to personal 
characteristics of their leadership (De Vries, 2016).
In the present study, we argue that a public leader’s public sector motivation (PSM) helps 
to explain the priorities they assign to organizational learning activities in the wake of a 
crisis. PSM has been studied extensively in the field of public administration in the past 
two decades (Perry and Hondeghem, 2008) and can be defined as “the motivational force 
that induces individuals to perform meaningful public service (i.e., public, community, and 
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social service)” (Brewer and Selden, 1998, p. 417). It is about holding “motives and action in 
the public domain that are intended to do good for others and shape the well-being of society” 
(Perry and Hondeghem, 2008, p. 3). The literature indicates a positive relationship between 
PSM and behavior that is seen by the individual as benefiting society (e.g., Andersen and 
Serritzlew, 2012). Nevertheless, individuals might be confronted with having to make a 
trade-off between the interests of the general public and those of themselves and individual 
clients. Jensen and Andersen (2015), for example, found that medical practitioners with a 
higher PSM, by prescribing fewer antibiotics (which is better for society due to problems of 
increasing resistance), focus more on serving the collective good. However, by doing so, they 
are being less responsive to the individual patient. Brewer and Selden (1998), when studying 
the link between PSM and whistleblowing, found that individuals with a higher PSM, 
motivated by their concern for the public interest, report wrongdoings more frequently, 
even if this may run counter to their self-interests (putting their job security at risk) or the 
interests of colleagues in the organization. In a contrasting finding, Schott et al. (2018) found 
that, when confronting public servants with dilemma scenarios in which their core work 
values were in conflict with each other, PSM had no effect on the respondents’ decision-
making. 
Learning in the wake of a crisis also entails trade-offs for public leaders as, in a short 
time frame, they have to decide which learning activities to prioritize. Under complex 
circumstances, these public leaders have to organize a range of simultaneous activities, such 
as acquiring an understanding of the causes of the crisis, collaborating with a variety of 
stakeholders, adapting organizational procedures, publishing media reports, and organizing 
press meetings. Here, the combination of an overloaded agenda and serious time pressures 
compels public leaders to prioritize certain learning activities. There is a potential trade-
off between putting effort into instrumental learning, i.e., acquiring an understanding of 
the crisis and implementing appropriate adaptations in the organization, and engaging in 
political learning, such as by adapting the organization’s political strategies. Following a 
similar logic to Jensen and Andersen (2015) and Brewer and Selden (1998), and taking into 
account that a crisis situation poses a sudden threat to the vital interests of society (Rosenthal 
et al., 2001), we expect that public leaders with a strong motivation to serve the public good to 
be most concerned with making structural improvements in the organization that increase 
the organization’s ability to prepare for and prevent future crises. Thus, their actions are 
likely to be aimed at accomplishing both cognitive and behavioral forms of instrumental 
learning. However, public leaders also have to manage blame and control reputational 
damage to the organization, while they may also fear losing their own position (Coombs 
and Holladay, 2002). Taking into account the complexities of learning from a crisis (Stern, 
1997), we expect public leaders with a relatively weak motivation to serve the public good to 
be more concerned with the short-term political implications of a crisis, and consequently 
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to be more oriented towards political learning processes. On the basis of these arguments, 
we therefore hypothesize that:
H1a. Public leaders’ level of public service motivation is positively associated with their 
orientation towards the organization’s cognitive instrumental learning in the immediate 
aftermath of a crisis.
H1b. Public leaders’ level of public service motivation is positively associated with their 
orientation towards the organization’s behavioral instrumental learning in the immediate 
aftermath of a crisis.
H2. Public leaders’ level of public service motivation is negatively associated with their 
orientation towards the organization’s political learning in the immediate aftermath of a crisis.
Before discussing the methods we used to measure crisis-induced learning and PSM, in the 
next section we will first explain the important role of Dutch mayors in crisis management.
5.4 DUTCH MAYORS AS COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF IN TIMES OF 
CRISIS
Dutch mayors are our object of study. In the Netherlands, mayors hold specific competences 
and responsibilities in the field of public security within the territory of their municipality. 
Beyond a general responsibility for public security, mayors hold the leading responsibility 
for crisis and disaster management (Municipal Act, 1992). In times of crisis, the mayor is 
the commander-in-chief of the municipal crisis management team and charged with the 
coordination of the local crisis response activities. The mayor is responsible for an adequate 
coordination of the crisis response as well as strategic administrative decision-making (De 
Vries, 2016; NGB, 2013). The mayor has direct authority over the deployment of the fire 
services and medical services operations, and can issue an emergency decree (Municipal 
Act, 1992). Further, mayors are central players in the local crisis management network of 
the wider safety regions (Min. VenJ, 2013). In effect, mayors represent the municipality 
within a multidisciplinary network of actors, including regular emergency services, i.e., 
police, fire, and ambulance services, as well as public and private actors within the context 
of the crisis (Scholtens, 2008). During a crisis, the mayor is responsible for external crisis 
communication, for example by organizing press conferences (NGB, 2013; Min. VenJ, 2013). 
Thus, overall, in the Netherlands, mayors have key leadership responsibilities and tasks in 
the area of public security within their municipality, and these are particularly extensive in 
times of crisis, when the mayor in effect becomes the commander-in-chief.
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5.5 METHODOLOGY
5.5.1 Data collection
Survey of Dutch mayors 
In the present study, we collected data about the relationship between public leaders’ PSM 
and their organizational learning priorities in the wake of a crisis, using a questionnaire 
sent out to all 391 Dutch mayors19 in fall 2015. In order to ensure the survey’s validity, we 
conducted a pre-test and further discussed the questionnaire with two municipal officials 
and two senior scholars. This led to some minor adjustments regarding formulations. The 
part of the broader survey that was relevant for this study consisted of three sections. First, 
there were a number of general questions to assess the background of the respondent. Second, 
the respondents were asked to express their level of agreement with a number of PSM-related 
items. Third, we confronted the respondents with a hypothetical crisis situation, described 
in ‘general’ terms. They were then asked to indicate the priority they would give to several 
aspects of learning in the wake of this hypothetical crisis.
In our initial approach, the mayors were contacted through the official e-mail addresses 
of the municipalities and asked to participate in an online survey. An identical hard-copy 
version of the survey was sent out by post one month later. Another month later, a friendly 
final reminder was sent by e-mail. In total, combining the responses collected with the 
online data collection software (Qualtrics) and the hard-copies returned, we had data from 
209 mayors (a response rate of 53 percent).
Particularly since mayoral activities in the wake of a crisis are politically sensitive, our 
study could be influenced by social desirability (Nederhof, 1985). We tried to minimize this 
risk by referring to a non-specific hypothetical crisis situation and by also guaranteeing 
anonymity. There are several indicators that suggest our sample is representative of the 
total population of municipalities and mayors in the Netherlands. Here, we compared 
the distribution of the sample’s municipality populations with official data published by 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS, 2017), as well as the respondents’ political affiliations20 and 
the political composition of the executive boards to data published by the Ministry of the 
Interior (Min. BZK). All three statistics suggest our sample is a good match to the wider 
population. The mayors participating in the survey had a wide range of ages (36 to 74) and 
the number of their crisis experiences also varied widely (0 to 8). No significant differences 
were found between the data in the online and hard-copy formats.
19  The Netherlands, excluding the Dutch Caribbean, was made up of 393 municipalities in 2015. Two mayoral 
positions (Neerijnen and Bloemendaal) were vacant at the time of the survey, with the official duties performed by 
a mayor of a neighboring municipality. Thus, our maximum sample at the time of the survey was 391 mayors.
20  Although, mayors in the Netherlands are not democratically elected but appointed, they are affiliated to a 
political party. 
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Measurement of crisis-induced learning priorities
The literature lacks an established scale for measuring crisis-induced learning. Therefore, in 
order to measure learning orientation in a crisis, we developed 21 items that each tap into an 
aspect of crisis-induced learning. These items were based on existing scales for organizational 
learning: the Learning Organization Survey (Garvin et al., 2008), the Organizational 
Learning Survey (Goh and Richards, 1997), the Organizational Learning Capability (Chiva 
et al., 2007), and the Dimensions of the Learning Organizations Questionnaire (DLOQ) 
(Marsick and Watkins, 2003). In addition, we drew on insights from the crisis management 
literature on crisis-induced learning related processes (see Table 5.1). 
Most of the items in the existing organizational learning surveys were not directly 
transferable to a crisis context, largely because they are related to continuous long-term 
learning processes in an organization. An example being ‘My organization measures the 
results of the time and resources spent on training’ included in the DLOQ (Marsick and 
Watkins, 2003, p. 144). We therefore adopted the items we saw as relevant by adjusting them 
to a crisis context. Some items needed minor adjustments to match Dutch crisis management 
practice, which we carried out based on the Dutch crisis management handbook for mayors 
(NGB, 2013). The resulting 21 items on crisis-induced learning relate to the dimensions of 
instrumental learning or of political learning, with the former being further subdivided into 
knowledge acquisition and organizational adjustments (see Table 5.1). The questionnaire 
used a ten-point Likert scale to assess the importance each mayor gave to each aspect of 
crisis-induced learning (ranging from 1 – lowest priority, to 10 – highest priority).
Table 5.1 Item generation for crisis-induced learning
Dimension and processes/
aspects
Item Literature source 
Instrumental learning
Cognitive dimension (knowledge acquisition)
Information acquisition IC1. The systematic collection of 
information
Marsick and Watkins, 2003; 
Garvin et al., 2008; Argyris and 
Schön, 1978; Turner, 1976; Elliott, 
2009; 
Time for reflection IC2. Despite the workload, create 
space and time for reflection 
Marsick and Watkins, 2003; 
Garvin et al., 2008; Toft and 
Reynolds, 1994
Sense- and meaning 
making 
IC3. Provide meaning to the events Boin et al., 2016; Weick, 1995; Boin 
and ’t Hart, 2003; Huber, 1991
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Knowledge 
dissemination
IC4. Internal dissemination of 
new information through the 
organization
Marsick and Watkins, 2003; Goh 
and Richards, 1997; Garvin et al., 
2008; Huber, 1991 
Evaluation study IC5. Have an evaluation study 
conducted by an external 
organization
Turner, 1976; Elliott, 2009
Learning environment IC6. Create an atmosphere in 
which employees can readily 
say what they think
Marsick and Watkins, 2003; 
Garvin et al., 2008; Chiva et al., 
2007 Carley and Harrald, 1997; 
Turner, 1976, 1978 
Openness to new ideas IC7. Create openness to new ideas 
of employees
Garvin et al., 2008; Goh and 
Richards, 1997; Chiva et al., 2007
Behavioral dimension (organizational re-adjustments)
Adaptation IB1. The quick implementation of 
improvements
May, 1992; Birkland 2006; Carley 
and Harrald, 1997
Procedural changes IB2. Reconsider organizational 
procedures and protocols
Birkland, 2006, Carley and 
Harrald, 1997; Toft and Reynolds, 
1994
Cultural re-adjustments IB3. Determine whether a change 
in the organizational culture 
is needed 
Garvin et al., 2008; Turner, 1976; 
Senge, 1990
Learning culture IB4. Launch training and courses 
for employees 
Garvin et al., 2008; Weick and 
Suthcliffe, 2001; Senge, 1990 
 Network learning IB5. Improve affairs in conjunction 
with the network outside the 
organization
Chiva et al., 2007; Moynihan, 
2008; Kapucu, 2006; Downe et 
al., 2004
Debating in groups IB6. Debate new ideas in group/
teams 
Marsick and Watkins, 2003; Goh 
and Richards, 1997; Garvin et al., 
2008; Chiva et al., 2007 
Political learning (refinement of political activities)
Political responsibility P1. Examine whether parties 
have acted according 
to their authorities and 
responsibilities
Boin et al., 2008; 2016; Toft and 
Reynolds, 1994; Olson, 2000
Dimension and processes/
aspects
Item Literature source 
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Political strategy P2. Refine the political strategy May, 1992; Birkland, 2006; 
Coombs, 2006; Boin and ’t Hart, 
2003
External communication P3. Frequently communicate 
to the external media about 
developments
Coombs, 2012; Seeger et al., 2003 
Allocation of blame P4. Pay attention to the allocation 
of blame 
Boin et al., 2008; Broekema, 2016; 
Olson, 2000; Coombs, 2006
Monitoring of public 
opinion
P5. Monitor public opinion, for 
example through social media
Chiva et al., 2007; Seeger et al., 
2003; Toft and Reynolds, 1994
Attention to interests of 
stakeholders
P6. Take into account the 
interests of external parties 
involved
Brändström and Kuipers, 2003; 
Boin et al., 2008; Kapucu, 2006
Mapping public support P7. Map public support for 
decisions 
Chiva et al., 2007; Coombs, 2012 
Reputational damage P8. Limit reputational damage to 
the organization
Christensen et al., 2016; Coombs 
and Holladay, 2002; Coombs, 2006
Measurement of public service motivation
For measuring PSM, we used the 16-item measurement instrument developed by Kim et 
al. (2013). This well-established measurement instrument has been validated across 12 
countries and builds upon the work of Perry (1996) and Kim and Vandenabeele (2010). The 
instrument distinguishes four dimensions of PSM: compassion (COM), self-sacrifice (SS), 
attraction to public service (APS), and commitment to public values (CPV). 
Measurement of control variables
In the survey, we measured several individual characteristics of the mayors, i.e., their gender 
[female=0, male=1]; age [2017 – year of birth]; experience as mayor [years in function]; 
political affiliation [0,1 for each of the Christian democrats (‘CDA’), liberal party (‘VVD’), 
social democrats (‘PvdA’) parties, the three main parties to which mayors are affiliated, 
and ‘other’]; number of crises experienced while in office [number]. We also included 
one characteristic to reflect the size of the municipality, i.e., the number of inhabitants 
Dimension and processes/
aspects
Item Literature source Dimension and processes/
aspects
Item Literature source 
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[<15,000=0, 15,000–25,000=1, 25,000–50,000=2, 50,000–100,000=3, >100,000=4]. These 
data were obtained from official sources (CBS, 2017).
5.6 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In the analysis, we first present descriptive statistics for the crisis-induced learning items 
and explore the related dimensions. Subsequently, we discuss the composition of the PSM 
construct. Finally, we present the results of the analysis as to the effects of the various PSM 
dimensions on the range of crisis-induced learning dimensions. 
5.6.1 Mayors’ learning priorities in the wake of a crisis: four crisis-induced 
learning dimensions
The descriptive statistics of the crisis-induced learning items (see Table 5.2) show that 
mayors attach significant importance to all the organizational learning processes in the 
immediate aftermath of a crisis (means = 5.33–8.82 on a 0–10 scale with N=185–194). The 
average mean score of all items is 6.92. Further, there are substantial variations in the scores 
for all the items (s.d. = 1.20–2.15). The largest variations found were for the “authority and 
responsibility” (P1) (s.d. = 2.15), “change in organizational culture” (IB3) (s.d. = 2.12), and 
“reconsidering organizational procedures” (IB2) (s.d. = 2.08) items. The most consistent 
scoring was for the “meaning to the events” (IC3) (s.d. = 1.20) and “systematic collection of 
information” (IC1) (s.d. = 1.31) items.
An explorative principal component factor analysis with Varimax rotation (using Stata) 
of the 21 crisis-induced learning items was carried out, and this identified four underlying 
dimensions which we labelled as cognitive learning, behavioral learning, political 
accountability, and external communication (see Table 5.3).21 The items were categorized on 
the basis of their highest factor loading; all of which were above 0.5. 
The items within the ‘cognitive learning’ dimension (IC1, IC2, IC3, and IC6) address 
processes of knowledge acquisition and reflection on crisis events, and therefore correspond 
well with the theoretically derived concept. This is the weakest of the four dimensions 
(Eigenvalue = 1.15). The items grouped within the behavioral learning dimension (IB3, IB4, 
IB5, IB6, IC7) are also largely in line with our expectations in that they all relate to adjusting 
the organizational culture and disseminating knowledge within the organization. This was 
by far the strongest factor, with an Eigenvalue of 6.58. 
21  We excluded item P8. ‘Limiting reputational damage’, because of its very low factor loadings (<.36) on all four 
factors. We also excluded item P2. ‘Political strategy’, despite its acceptable loading on the behavioral learning 
dimension because, in the context of an explorative study, it made offering a clear interpretation of the resulting 
factor difficult.
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Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics of the 21 crisis-induced learning items before regrouping
Dimensions and items N Mean S.d. Min. Max.
Instrumental learning
Cognitive dimension
IC1. Systematic collection of information 185 7.50 1.31 3 10
IC2.  Rest and time for reflection 187 7.72 1.45 1 10
IC3. Meaning to the events 185 8.45 1.20 5 10
IC4.  Dissemination of information 185 6.77 1.61 2 10
IC5.  Evaluation by external organization 190 6.62 2.03 1 10
IC6.  Open atmosphere 190 8.03 1.43 2 10
IC7.  Openness to new ideas 185 7.47 1.69 2 10
Behavioral dimension
IB1.  Quick implementation of improvements 193 7.08 1.83 1 10
IB2. Reconsider organizational procedures 191 5.85 2.08 1 10
IB3. Change in organizational culture 190 5.81 2.12 1 10
IB4. Trainings and courses 190 6.06 1.94 1 10
IB5. Networking outside the organization 185 7.24 1.56 2 10
IB6. Debate new ideas in teams 191 6.26 2.01 1 10
Political learning
P1. Authority and responsibility 194 6.27 2.15 2 10
P2. Political strategy 187 6.45 1.83 2 10
P3. External communication to the media 188 7.45 1.67 2 10
P4. Allocation of blame 187 5.33 2.00 1 10
P5. Monitoring public opinion 186 7.58 1.39 2 10
P6. Interests of external parties 186 7.04 1.40 3 10
P7. Public support for decisions 185 6.99 1.57 2 10
P8. Limiting reputational damage 187 6.45 1.83 2 10
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Table 5.3 Results of principal component analysis for the 19 crisis-induced learning items














IC1. Systematic collection of information .03 .19 .33 .68
IC2.  Rest and time for reflection .25 .05 .06 .80
IC3. Meaning to the events .08 -.04 .47 .56
IC6. Open atmosphere .45 .11 .14 .52
Behavioral learning
IB3. Change in organizational culture .69 .51 .04 -.09
IB4. Trainings and courses .76 .38 .05 .05
IB5.  Networking outside the 
organization
.74 .05 .15 .22
IB6. Debating new ideas in organization .76 .13 .03 .15
IC7.  Openness to new ideas .77 -.02 .03 .38
Political learning
Accountability
P1.  Authority and responsibility .14 .83 .20 .12
P4.  Allocation of blame .11 .64 .27 -.01
IC5.  Evaluation by external organization .02 .62 .09 .39
IB1.  Quick implementing improvements .42 .53 .12 .16
IB2. Reconsidering organizational  
 procedures
.57 .62 .04 -.14
External communication 
P3.  External communication to the 
media
.03 .27 .73 .07
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P5.  Monitoring public opinion -.09 .20 .78 .16
P6.  Interests of external parties .19 .09 .69 .20
P7.  Public support for decisions .55 .00 .58 .01
IC4.  Dissemination of information .44 .05 .51 .27
Factor loadings after Varimax rotation
However, the political learning structure that emerged is quite different from what we had 
expected on the basis of theory. We found two distinct political dimensions: one related to 
dealing with accountability processes and one related to refining external communication. 
The ‘accountability’ dimension included the ‘authority and responsibility’ and ‘allocation of 
blame’ items (P1 and P4). In addition to these two items, the dimension included one item 
related to external evaluation (IC5) and two linked to quick and procedural changes (IB1 
and IB2). The inclusion of an item on external evaluation appears reasonable since external 
evaluations are often considered as playing a central role in the post-crisis accountability 
process (Boin et al., 2016; Resodihardjo, 2006). The relatively high loadings of the quick 
and procedural change items onto this accountability dimension is more of a surprise. The 
analysis suggests that engaging in political activities and ‘reconsidering procedures’ and 
‘quick implementation’ themes tap into related prioritizing patterns. Reflecting on the crisis 
management literature on these two themes of crisis-induced learning, our result suggest 
that public leaders do not particularly view quick and procedural change as a structural 
way of learning, in contrast to other organizational forms of adjustments such as changing 
culture or training programs. The results suggest that public leaders implement quick and 
procedural changes as a political solution to external pressures (May, 1992; Broekema, 2016). 
The factor analysis shows that the remaining political items (P3, P5, P6, and P7) load onto 
the second political learning dimension that captures processes related to refining external 
communication. One further item, the ‘dissemination of information’ (IC4), also loads onto 
this dimension but this can easily be understood as a communication process.
5.6.2 Two dimensions of public service motivation
The mayors, on average, gave the PSM items consistently high scores (mean = 6.83–8.51, N = 
205–208). The overall mean score of all the items was 7.62. However, there were substantial 
variations among the mayors on all the items (s.d. = 0.85–1.60). The highest variations were 
for the “it is important for me to contribute to the common good” (CPI2) (s.d. = 1.60) and 
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“I believe in putting civic duty before self” (SS3) (s.d. = 1.39) items. The smallest variations 
were recorded for the “to act ethically is essential for public servants” (CPV7) (s.d. = 0.85) 
and “I admire people who initiate or are involved in activities to aid my community” (APS5) 
(s.d. = 0.95) items. The observation that mayors give the PSM construct high scores is not 
surprising given their large public responsibilities. Mayors in the Netherlands also serve as 
representatives of the public interest and the face of the community to the outside world 
(as ‘head of the community’). Although PSM measurement scales have been frequently 
tested, they have been mostly applied to civil servants and, occasionally, to private-sector 
employees (e.g., Taylor, 2010; Liu et al., 2012; Andersen and Kjeldsen, 2013), and especially to 
those providing public services (e.g., Andersen and Serritzlew, 2012; Jensen and Andersen, 
2015). This study shows that this scale can be applied to public office holders as well.
We conducted a principal component factor analysis with Varimax rotation of the 16 
PSM items to test whether the same dimensions identified by Kim et al. (2013, p. 92) are 
present in our dataset on mayors. From our data, we were able to identify two distinct factors 
in the PSM construct (see Table 5.4), each combining two of the four dimensions reported 
by Kim et al. (2013). All but one of the items that are in Kim et al.’s COM (compassion) and 
SS (self-sacrifice) dimensions load highly onto our first factor which we label ‘compassion 
and self-sacrifice’ (COM/SS). Also loading highly onto this factor is one item from Kim 
et al.’s ‘attraction to the public service’ dimension: finding it important to contribute to 
activities that tackle social problems (APS7). Our second factor includes all the other items 
from Kim et al.’s APS (attraction to the public service) and CPV (commitment to public 
values) dimensions, which we therefore labeled ‘attachment to public service and values’ 
(APS/CPV). 
Table 5.4 Results of principal component analysis for the 16-item PSM measure






Compassion and Self-Sacrifice (COM/SS)
Compassion 
(COM)
COM2. I feel sympathetic to the plight of the 
underprivileged 
.76 .33
COM3. I empathize with other people who face 
difficulties 
.65 .43
COM5. I get very upset when I see other people being 
treated unfairly 
.38 .42








SS1. I am prepared to make sacrifices for the good 
of society 
.72 .24
SS3. I believe in putting civic duty before self .67 .37
SS4. I am willing to risk personal loss to help 
society 
.75 .19
SS7. I would agree to a good plan to make a better 
life for the poor, even if it costs me money
.81 -.05




APS5. I admire people who initiate or are involved in 
activities to aid my community 
.38 .69
APS7. It is important to contribute to activities that 
tackle social problems 
.66 .49
CPI1. Meaningful public service is very important 
to me 
.16 .74






CPV1. I think equal opportunities for citizens is very 
important 
.42 .52
CPV2. It is important that citizens can rely on the 
continuous provision of public services 
.10 .84
CPV6. It is fundamental that the interests of future 
generations are taken into account when 
developing public policies 
.27 .63
CPV7. To act ethically is essential for public servants .26 .66
Factor loadings after Varimax rotation.
5.6.3 The effect of public service motivation on crisis-induced learning
To study the effect of PSM on the crisis-learning orientation dimensions, we conducted 
a series of OLS regression analyses using Stata. The two PSM dimensions were treated 
as independent variables and the four crisis-induced learning dimensions as distinct 
dependent variables. The mayor’s ‘gender’, ‘age’, ‘mayor tenure’, ‘political affiliation’, and 
‘crisis experience’, and the ‘municipality population size’ were included as control variables. 
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The results are presented in Table 5.5 and show a significant positive effect of PSM on the 
prioritization of both instrumental learning and political learning processes in the wake of 
a crisis. The R-squared values range from .09 to .19.
Table 5.5 OLS regression of PSM and crisis-induced learning dimensions















-.08 (.09)  .22 (.09)**  .21 (.09)**  .18 (.09)*
Attachment to public 
service and values 
(APS/CPV)
 .22 (.10)** -.11 (.10)  .20 (.10)** -.01 (.10)
Control variables
Gender = male  .04 (.25)  .19 (.26) -.07 (.25) -.36 (.27)
Age -.00 (.01)  .02 (.01)* -.01 (.01)  .02 (.01)
Mayoral tenure ¹
1 – 2 years -1.26 (.46)*** -.67 (.47) -.47 (.46) -.47 (.49)
2 – 5 years - .61 (.35) -.36 (.36)  .08 (.35) -.15 (.37)
5 – 10 years -1.06 (.39)*** -.60 (.40)  .23 (.39) -.38 (.41)
> 10 years -1.00 (.36)*** -.70 (.36)*  .43 (.36) -.17 (.38)
Political affiliation ²
Christian democrat  .56 (.28)**  .15 (.28) -.01 (.28) -.07 (.29)
Liberal  .43 (.28)  .18 (.28)  .13 (.28) -.01 (.29)
Social democrat -.01 (.30)  .00 (.30)  .01 (.30)  .20 (.31)
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Crisis experience 
(number)
 .02 (.06)  .17 (.06)**  .03 (.06)  .05 (.07)
Municipality 
population size ³
15,000 – 25,000 -.06 (.29) -.17 (.30)  .26 (.29) -.10 (.31)
25,000 – 50,000  .26 (.27) -.24 (.28) -.33 (.27) -.26 (.29)
50,000 – 100,000  .12 (.38) -.47 (.38)  .23 (.38) -.25 (.40)
> 100,000 
inhabitants
-.09 (.54) -.18 (.55) -.18 (.54) -.10 (.58)
Constant  .33 (.77) -1.08 (.78)  .49 (.77) -.35 (.81)
R2  .19  .15  .17  .09
N  135  135  135  135
¹ Reference category < 1 year experience; ² Reference category = other affiliation; ³ Reference category = < 15,000. 
Unstandardized Coefficients
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
First, addressing cognitive learning, we find that the ‘compassion and self-sacrifice’ (COM/
SS) component of PSM has a small but significant effect (B = 0.18, p = .06) on the cognitive 
learning dimension. This confirms hypothesis H1a: PSM is positively associated with public 
leaders’ cognitive learning orientation. As regards cognitive learning, none of the other 
independent variables play a significant role. Second, the results show that ‘attachment to 
public service and values’ (APS/CPV) is significantly associated with behavioral learning (B 
= 0.22, p = .02). This confirms hypothesis H1b: PSM is positively associated with behavioral 
learning. The results also show that experience as a mayor plays a negative role (if ‘mayoral 
tenure’ 1–2 years, B= -1.26, p = .007; if ‘mayoral tenure’ 5–10 years, B = -1.06, p = .007; 
and if ‘mayoral tenure’ > 10 years, B = -1.00, p = .006) in that the longer a mayor has been 
in post the more reluctant they are to adjust the organization’s culture. One explanation 
could be that, the longer a mayor has been working in a municipal administration, the more 
they become socialized to the organization’s culture and identify with the organization’s 
structure and procedures, making them less willing to change things.
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Both of the political learning dimensions that came out of the principal component 
analysis were included in the regression analysis. First, the data indicate that the ‘compassion 
and self-sacrifice’ (COM/SS) dimension of PSM has a positive effect on accountability-
related learning (B = 0.22, p = .02). We also see that ‘crisis experience’ has a significant 
positive relationship with political accountability (B = 0.17, p = .01), which indicates that 
the more crises a mayor has experienced in a municipality, the more highly they prioritize 
this type of political activities. It seems that, the more that mayors have dealt with crises 
in their municipality, the more they are aware of the importance of political processes 
such as blaming and framing, and the more conscious they are of the importance of the 
political accountability process. Second, the analysis showed that both the COM/SS and 
APS/CPV PSM dimensions were positively associated with learning in terms of improving 
external communication (B = 0.21, p = .04; B = 0.22, p = .02). To conclude, PSM is positively 
associated with an orientation towards both political learning dimensions, which means 
that, hypothesis H2 has to be rejected. This finding seems to suggest that mayors also 
consider refining political processes in the immediate aftermath of a crisis as important 
for the public good (the organization and society) in the long run. Concentrating on purely 
political issues such as adapting the political strategy, allocating blame, dealing with external 
party interests, and limiting reputational damage, might be viewed as serving public values 
and the well-being of society similar to efforts into acquiring knowledge and changing the 
organization’s culture (i.e., instrumental learning).
5.7 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
This study has explored public leaders’ organizational learning orientations in the wake of a 
crisis, and the relationship between this and their public service motivation (PSM). The aim 
was to establish systematic empirical evidence on crisis leadership in connection with crisis-
induced learning and to refine the operationalization of the dimensions of crisis-induced 
learning (Smith and Elliot, 2007; Dekker and Hansén 2004). We investigated elements 
of crisis-induced learning that were derived from the crisis management literature and 
previous surveys in the field of organizational learning, and further applied the public sector 
motivation measurement scale of Kim et al. (2013), in a survey study among Dutch mayors. 
Our study revealed “cognitive”, “behavioral”, “accountability” and “external 
communication” dimensions of public leaders’ crisis-induced learning orientations and 
two dimensions of PSM: ‘attachment to public service and values’ and ‘compassion and 
self-sacrifice’, rather than the four identified by Kim et al. (2013). We found that mayors 
with a stronger PSM give higher priority to both instrumental (cognitive and behavioral) 
learning and political learning (accountability and external communication) than those 
with a weaker PSM in the wake of a crisis. This finding confirms our hypothesis that a 
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mayor’s PSM is positively associated with their orientation towards instrumental learning, 
but rejects our hypothesis that a mayor’s PSM is negatively associated with their orientation 
towards political learning. Further, we found that mayoral experience with previous crisis 
situations is positively associated with accountability-related political learning. Mayoral 
tenure is, however, negatively associated with behavioral learning following a crisis.
This study has several implications. First, the more refined operationalization of crisis-
induced learning provides an important step towards the establishment of a systematic 
measurement instrument for crisis-induced learning. One of the challenges in this study 
was related to the validity of conceptualizations of organizational learning, which has 
been defined and measured in many different ways (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Crossan et al., 
2009; Dekker and Hansen, 2004, p. 141). Moreover, despite crisis-induced learning being 
acknowledged as a focal issue in the managing of crises, crisis management research lacks a 
clear definition and operationalization of what learning in the wake of a crisis entails. Here, 
the four dimensions that we identified require further rigorous testing in new contexts – 
in terms of agents, organizations, and institutional settings – to build confidence in the 
measurement instrument. 
This study further contributes to the literature by addressing and specifying the political 
dimension of crisis-induced organizational learning in addition to a common ‘technical’ 
approach to the process (e.g., Choularton, 2001; Vastveit et al., 2015; Silva et al., 2017). Crisis-
induced learning inherently differs in several respects from organizational learning in more 
‘regular’ times. Our findings indicate that crisis-induced lessons are characteristically rooted 
in specific events and involve adjustments in political activities related to accountability and 
communication, such as attributing responsibilities, monitoring public opinion, balancing 
parties’ interests, and communicating to the media (see Boin et al., 2016; Seeger et al., 2003). 
In contrast, aspects of learning that entail continuous long-term organizational processes, 
or require calm periods, such as learning by trial-and-error and experimentation, are not, 
or only to a lesser extent, applicable to crisis-induced learning (see Marsick and Watkins, 
2003; Goh and Richards, 1997; Chiva et al., 2007; Garvin et al., 2008). The finding that public 
leaders who are oriented towards political accountability also tend to promote quick and 
procedural changes in an organization was unexpected, and suggests that leaders consider 
implementing procedural, less-structural, changes in response to political pressures. We 
recommend further research on the role of specific political learning processes (May, 1992; 
Birkland, 2006).
Moreover, the present study connects crisis-induced learning to public leadership 
theory. The analysis shows that public leaders’ approach to learning after a crisis can be 
explained by a systematic variation in PSM, rather than by idiosyncratic personality traits. 
If we consider PSM to be an orientation towards doing good for society, we see that public 
leaders with a high PSM are more oriented towards not only instrumental learning but, 
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perhaps surprisingly, also towards political learning. One interpretation is that such leaders 
not only consider instrumental learning but also political learning as being important for 
the organization and for the wider society in the long run. Political efforts such as adapting 
the political strategy, allocating blame, and limiting reputational damage might similarly 
benefit the public interest as efforts in acquiring knowledge and improving the organization’s 
culture. This suggests that, in the context of a crisis, both kinds of organizational learning 
are experienced as important in building resilience. The results of this study further stress 
the significance of experience as a factor in crisis-induced learning (Deverell, 2010). Finally, 
this study shows that it is appropriate to apply the PSM concept (Perry and Hondeghem, 
2008), and the measurement scale proposed by Kim et al. (2013) specifically, to public office 
holders and maybe even to political leaders. 
The critical findings in the analysis may provide support for education, trainings, and 
designing of simulations specifically addressing the needs of mayors in the response to crises. 
This might enhance the crisis preparedness of municipalities. Despite the limitations of our 
research, which is based on cross-sectional data derived from a specific group of respondents, 
the study does suggest that linking crisis-induced learning to actors’ motivations is a valid 
avenue for further research.
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this chapter provides a discussion of the main research findings 
and a reflection upon them. We present a summary of the study 
conducted, a discussion of the main findings, and an overall 
conclusion including a conceptual theoretical model outlining 
the main factors that influence crisis-induced learning by public 
organizations. Subsequently, we discuss the study’s contributions 
to theory and empirical understanding of crisis-induced learning, 
outline the limitations of the research, make suggestions for 
future research, and conclude with implications for practice.
138 | Chapter 6 ConCluSIonS and dISCuSSIon | 139
6.1 THE STUDY OF CRISIS-INDUCED LEARNING BY PUBLIC 
ORGANIZATIONS
Modern-day societies are faced with a large number of crises, events that severely affect 
the day-to-day lives of their citizens. Crises have a vast impact on societies, in terms of 
security, social stability, economic prosperity, environmental health, and how their 
public institutions are shaped. In the present study, a ‘crisis’ is understood as an extreme 
situation in which the core interests of a society are threatened with potentially devastating 
consequences, accompanied by high levels of uncertainty, urgency, and surprise (Rosenthal, 
2001; Boin and ’t Hart, 2003). Consequently, ‘crisis management’ is viewed as all activities 
aimed at preventing, responding to, and recovering from such an event. In the literature, 
and in practice, organizational learning is considered one of the key processes in crisis 
management, because it is through this process that public organizations are able to improve 
their crisis management performance. Organizational learning gives them the capability to 
prevent future crises from occurring or, if a crisis does occur, to respond more adequately 
and thus mitigate the damage created.
People expect public organizations to learn from crises. Many actors in society, including 
the media, perceive learning from a crisis as a rather straightforward process. However, 
one observes that, in reality, public organizations tend to experience major difficulties with 
learning from crises. This observation has been confirmed by a substantial and growing 
number of academic studies (Smith and Elliott, 2007; Stern, 1997; Deverell, 2009; Roux-
Dufort, 2000; Elliott, 2009; Moynihan, 2009; Birkland, 2009; Carley and Harrald, 1997). 
Nevertheless, crises show a large variation in the degree of organizational learning that 
results. We observed that while public organizations seem to often learn little from a crisis, 
suddenly they seem to learn extensively from another, similar, crisis. We identified this 
variation in crisis-induced organizational learning in many crisis contexts, across different 
policy fields, and with different types of crises, suggesting that there must be underlying 
mechanisms that explain this variation. However, the current body of public administration 
literature does not provide a clear reason for this variation. Organizational learning from 
crisis is not well-understood (Carley and Harrald, 1997; Deverell, 2009) and has gained 
relatively little attention (notable exceptions being Van Duin, 1992; Carley and Harrald, 
1997; Stern, 1997; Dekker and Hansén, 2004; Deverell, 2010; Birkland, 2006; Smith and 
Elliott, 2007). In particular, questions remain as to what factors and mechanisms drive 
crisis-induced organizational learning insofar as a solid convincing theory has yet to be 
developed (Smith and Elliott, 2007; Deverell, 2009; Stern, 1997). The aim of the present 
study has been to explore what main factors and mechanisms influence crisis-induced 
organizational learning by public organizations. This led to the main research question: 
How do public organizations learn from crises; and what factors and mechanisms explain this 
process of crisis-induced leaning? 
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The opportunities for learning from crises are not straightforward (Carley and Harrald, 
1997). On the one hand, crises are viewed as major opportunities for learning, because 
crises create a momentum for organizational change, and urgency and political pressure to 
implement lessons. In this line of reasoning, organizational learning is presented as a rather 
straightforward process: an evaluative investigation reveals the causes of a crisis, which are 
subsequently addressed by changes in the organization. On the other hand, crises are seen as 
complicating learning, because of the complexity of the circumstances surrounding a crisis. 
Typically, large inflows of biased information, strong interference from diverse political 
interests, and time pressure hinder a thorough and ‘objective’ reflection on past events. 
Further, organizational learning is subject to considerable conceptual discussion in the 
literature. In the present study, we took an integrated approach to organizational learning, 
including both cognitive and behavioral perspectives (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). We defined 
organizational learning as: the process of acquiring new knowledge and understanding 
(cognitive) and the transposing of this new knowledge and understanding into improved 
organizational actions (behavioral). A general theoretical framework was built upon existing 
distinctions in the fields of organizational learning and crisis management, distinguishing 
between ‘who learns’, ‘what is learnt’, ‘why it is learnt’, and ‘when it is learnt’. 
The present study was designed as a systematic empirical analysis of data from multiple 
crises. The aim was to build an initial proposition in the form of a theoretical model of the 
underlying factors and mechanisms that would be applicable in various policy, crisis, and 
institutional contexts (Pawson and Tilly, 1997). In this, the empirical data would lead the 
research design, although the crisis management literature was used as a general framework 
(Dubois and Gadde, 2002). Rather than looking at learning from a crisis in general, we 
analyzed learning on the level of specific crisis lessons. The present study included both 
qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods and considered a large number of crisis 
cases. The study was broken down into four sub-studies. In each sub-study, the cases and 
methods were selected on the basis of the study’s objective and context. In sub-study 1, we 
explored the main factors and mechanisms. An in-depth case study analysis was conducted 
of the learning by the Dutch food safety services organization (NVWA) in response to four 
veterinary crises between 1997-2010 in the Netherlands. This study was based on 17 expert 
interviews with members of the crisis management division and reviews of 27 internal 
and external crisis management documents. In sub-study 2, we addressed the role of issue 
politicization in the learning process of the European Commission after four major oil-spill 
disasters in European waters. We used political claims analysis (Koopmans and Statham, 
1999) to analyze 1,449 claims in national newspapers, national parliamentary debates, and 
European parliamentary debates, plus the pattern-matching technique (Trochim, 1989; 
Yin, 2009) to compare politicized issues, issues in evaluation reports, and new legislation 
adopted by the European Union. Sub-study 3 addressed the role of external experts in in-
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crisis learning. A research synthesis was performed on 114 post-crisis evaluation reports 
published after 60 crises in the Netherlands between 2000 and 2013. In sub-study 4, we 
explored the organizational learning orientation of public leaders in the wake of a crisis, 
and its relation with their public service motivation. In this, quantitative survey data were 
collected from 209 mayors in the Netherlands, including items on organizational learning 
priorities in the wake of a hypothetical crisis in their municipality. 
6.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS
In this section, we discuss the research findings from each of the four sub-studies, followed 
by a discussion of the general research findings that contribute towards the theoretical 
model. This provides an answer to the main research question.
6.2.3 Findings from sub-study 1: The factors and mechanisms that drive 
crisis-induced learning
In sub-study 1, an explorative study of the Dutch food safety services based on expert 
interviews, we distilled six factors that drive crisis-induced learning by public organizations. 
These factors were found to be of a divergent nature, often interrelated, and working through 
different mechanisms. The first two factors are external to the organization and lead in a 
direct way to tangible and large-scale lessons on crisis issues that correspond to specific 
events. (1) Political-economic context. Political pressure works in two directions. On the 
one hand, it puts pressure on an organization to actually draw lessons and generate the 
means and capacity needed to implement them. On the other hand, political pressure can 
forestall adequate reflection and the incorporation of lessons, and lead to adopting changes 
that do not reflect learning due the influence of various interests. Budget cuts can also create 
the political attention and scrutiny needed to adopt crisis lessons. (2) Social-emotional 
understanding. Specific events with large social-emotional impacts create awareness and 
pressure to change policies on the issues that allowed these events. Such dramatic events are 
referred to by employees using strong emotions, stories, and symbols, and form part of the 
common organizational memory. Media attention increases the impact of social-emotional 
events by magnifying attention and involving the wider public.
Two of the other factors found are internal characteristics of the organization and function 
as fundamental conditions for facilitating learning within organizations. (3) Organizational 
culture. Inter-collegial relationships and an open atmosphere of trust and individual 
face-to-face contacts facilitate an open discussion of failures and an adequate sharing of 
knowledge within the organization. Being motivated to acquire knowledge and improve the 
organization, plus professional attitude and status, facilitate learning. (4) Organizational 
structure. The structure of an organization, such as an established crisis management 
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division, can create the capacity and expertise required to be able to adequately evaluate 
events and implement changes in the organization. However, a large team and/or major 
reorganizations can disrupt communication channels as well as the learning culture. Crisis 
procedures/protocols and education and training/simulation programs sustain learning by 
structuring learning processes, such as through ensuring a debriefing-briefing session takes 
place. At the same time, structuring processes can inhibit people adapting their behavior to 
unexpected circumstances, which learning can require.
The last two factors are process-related. (5) Crisis management stage. During the crisis 
response stage, there is a great urgency to adapt organizational actions because these can still 
limit the impact of the crisis. However, this provides little opportunity to institutionalize 
lessons. In the post-crisis stage, time, calm, and available capacity enables a thorough 
reflection and the implementation of structural changes. However, during such more 
relaxed periods, crisis experiences can get lost and there is a lack of urgency to learn. The 
larger lessons are often learnt in an incremental way over a sequence of events. This happens 
through a process of fine-tuning and “maturing” over successive crises. (6) Organizational 
forgetting. In the longer run, the outflow of expertise and experience negatively affects 
learning. Lessons learnt are ‘forgotten’ as people leave the organization and reorganizations 
take place. Although lessons can be retained in an organization by the active sharing of 
knowledge, it seems that, paradoxically, for learning in the long-term, actual experience of 
crises is also necessary. 
Based on the expert interviews, neither post-crisis evaluation reports, a shared sensemaking 
of what lessons to learn nor public leadership were found to play a central role in the crisis-
induced learning process. 
6.2.4 Findings from sub-study 2: The effect of issue politicization on crisis-
induced learning is ambivalent
In this study, which looked into political claims, post-crisis evaluation reports, and new 
legislation in response to oil-spill disasters in the European Union, we found that the role of 
politicization in the crisis-induced learning process is complex and ambivalent. The study 
showed that politicization can either promote or impede crisis-induced learning through 
different mechanisms. In all four crises, the Braer, Sea Empress, Erika, and Prestige oil-spills, 
we found support for both roles of politicization, suggesting that other intervening variables 
are involved in explaining crisis-induced learning. On the one hand, politicization facilitates 
crisis-induced learning by creating increased attention, actor involvement, availability of 
information, understanding, public scrutiny, and motivation and pressure to learn. On 
the other hand, politicization impedes crisis-induced learning by creating an overload of 
unreliable information, interventions by actors and interests, conflicting interpretations, 
142 | Chapter 6 ConCluSIonS and dISCuSSIon | 143
and pressure for quasi-learning. Despite the contrary findings on the relationship between 
politicization and learning, we found most support for politicization having a promoting 
effect on both cognitive and behavioral learning.
We found that crises can be quickly and extensively politicized. Politicization can 
be understood as an increase in political conflict between actors in formal and informal 
political arenas on different levels (drawn on Wilde, 2011). Oil-spill disasters result in 
strong political conflicts between a large number and wide variety of actors involved on 
the question of what public organizations should learn from them. These issues are debated 
through the issuing of claims – political demands aimed at public organizations – in mass 
media, national parliaments, and the European Parliament. The technical feasibility of 
claims does not play an important role in the learning process. No evidence was found that 
politicization facilitates policy changes beyond those based on increased knowledge, that is, 
‘quasi-learning’. The new legislation adopted by the European Union in response to oil-spill 
disasters was strongly grounded in post-crisis evaluation reports. A plausible alternative 
explanation for the variation in crisis-induced learning by the European Union could be the 
characteristics of the post-crisis evaluation reports, and particularly the international focus 
of recommendations contained. No significant differences were found between mass media, 
national parliaments, and the European parliament in terms of politicization affecting 
learning. This is perhaps surprising since one might expect politicization on the formal 
political level to play a more prominent role than that on the public level, given the former 
is closer to decision making. 
6.2.5 Findings from sub-study 3: The conditions that facilitate the successful 
involvement of external experts in crisis-induced learning 
In this third study, on the role of external experts in crisis situations in the Netherlands 
and based on a research synthesis of post-crisis evaluation reports on crises between 2000-
2013, we found that external experts play a prominent and often central role in ‘in-crisis’ 
learning. Public organizations learn during crises by integrating knowledge from external 
experts in their crisis decisions and by using the experts’ operational skills to implement 
complex tasks. External experts are almost always, and often in large numbers, involved in 
the crisis response of the regular crisis management organization. The number of external 
experts involved seems to be largely determined by the duration of the crisis: the longer the 
crisis, the more experts involved. The backgrounds of external experts vary widely, from 
private companies, government-controlled companies, civil society organizations, scientific 
organizations, to public organizations. The main reason for involving external experts in 
resolving crises is to bring in their specialized knowledge and operational skills, which 
are often not available within the regular crisis management organization (i.e. ‘technical 
experts’). However, we found that external involvement can also stem from proximity to 
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the crisis location (‘proximity experts’), from their formal tasks and responsibilities (‘task 
experts’), and from a direct threat on their own organization caused by the crisis (‘threatened 
expert’). Surprisingly, we saw that external experts are frequently not actively involved at 
the behest of the regular crisis management organization, but that the collaboration stems 
from an expert’s own initiative or is an automatic consequence of the crisis situation. Most 
external experts are involved during the crisis on an ad hoc basis – in only a third of the 
cases were they involved over a longer period on a structural basis. The coordination by the 
regular crisis management organization of the external experts’ activities is often limited. 
Interestingly, we found that whether an expert is considered “external” to the regular crisis 
management organization depends on the specific crisis context. 
We identified six mechanisms through which external expert involvement led to 
opportunities and threats. On the one hand, involving external experts in the crisis response 
enables public organizations to acquire knowledge, carry out complex tasks, and strengthen 
the legitimacy of their actions. On the other hand, involving external experts can result in a 
reduced consensus, a lack of control over actions, and a reduced focus on public values. We 
identified ten conditions under which involving external experts contributes to adequate 
crisis management: (1) pre-assessing the need for involving external experts, (2) maintaining 
an expert network in non-crisis times, (3) being familiar with actors’ roles and plans in 
a crisis, (4) employing clear and close communication lines, (5) clearly defining mutual 
expectations, (6) requesting specific information, (7) consulting experienced crisis managers 
and requesting second opinions, (8) anticipating conflicts of interests and building mutual 
trust in a dynamic process, (9) remaining in the lead as the crisis management organization, 
and (10) explicitly coordinating external communication.
6.2.6 Findings from sub-study 4: Public leaders’ public service motivation 
and experience stimulate crisis-induced learning
In this study on public leaders’ crisis-induced learning orientations, based on a survey of 
Dutch mayors, we found that public leaders with a higher public service motivation are 
more oriented towards instrumental learning as well as towards political learning by a 
public organization in the wake of a crisis than their colleagues with less public service 
motivation. Contrary to our expectation, the findings showed that public leaders not only 
consider instrumental learning but also political learning as important for the long-term 
well-being and resilience of public organizations. Further, we found mayors that have dealt 
with more crises in a municipality being more oriented towards organizational activities 
related to political accountability. This suggests that the more experience that public leaders 
have with previous crisis situations the more they are aware of the importance of political 
processes such as blaming and framing. The more experience mayors have in office, the less 
they are oriented towards organizational activities aimed at post-crisis behavioral learning. 
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This suggests that public leaders who work in municipal administrations for a lengthy 
period have become socialized in the organization’s culture, and identify with its structure 
and procedures, making them less willing to adjust the organization’s culture.
The nature of crisis-induced learning differs from that of organizational learning in 
‘regular’ contexts given its characteristic roots in specific events and the need for re-
adjustments related to political accountability and external communication. Continuous 
learning processes that require calm periods of reflection, such as trial-and-error and 
experimentation, have little applicability when it comes to crisis-induced learning. A factor 
analysis identified four dimensions of public leaders’ organizational learning priorities 
in the wake of a crisis: (1) cognitive, (2) behavioral, (3) accountability, and (4) external 
communication. The first two, cognitive and behavioral, are dimensions of instrumental 
learning, whereas accountability and external communication are dimensions of political 
learning. Cognitive learning consists of processes related to the acquisition of new 
knowledge and the reflection on crisis events. Behavioral learning involves processes related 
to adjusting the organization’s culture and disseminating knowledge. Political learning 
emerged in a different way than we had anticipated. Surprisingly, public leaders’ orientation 
towards improving processes related to accountability is positively associated with their 
orientation towards quick and procedural changes in an organization. This finding suggests 
that public leaders view quick and procedural change as an answer to political pressures. The 
other political learning dimension involved processes related to external communication, 
both to and from the public. The analysis identified two dimensions of public service 
motivation: ‘attachment to public service and values’ (APS/CPV) and ‘compassion and 
self-sacrifice’ (COM/SS). The study showed that post-crisis organizational learning can 
in part be explained by public leaders’ orientation. Moreover, it provides a more refined 
operationalization of crisis-induced organizational learning as a first step towards the 
establishment of a systematic measurement instrument.
6.2.7 Towards a theoretical model of main factors affecting crisis-induced 
organizational learning
The research findings, discussed in the previous section, show that organizational learning 
from a crisis is a highly complex process, and one that is very challenging for public 
organizations to achieve. For public organizations, it is often a long-term process, in which 
they find themselves in a constant struggle to manage, continue, and follow-up the learning 
processes they have started. From the studies in this dissertation, we can conclude that the 
complexity of crisis-induced learning is related to three main issues. First, organizational 
learning by public organizations can take many different forms. It can manifest itself as 
adaptations of organizational procedures, routines, legislation, strategies, structure, and 
culture (action dimension), which are based on the increased knowledge gained from direct 
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experiences, reflections, evaluative investigations, group discussions, and/or other actors 
(cognitive dimension). Crisis lessons differ in the extent to which they are structural (protocol 
versus new organization), in scale (minor adaptation versus new legislation), when they are 
implemented (in-crisis versus post-crisis), and purpose (prevention versus response). Second, 
the present study shows that many factors influence crisis-induced learning and that these 
factors can have very different natures (internal, external, process-related). Organizational 
learning and the factors that explain it can be intertwined: the outcome of learning itself can 
be a factor that affects further learning (such as a change of culture or a new organizational 
division). Some factors, such as politicization or organizational structure (e.g., the form of 
crisis protocols), have ambivalent influences and can either facilitate or inhibit learning 
through different mechanisms. Factors can also indirectly affect learning, such as 
reorganizations (organizational structure) that negatively affect the learning culture, which 
in turn impedes learning. A third identified complexity stems from the fact that crises are, 
fortunately, uncommon low-probability high-impact situations. This makes it challenging 
to learn from one crisis in preparation for a future one because a crisis is difficult to foresee, 
and it is largely unknown what will happen, when, and with what impact.
Nevertheless, from the findings in the four sub-studies, we were able to distill seven 
main factors that affect crisis-induced organizational learning: issue politicization, political-
economic context (both external), expertise, organizational structure, organizational culture, 
public leader orientation (all internal), and organizational forgetting (process). These factors 
are different in nature and affect organizational learning through different mechanisms, each 
following a specific logic. Based on the four sub-studies, we outline a conceptual model that 
incorporates the mechanisms that drive crisis-induced organizational learning (see Figure 
6.1). On the left of the model as drawn is issue politicization as a major factor driving crisis-
induced learning. However, the way in which politicization affects learning depends on its 
interplay with five of the other six factors identified in the various sub-studies. That is, the 
learning outcome that politicization generates depends on the external political-economic 
context, expertise, the internal organizational structure, and organizational culture, and 
public leader orientation. The model works as follows. If a crisis issue becomes politicized 
AND change is supported by the political-economic context AND the required expertise is 
available on this issue AND there is a learning culture AND there is structural capacity to 
implement the lessons AND the public leader is oriented towards learning on this issue, then 
a public organization will learn. Conversely, if a crisis issue becomes politicized AND it is 
not supported by the political-economic context AND expertise on this issue is unavailable 
AND there is no learning culture AND there is no capacity to implement the lessons AND 
the public leader is merely oriented towards blaming and framing, then a public organization 
will NOT learn. In addition, over the longer term, the organizational learning outcome is 
affected by organizational forgetting: the extent to which lessons are forgotten instead of 
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retained and stored by the organization. The model implies that, in general, politicization is 
necessary, but not sufficient, for crisis-induced learning by public organizations. 
Figure 6.1 Conceptual theoretical model of main factors affecting crisis-induced organizational 
learning through various processes
We found that in-crisis learning – organizational learning during a crisis – usually entails 
drawing lessons based on direct experience, group discussions, or knowledge obtain from 
experts, which are implemented by changes in behavior during the crisis and aimed at 
improving the response to the present crisis. During a crisis, there is little time for a thorough 
investigation. Lessons learnt during a crisis are typically followed up by changing protocols 
and holding training sessions and simulations after the crisis. The research findings show 
that processes of structural change often have their origins in a crisis. However, structural 
changes are typically drawn up and implemented in the post-crisis period. In the post-
crisis period, calm, time for reflection, and the capacity needed to carry out comprehensive 
investigations and to implement structural changes, become available. However, at the same 
time, during the post-crisis period, there is a lack of urgency and pressure to put effort into 
learning and keep it on the agenda. As a consequence, to enact very comprehensive changes 
requires a sequence of crisis events in which the issues can be re-politicized to ensure the 
full learning process is completed. For large structural changes, appropriate organizational 
structures and political-economic context are essential. Basic, stable financial and human 
capacities are required to enable learning in the first place. Capacity is a necessity in order 
to be able to draw lessons, implement lessons, and to store lessons in the organization. An 
appropriate organizational culture is essential for all kinds of learning. An open atmosphere 
of trust and close personal ties enables failures to be admitted and knowledge to be effectively 
distributed within an organization. 
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6.3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY AND THE EMPIRICAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF CRISIS-INDUCED LEARNING 
The present study makes several important contributions to the general public administration 
literature and to the crisis management literature in particular. First, the research findings 
provide systematic empirical insights into the factors that drive the process of crisis-induced 
learning by public organizations. This contributes to a better understanding of the process, 
which to date has not been well understood (Deverell, 2009). The present study contributes 
a core of knowledge, based on extensive empirical data from a large number of cases, to 
a field of literature dominated by conceptual discussions and small-n case descriptions 
(Veil, 2011; An and Cheng, 2012). Furthermore, the literature on organizational learning 
and crisis management lacks an empirical grounding (Dekker and Hansén, 2014). In the 
field of crisis management, the present study’s systematic empirical analysis, which includes 
relatively large datasets from many crises, is rather unique. For example, in sub-study 2, 
we analyzed 1,449 political claims for learning, in sub-study 3 we included data from 114 
post-crisis evaluation reports on 60 crises, and in sub-study 4 we collected data from 209 
mayors. This approach made a systematic identification of general patterns that would 
otherwise have remained undetected possible. The systematic analysis of relatively large-n 
empirical evidence creates a more comprehensive understanding of factors and underlying 
mechanisms affecting learning from crisis situations (Smith and Elliot, 2007; Cooke and 
Rohleder, 2006). 
The second main contribution of the present study is that it provides a first theoretical 
framework that can be used to guide further studies in this field. It offers a first step in 
developing a solid theory on factors that explain crisis-induced learning. Studies on crisis-
induced learning in the literature have been wide-ranging and, by taking an open and 
integrative approach to learning, we were able to create an overview of relevant distinctions 
in crisis-induced organizational learning. This framework can function as a basis for further 
in-depth research into specific aspects of crisis-induced learning, such as specific types of 
lessons, and the role of specific factors. Moreover, the conceptual theoretical model of the 
main factors that influence crisis-induced learning provides a first step towards a more solid 
theory on why some organizations learn from crises and others do not. The present study 
shows that, by focusing on the core cognitive and behavioral processes that many definitions 
in the literature have in common (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Common, 2004), an innovative 
approach to organizational learning can be useful. To date, little systematic knowledge has 
been developed on the involvement of external experts in crisis situations (exceptions beings 
Rosenthal and ’t Hart, 1991; Grönvall, 2001; Baekkeskov and Rubin, 2014). Here, sub-study 
4 provided a framework on the types of external experts involved in a crisis response and 
the main roles that they play. We saw that organizational learning from a crisis differs from 
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organizational learning in regular situations in its very nature because crisis-based lessons 
are characteristically rooted in specific events whereas continuous learning processes 
require periods of calm. 
The third main contribution of the present study is that it provides a more refined 
operationalization of crisis-induced organizational learning. In sub-study 4, a framework 
for a more-systematic operationalization was created, to an extent based on existing 
organizational learning scales (Garvin et al., 2008; Goh and Richards, 1997; Chiva et al., 
2007; Marsick and Watkins, 2003). In this, we distinguished between specific processes 
within four dimensions: cognitive learning, behavioral learning, accountability processes, 
and communication processes. This operationalization framework facilitates a more 
comprehensive, systematic, and extensive empirical testing of crisis-induced learning. This 
contributes to bringing greater clarity to the ongoing theoretical debates surrounding a 
concept that has remained somewhat abstract in the literature. In other words, this study 
contributes to making the organizational learning concept more tangible and technically 
measurable. The operationalization of crisis-induced learning in the present study can 
be used as a first step in developing and validating a measurement instrument for crisis-
induced learning. Innovatively, the present study introduced a systematical analysis of a 
large quantity of data on many crises. It showed that using quantitative as well as qualitative 
methods can be useful when studying crises and organizational learning. This can create 
a more comprehensive view across a large number of cases. The fields of both crisis 
management research and of organizational learning would benefit from using a greater 
variety of methods. In sub-study 3, a dataset was established of 144 post-crisis evaluation 
reports following 60 crises in the Netherlands between 2000-2013 (see Appendices A and 
B; Van Eijk, Broekema, Torenvlied, 2013). This is a new dataset and can benefit further 
research on crisis management. The prevalent method in organizational learning research 
looks at overall learning from a crisis. In the present study, by analyzing learning on the 
level of separate lessons and disentangling crisis lessons learnt (or not learnt), we adopted 
a rather novel approach to identifying organizational learning. This approach has several 
important advantages. It allows the systematic analysis of numerous lessons within a crisis 
and enables one to differentiate between characteristics of specific lessons and then link 
these characteristics to specific factors (thereby also allowing a better comparison with 
lessons learnt in other cases). In sub-study 2, we saw that, by analyzing on the level of 
separate lessons, one is better able to indicate and differentiate the origins of learning, which 
is valuable because different lessons can have different origins. This contributes to creating a 
deeper understanding of related sub-processes. 
The fourth main contribution of the present study is that it provides clear insights into 
distinctions in crisis-induced organizational learning. The overview presented functions as 
a study framework and helps placing studies in relation to each other. First, the research 
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findings showed that organizational learning can manifest itself in a diversity of ways. It can 
manifest itself as changes in various organizational aspects (the behavioral dimension) such 
as in organizational procedures, organizational routines, legislation, organizational policies, 
organizational strategies, organizational structures, organizational culture, and behavior. 
This diversity of organizational learning outcomes has been noted by other scholars (Carley 
and Harrald, 1997; and Bennett et al., 1992). These organizational changes can, in turn, be 
based on increased knowledge (the cognitive dimension) from various sources such as direct 
experiences, reflections, evaluation investigations, group discussions, or other actors. Both 
dimensions of organizational learning – acquiring knowledge (cognitive) and organizational 
action (behavioral) – can occur individually or in groups (of various sizes), and within or 
(partly) outside the organization. We also saw in this study that crisis lessons learnt vary in 
terms of how fundamental versus superficial they are. For example, the establishment of a 
full crisis management agency (such as the European Maritime Safety Agency in response 
to the Erika oil spill, sub-study 2) is very different to the alteration of protocols for a crisis 
response operation (such as the NVIC zoonosis action plan, sub-study 1). The relevance of 
how deep lessons go (fundamental versus superficial) has been also discussed by Argyris 
and Schön (1978), Smith and Elliot (2007), and Choularton (2001). Furthermore, crisis 
lessons differ in their scale, and can vary from minor adaptations to existing organizational 
aspects through to entirely new comprehensive legislation. Finally, we have demonstrated 
the relevance of distinguishing between learning during a crisis (in-crisis learning) and after 
a crisis (post-crisis learning) (Moynihan, 2009), and learning for the purpose of preventing 
future crises and learning to improve the response to future crises (Deverell, 2009). Further 
studies on crisis-induced learning could build on the distinctions found in this study.
Following up on the previous contribution, the present study showed the interrelatedness 
of factors that influence crisis-induced learning. We found that factors may be interrelated 
with each other and with crisis-induced learning, and can play ambivalent and indirect 
roles in the learning process. Organizational learning and the factors that explain it can be 
intertwined. The outcome of learning can itself be a factor that facilitates further learning. 
For example, organizational structure and organizational culture can enable learning to 
take place, but adjustments in structure and culture can also be outcomes of learning. As 
a real example, the budget cut by the European Commission in 1998 contributed to the 
establishment of a permanent NVWA crisis management organization (NVIC, sub-study 
1), which is a lesson learnt, but the establishment of the NVIC also created the capacity, 
expertise, and routines that were needed to be able to draw additional lessons as well as 
establish the organizational memory required to store lessons in the organization. The 
observation that organizational learning outcomes can in turn influence learning, and vice 
versa, has also been made by Fiol et al. (1985, pp. 804–805). Factors can also indirectly affect 
learning. For example, the major reorganization in 2006 at the NVWA (organizational 
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structure, sub-study 1) affected the organization’s culture by tearing down personal 
connections between people. This in turn influenced organizational learning by decreasing 
the effective distribution of knowledge within the organization. Furthermore, factors, such 
as politicization and crisis protocols, can exert ambivalent influences, that is they can both 
facilitate and inhibit learning through different mechanisms. Finally, we observed that large 
structural lessons are often accumulated incrementally, in sequences of events. 
6.4 THREE ADDITIONAL NOTABLE FINDINGS
In addition to the five focused contributions linked to answering the research question 
discussed above, the present study also makes three notable contributions that stem 
directly from the empirical material. First, the present study underlines the importance of 
distinguishing between organizational learning and organizational change. Organizational 
change does not have to reflect learning, as change might not be based on increased 
knowledge (the cognitive dimension of learning) and thus on failures revealed by a crisis. 
Such organizational changes can be referred to as ‘quasi-learning’, because learning is 
professed but did not actually take place. Theoretical notions of similar processes of mere 
change, rather than learning, are recognized by several scholars in the field of organizational 
learning in terms such as ‘adaptation’ (Fiol and Lyles, 1985, p. 811), ‘mimicking’ (May, 1992, p. 
336), ‘superstitious learning’ (Levitt and March, 1988, p. 325-326), and ‘learning impression 
management’ (Carley and Harrald, 1997, p. 122). We argue that the opposing arguments seen 
in the literature about the extent to which public organizations learn and can learn from crises 
are often a result of equating change and learning. Conclusions that public organizations 
learn automatically and extensively from crises are often a result of not including either the 
cognitive or the action component of learning (or a lack of empirical evidence). As Fiol and 
Lyles note, “what is called “learning” in one is “adaptation” in another and “action” in yet a 
third” (1985, p. 811). If organizational changes are not based on improved understanding, 
they may be, at least partly, based on political pressures. Particularly in a crisis context, 
where the stakes are high, change is vulnerable to the influence of political self-interests. 
Public organizations have a large interest in ‘showing the public’ that they have ‘learnt’ from 
a crisis. Although we have not demonstrated quasi-learning in a clear and incontestable 
way, some examples have pointed towards political interference in the learning process. For 
example, the influence of the oil industry in the evaluation process following the Erika oil-
spill disaster (sub-study 2) has been questioned. The organization responsible for advising 
the French government, CEDRE, appeared to be partly funded by oil company TotalFinaElf 
that, at the same time, was blamed by many for causing the crisis. On January 5th 2000, 
Le Monde stated that “having signed cooperation agreements with the Maltese government, 
the tanker’s flag state, it was perfectly able to monopolize the dissemination of scientific 
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information” (p. 1). Distinguishing quasi-learning from ‘real’ learning is a challenging and 
effortful process since it requires tracing organizational changes back to their origins and 
finding evidence that this was indeed based on thorough reflection (Birkland, 2006; May, 
1992). Moreover, unbiased data on public leaders’ motivations for having pursued specific 
changes in response to crises are rarely available. 
The second striking finding is that the empirical data in the present study showed that 
the process of organizational forgetting plays a key role if an organization is to learn and 
improve its crisis management performance in the longer run. Organizational forgetting 
implies that previously learnt lessons flow out of the organization. This process is related 
to organizational processes of storing knowledge, creating organizational memory, and 
knowledge dissemination (Huber, 1991; Levitt et al., 1988; Argote, 2013). In our study, 
we identified instances of organizational forgetting in a variety of crisis situations and by 
different public organizations. For example, some lessons learnt by the Dutch food safety 
services during the swine fever crisis in 1997-1998 were later lost because of a limited sharing 
of information within groups and experts leaving the organization. This became apparent in 
the foot-and-mouth crisis in 2001 (sub-study 1). The lesson learnt by oil companies that they 
should avoid maritime-sensitive areas around the Shetland Islands were ‘forgotten’ over 
time, and this contributed to the occurrence of the Braer oil-spill disaster in 1993 (sub-study 
2). We argue that, in terms of the crisis management performance of public organizations, 
organizational forgetting is as important as organizational learning. Strikingly, however, 
organizational forgetting has gained very little attention in the literature (notable exceptions 
being De Holan and Phillips, 2004; Argote, 2013; Besanko et al., 2010). Moreover, no studies 
appear to have addressed organizational forgetting in the context of crisis management. 
This is despite this aspect seeming particularly relevant in the context of crisis since crises 
have an extraordinary impact but their occurrence is extremely rare. The latter aspect 
makes retaining and storing lessons a challenging necessity. Most studies on organizational 
learning implicitly assume learning to be a cumulative process, which would imply that 
public organizations are constantly increasing their operational effectiveness. This study 
shows that, in reality, public organizations’ performance in crisis management reflects a 
dynamic balance between learning and forgetting. Ironically, for an organization to learn 
over a long period of time, and thus not forget lessons learnt previously, it seems that crises 
are required on a not too infrequent regularity. We call this the ‘crisis prevention paradox’.
Finally, the empirical data in the present study points to public inquiries playing an 
ambiguous role in the crisis-induced organizational learning process. On the one hand, 
we found that public inquiries play a fundamental role in organizational learning. In sub-
study1, for example, we saw that the new legislation adopted by the European Union in 
response to oil-spill disasters was largely grounded in reports by the Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch (1993, 1997), Lord Donaldson (1994), Maltese Maritime Authority 
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(2000), the Permanent Commission of Enquiry into Accidents at Sea (2000), Bahamas 
Maritime Authority (2004), and the Temporary Committee on Improving Safety at Sea 
(2004). This at least partly corresponds with a technical view of learning: that evaluative 
investigations draw lessons from a crisis, which are subsequently implemented by a public 
organization (cf. Howlett, et al. 2009; Birkland, 2006). However, other data in the present 
study indicated a more subtle and political role of public inquiries (see Elliott, 2009). In 
sub-study 1, for example, key experts in the Netherlands Food Consumer Product Safety 
Authority explained that the organization had already learnt during the investigation and 
underlined the political function of the reports for raising political attention. Overall, we 
saw that public inquiries differ in many respects, such as in terms of the type of organization 
carrying out the evaluation, their comprehensiveness, the form of recommendations, 
whether pre- and post-crisis stages are included, whether the focus is on crisis prevention 
or crisis response, and the timing of the report publication. Despite several studies having 
discussed the role of crisis evaluation reports (Elliott, 2009; Turner, 1976; Birkland, 2009; 
Resodihardjo, 2009), few studies address the variations in reports and the role these have in 
organizational learning (one exception being Rena and Christensen, 2018). 
6.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY
The present study has some significant limitations. The first concerns the measuring 
of the dependent variable. When operationalizing organizational learning there are 
inevitably threats to internal validity since the concept is inherently subject to conceptual, 
methodological, and normative problems and debate (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Freeman, 
2007; Carley and Harrald, 1997; Stern, 1997; Dekker and Hansén, 2004). Nevertheless, 
organizational learning is as relevant and commonly used across disciplines, as it is 
complex. In the literature, organizational learning has been defined and operationalized in 
many different ways (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Crosson et al., 1999). 
As such, we recognize that, in the present study, we might not have fully and indisputably 
‘measured’ learning. In this context, Birkland (2006) explains that “the operationalization 
of learning cedes a great deal of judgment to the researcher” (p. 22). We acknowledge that 
defining learning in a different way, for example as the mere drawing of cognitive lessons 
or as organizational change, rather than as a combination of the two, could have generated 
rather different outcomes. In a hypothetical ideal situation, if an organization learns 
perfectly, no further crises might occur. However, even if no crises were to take place, this is 
not irrefutable evidence that learning has taken place, since it might simply be a coincidence. 
Pearson and Clair (1998) add that “even when the organization averts a crisis and learning 
leads to organizational improvement, there will be elements that could have been handled 
better” (p.67). 
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Part of the complexity of conceptualizing learning results from the concept of “learning” 
having a positive connotation. Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) described learning as “a 
golden concept, everybody is for it” (p. 245). Normative problems stem from the component 
included in definitions of learning that implies that improved effectiveness is achieved. 
Further, when it comes to crisis management, defining what is effective action and what 
is not is complicated (Pearson and Claire, 1998; Muller, 2009). However, this effectiveness 
component is important in differentiating learning from change. We tried to respond to 
this challenge by seeking to demonstrate learning by not only looking for organizational 
change, but by also tracing back the cognitive basis of these changes. For example, in sub-
study 1, we studied new legislation by the EU in response to crises, which we traced back 
to the recommendations made in public inquiries following these crises. This supports 
the view of Freeman (2007) that normative claims related to learning are often implicit. 
Linking the term ‘learning’ to an organization is normatively charged because it suggests 
that the organization is, or is not, functioning well. Given that learning is always considered 
a constructive process, organizations are eager to be linked to the term as this contributes 
to a positive image. Given this positive interpretation, we avoided asking experts explicitly 
about learning in their organization.
A second significant limitation of the present study is the danger of oversimplifying the 
context. Recognizing that the context can have a strong explanatory value in research on 
organizational learning and crisis management (Johns, 2006; Pierce and Aguinis, 2013), 
we stress that we tried to avoid making any strong inferences. Rather, we explored factors 
and mechanisms that could explain crisis-induced organizational learning, and did not 
attempt to ‘measure’ any causal relationships or ‘effects’. The aim was to provide new 
insights by looking in depth into mechanisms that recur in different contexts (Pawson and 
Tilly, 1997; De Vaus, 2001). In the various sub-studies, crisis-induced learning was studied 
in specific contexts in terms of the type of crisis, policy field, kind of public organization, 
and institutional context. There are several reasons for being particularly cautious when 
considering generalizing the research findings to other contexts. First, in the present study, 
we defined crises according to shared characteristics. However, we are aware that, in reality, 
crises are to some extent unique phenomena, and that they can be classified in different 
ways, such as by the type of crisis event (Rosenthal et al., 2001; Kuipers and Welsh, 2017). 
We should nevertheless note that we found remarkable similarity between “unique” crises 
in many respects. In sub-study 3, we observed that if variation in kinds of crises would 
systematically intervene in organizational learning, it is not so much the type of crisis event 
but the duration of the crisis (i.e. the time available for reflection) and the actors involved. 
Second, as discussed above, crisis-induced organizational learning is affected by a variety 
of factors, often indirectly and through different mechanisms, which makes comparing 
results from different contexts potentially problematic. Third, we must be aware that public 
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organizations, as our entity of study, differ including in their character, responsibilities and 
size. Public organizations have different levels of formal authority in carrying out tasks and 
operate in different networks of organizations, both horizontally and vertically (Van den 
Berg, 2011; Van der Meer et al., 2012). Within each of the sub-studies of the present study, we 
attempted to decrease any generalizability bias by keeping the context as constant as possible. 
Within the first three sub-studies, we kept the public organizations studied constant, while 
in sub-study 4 we studied the same type of organization (i.e., municipalities) and controlled 
for their size and the characteristics of their public leader. Within sub-studies 1, 2, and 4, 
we further kept the type of crisis constant, while in sub-study 3 we controlled for the type 
of crisis. Nevertheless, we would emphasize that the findings might only partially apply in 
different organizational, institutional and crisis contexts. 
A third important limitation of the present study concerns the reliability of data and this 
is an issue that is common in crisis management research. Crises are very much political in 
nature. Even issues that are considered ‘factual’ in normal times, can become questioned 
and heavily debated during a crisis (Boin et al., 2008). In sub-study 2, we saw how politics 
can come to the fore during a crisis and how learning is also heavily debated. As such, when 
studying crisis management, there is an inherent threat of collecting politically biased 
information. When collecting data through interviews in sub-studies 1 and 3, we aimed to 
reduce this threat by not asking explicitly about learning and emphasizing confidentiality. 
Further, since interview and secondary data might also be subject to hindsight bias – seen as 
particularly likely in crisis studies due to psychological aspects such as intense chaos, stress, 
and political pressure (Rosenthal, 2001) – we triangulated data whenever possible. Another 
threat stems from the problem of “latent” crises. Since a crisis is the starting point of this 
research, data from incidents that might have, but did not, evolve into a crisis – possibly 
because of effective learning – are not included in the analysis. This limitation cannot be 
eliminated because one can never verify that an incident has the potential to turn into a 
crisis. 
6.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Based on the present explorative research, we propose five promising avenues for further 
research that are largely connected to the contributions discussed above. First, in line 
with our first contribution, we recommend further empirical studies on crisis-induced 
organizational learning. Additional empirical research is needed to verify the findings 
in other contexts; including different types of crises (specifically in terms of duration 
and actors involved), different public organizations (specifically in terms of size and 
responsibilities), different policy fields, and different institutional systems. We need to gain 
a more comprehensive understanding of the roles of these context variables in the learning 
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process. Crisis-induced learning requires extended empirical verification in order to 
establish a more solid theory and a more systematic measurement instrument. The present 
research’s proposed theoretical model and improved operationalization can serve as an 
initial framework to guide developments. The second suggested avenue for further research 
concerns the adoption of new methods in the field of crisis management research alongside 
small-n case descriptions. Given the current limitations, the field of crisis management 
would benefit from systematic analyses using data from a large number of crises in order to 
identify recurring patterns and to be able to make stronger inferences. Third, in line with 
our first notable additional finding, we recommend further studies on ‘quasi-learning’ (see 
sub-study 2) to understand how frequently this occurs and what the consequences are. The 
field also calls for a clearer differentiation between studies on organizational learning and 
studies on organizational change. Following on from this, based on our second additional 
finding, our fourth suggestion would be to put organizational forgetting on the research 
agenda since we saw its significant relevance to the process of organizational learning and 
to crisis management in general. Fifth, and linked to our final contribution, we propose 
further studies on the role of public inquiries in the crisis-induced learning process. It 
is very relevant to understand how different aspects of public inquiries, such as the form 
of their recommendations, affect learning. Finally, we would encourage further research 
into organizational learning in groups/teams and networks of organizations. Although 
organizational learning often occurs in groups of people and in groups of organizations, 
there is little knowledge about ’group learning’ and ‘network learning’, and particularly how 
these relate to individual learning.
6.7 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Based on the findings of the present research, we are able to identify several implications 
for crisis management practice in public organizations. The present research provides a 
better understanding of crisis-induced learning processes, which can contribute to public 
organizations more adequately achieving learning. Enhanced learning would help to avoid 
and manage crises, which could have major positive effects given the potential tremendous 
adverse impacts that crises can have. Moreover, achieving learning contributes to the 
legitimacy of public organizations. 
First, with regard to learning in general, the results of the present research highlight the 
complexity of crisis-induced learning and the importance of public organizations putting in 
sufficient time, effort, and capacity. The research findings show that learning is multifaceted, 
that organizations can learn in many different ways. The research provides an overview 
of important learning distinctions and sub-processes, which makes the abstract concept 
more tangible and can serve as a ‘checklist’ for public managers and crisis management 
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practitioners to verify which aspects of learning an organization has covered and which 
need more attention. Practitioners should also be aware of the dangers of quasi-learning 
and should ensure that organizational changes are heavily based on genuine investigation 
and group discussions. When collecting data, a crisis expert raised the question: ‘how do 
other organizations do that?’ As a partial answer to this, the present study provides empirical 
information and practical examples of learning and non-learning by different public 
organizations in various real-life situations. Crisis management practitioners can gain ideas 
and draw lessons from this. Finally, we would advise evaluation organizations, if possible, to 
include multiple crises in evaluation studies since this will enable them to identify recurring 
patterns and draw more reliable conclusions. 
Second, the present study shows the need for public organizations to pay attention to 
retaining and disseminating lessons learnt in the organization. Although similarly important 
to learning, forestalling organizational forgetting seems to get disproportionately little 
attention. The results of our research show that it would be wrong for public managers and 
crisis practitioners to underestimate the importance of achieving an open atmosphere of 
trust and close personal ties between employees for organizational learning to take place. 
The data indicate the enormous negative effects that reorganizations and high outflow rates 
of employees can have on a learning culture. Public organizations often seem unaware 
of the fact that learning largely takes place within groups of people. Public organizations 
would benefit from their managers having a clear oversight of where, by whom, and when 
cognitive lessons are drawn, and then implemented, and how information is disseminated. 
The research findings show that basic, and stable, financial and human capacities are 
necessary for an organization to be able to achieve learning in the first place (see sub-studies 
1 and 2). Capacity provides the expertise for drawing lessons, and then enables changes 
to be implemented and lessons stored in the organization. Without capacity, there is no 
learning. Based on the findings, we recommend political decision-makers to ensure that 
a stable financial budget is allocated to the crisis management responsibilities of public 
organizations. For the reasons described above, a fluctuating budget – increasing after a 
crisis, and decreasing in peaceful times – has a negative effect on organizational learning. 
Furthermore, we would urge external actors, and the media specifically, to only make 
realistic and feasible demands of public organizations as regards learning, and then to 
monitor the learning process over a lengthy post-crisis period since this helps guarantee 
learning far more than making general accusations that can lead to suboptimum responses. 
The research findings suggest that public organizations should already start putting 
effort into crisis-induced learning in the calm periods when there are no crises (in practice 
often referred to as the ‘cold phase’). Although it is challenging to make preparations for 
an unknown crisis, efforts in this period can be very beneficial. As our theoretical model 
shows, politicization facilitates learning only in a context where there is an adequate 
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organizational culture and structure, and appropriate external political-economic context 
and expertise, and these can all be partly developed in the period of calm before the storm. 
A lack of political pressure, and more time and resources available in non-crisis periods, 
provides room for extensive reflection. In these periods, public organizations would be able 
to develop communication channels and train their staff in learning routines. As part of 
this, crisis protocols, which can facilitate learning during a crisis, can be updated. We would 
recommend public organizations to map the expertise in terms of knowledge and skills that 
is internally available and identify gaps. The expertise potentially needed during a crisis can 
be mapped and linked to specific types of crises and policy domains. In non-crisis times, 
public organizations can start to establish and then maintain a network of external experts 
who can subsequently be rapidly consulted when a crisis occurs. The findings also indicate 
that it is advisable to include external parties in contingency plans in order to clarify mutual 
responsibilities and cooperation. It is also particularly important that public organizations 
that have not recently faced a crisis retain learning on the agenda. 
Ironically and paradoxically, public organizations seem currently only capable of learning 
extensively from crises over a longer period, rather than forgetting lessons learnt previously, 
if fresh crises occur at not too infrequent intervals. Notwithstanding this, we express the 
hope that, in the future, we will improve our abilities to prevent crises. Crises are adverse 
events that one should try to avoid at any time. Nevertheless, if a crisis strikes, we need 
to make the best of it. Let us hope that, over the longer term, by using the disruption a 
crisis creates as an opportunity to implement improvements, public organizations emerge 
stronger and more resilient from a crisis. In accomplishing this, learning is the key process. 
Therefore, we must further extend our knowledge on how and why public organizations 
learn, or fail to learn, from crises: that is, we need to further improve our understanding of 
‘when the phoenix rises’. 
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after the 60 crises in the Netherlands from 2000 to 201223
Abbas, T., Hanemaayer, D., De Bie, S., Hilhorst, R., Blom, U., Leewis, M., Geveke, H., Straathof, R. 
(2002). MKZ 2001. De evaluatie van een crisis. Eindrapport. Den Haag: B&A Groep.
Alders, J.G.M., Belonje, M.M. Belonje, Van den Berg, A., Ten Duis, H.J., Hoelen, A. (2001). Cafébrand 
nieuwjaarsnacht. Eindrapport. Rotterdam: Phoenix & den Oudsten. 
Arbeidsinspectie. Steigerongeval Amercentrale. Geertruidenberg 28 september 2003. Den Haag: 
Arbeidsinspectie.
Arbeidsinspectie (2001). Onderzoek vuurwerkramp Enschede. Rapportage van de Arbeidsinspectie 
over de uitgevoerde onderzoeken naar aanleiding van de ramp van 13 mei 2000 te Enschede. Den 
Haag: Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Arbeidsinspectie. 
Arbeidsinspectie, Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid (2010). Brand in de Kerkstraat in Veendam. 
Onderzoek naar het brandweeroptreden. Den Haag: Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid. 
Bekkers, H., Hanemaayer, D., Flierman, D. (2007). Museumbrand Amersfoort. Evaluatie van het 
optreden van de hulpdiensten tijdens de brand in de Amersfoortse Elleboogkerk op 22 oktober 
2007. Den Haag: B&A Consulting.
Bos, J.G.H., Dammen, R., Engel, K.E., Zannoni, M. (2007). Evaluatie van de gebeurtenissen naar 
aanleiding van de uitval van het drinkwater in een deel van Noord-Holland. Den Haag: COT 
Instituut voor Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement.
Bos, J.G.H., Dammen, R., Zannoni, M. (2007). ‘Luchtvaartuig in de problemen, Prio 1’. Evaluatie van 
de crisisbeheersing naar aanleiding van de noodlanding van een J-SAR helikopter op de Noordzee 
(21 november 2006). Den Haag: COT Instituut voor Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement.
Bos, J., Van Dijk, E. (2012). Multidisciplinair evaluatieverslag. Incident GRIP 3 ‘natriumbrand 
Farmsum’. Groningen: Crisis Management Groningen.
Bos, J.G.H., Schaap, S.D., Jumelet, J., Wensveen, M. (2008). Het mysterie van Hoogeveen. Evaluatie 
van de crisisbeheersing naar aanleiding van een incident in een dierenwinkel in Hoogeveen. Den 
Haag: COT Instituut voor Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement.
Bos, J.G.H., Van Es, A.M.D., Muller, E.R. (2010). Als maatschappelijke onrust dreigt. Evaluatie van 
het optreden van de autoriteiten naar aanleiding van de arrestatie van Benno L. Den Haag: COT 
Instituut voor Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement.
Bos, J.G.H., Van Es, A.M.D., Zannoni, M. (2012). Brand in zorgcentrum De Geinsche Hof. Evaluatie 
van de BHV inzet en de samenwerking met gemeente en hulpdiensten op en na 27 juni 2011. Den 
Haag: COT Instituut voor Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement.
23  This list was created as part of a research project for the Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) of the 
Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice. The list was published in the project’s report: Van Eijk, C.J.A, Broekema, 
W., Torenvlied, R. (2013). ‘Geen uniformen, maar specialisten’. Betrokkenheid van externe experts in crisissituaties. 
Den Haag: WODC / Universiteit Leiden.
184 | appendICeS | 185
Bos, J.G.H., Zannoni, M., Luiten, A.J. (2008). Een asbestbrand in Vroomshoop. Evaluatie van de 
respons van de gemeente Twenterand op een asbestbrand in Vroomshoop. Den Haag: COT 
Instituut voor Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement.
Bosman, A., Mulder, Y.M., De Leeuw, J.R.J., Meijer, A., Du Ry van Beest Holle, M., Kamst, R.A., Van 
der Velden, P.G., Conyn – van Spaendonck, M.A.E., Koopmans, M.P.G., Ruijten, M.W.M.M. 
(2004). Vogelpest Epidemie 2003: Gevolgen voor de volksgezondheid. Bilthoven: RIVM
Brandweer Midden- en West-Brabant (2011). Beschrijving eerste fase inzet brand Chemie-Pack 
Moerdijk. 5 januari 2011. Tilburg: Brandweer Midden- en West-Brabant. 
Brons, R. (2003). Kloppersingel brand. Rapportage Intern onderzoek. Den Haag: Regionaal 
Commandant Brandweer Haaglanden. 
Büchner, J., De Jong, H., Meeuwsen, J., Vrolijk, R. (2006) Onderzoek Stroomstoring Haaksbergen. 
Constateringen en aanbevelingen. Den Haag: Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit. 
Cohen, M.J., Van den Brink, G.J.M., Adang, O.M.J., Van Dijk, J.A.G.M., Boeschoten, T., Kalksma, 
I.T. (2013). Twee werelden. You only live once. Hoofdrapport. Commissie ‘Project X’ Haren. 
Commissie feitenonderzoek veiligheid en beveiliging Pim Fortuyn (2002). De veiligheid en de 
beveiliging van Pim Fortuyn. Feiten en verantwoordelijkheden. Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers.
Commissie onderzoek vuurwerkramp (2001). De vuurwerkramp. Eindrapport. Enschede/Den 
Haag: Commissie Onderzoek Vuurwerkramp.
Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (2008). 
Toezichtsrapport. Inzake de afwegingsprocessen van de AIVD met betrekking tot Mohammed B. 
Den Haag: CTIVD.
Commissie Vuurwerkramp. De Vuurwerkramp. Enschede / Den Haag: Commissie Vuurwerkramp. 
COT Universiteit Leiden (2001). Bossche Avonden. Onderzoek naar het optreden van bestuur, justitie 
en politie tijdens de ongeregeldheden in ’s-Hertogenbosch (16-18 december 2000). Leiden: COT 
Universiteit Leiden.
Crisisplan (2011). Praktijkervaringen en lessen crisiscommunicatie tijdens en na de brand bij Chemie-
Pack. In opdracht van de Veiligheidsregio Midden- en West Brabant. Leiden: Crisisplan.
Dammen, R., Bos, J.G.H., Van Leeuwen, A.L., Wesselink, L., Zannoni, M., Rosenthal, U. (2008). 
De bunker van Bilthoven. Evaluatie van de gebeurtenissen rondom de sloop van een bunker in 
Bilthoven. Den Haag: COT Instituut voor Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement.
Dammen, R., Hendriks van de Weem, N., Zannoni, M., Rosenthal, U. (2009). Dreiging in Weesp. 
Evaluatie van de gebeurtenissen rondom de bedreigingen van scholen. Den Haag: COT Instituut 
voor Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement.
Den Boer, M., Canté, L., Dekker, A., Duyvesteyn, B., Geveke, H., Jansen, R., Kort, M., Van der 
Mark, R. (2004). Eindrapport. De crisis tussen mens en dier. Evaluatie bestrijding AI-crisis. 
Utrecht: Berenschot.
Dorst, A.W., Spapen, S.J.J.C., Van der Doorn, S.G.J. (2006). Stroomstoring Haaksbergen 25-28 
november 2005. Den Haag: Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid. 
Engelbertink, R., Morée, R.J., Muis, S.M. (2012). Gemeente Heerlen. Evaluatie crisisorganisatie 
verzakking ’t Loon 10 september 2012. Ossenzijl/Amersfoort: Twynstra Gudde en Beeldvormer.
appendICeS | 185
Externe Onderzoekscommissie (EOC) (2006). Een tekortschietend zorgproces. Een onderzoek naar 
de kwaliteit en veiligheid van de cardiochirurgische zorgketen voor volwassenen in het UMC St 
Radboud te Nijmegen. Externe Onderzoekscommissie.
Externe onderzoekscommissie MSZ (2012). ‘Oog voor het onzichtbare’. Onderzoek naar de 
uitbraak van de Klebsiella Oxa-48 bacterie in het Maasstad Ziekenhuis Rotterdam. Externe 
onderzoekscommissie MSZ.
Gemeente Haaksbergen. Evaluatie stroomstoring. Haaksbergen: Gemeente Haaksbergen. 
Gemeente Helden (2004). Evaluatie vogelpestcrisis 2003. Gemeente Helden. Helden: Gemeente 
Helden.
Gemeente de Ronde Venen (2004). Evaluatie dijkverschuiving Wilnis. Mijdrecht: Gemeente De 
Ronde Venen.
Gemeente Spijkenisse. Evaluatie van het incident op 4 april 2007. ‘Wit stof ’. Spijkenisse: Gemeente 
Spijkenisse.
Geveke, H., Stuurman, M., Sybrandi, F., Temme, B. (2002). Het Ketelwagenincident. Rampbestrijding 
en crisiscommunicatie in Amersfoort. Evaluatie van het incident met de lekkende spoorketelwagen 
op 20 augustus 2002 te Amersfoort. Den Haag: B&A Groep.
Gunning – Schepers, L., Van Schaardenburg – Louwe Kooijmans, E., Naeyé, J. (2011). Rapport 
onafhankelijke commissie onderzoek zedenzaak. Amsterdam: Commissie Gunning.
Haasjes, J.S. e.a. (2012). De dijk staat op springen. Hoog water in de Veiligheidsregio Groningen. 
Groningen: Veiligheidsregio Groningen.
Hartman, M., Schweden, R. (2006). Q-organisatie. Evaluatierapport Stranding Fowairet op de 
Westerschelde. 20 september 2005. Plaats: LogicaCMG Nederland. 
Helsloot, I., Jong, W., Zannoni, M., Vinck, L.A., Lukkes, J.M.G., Muller, E.R. (2004). Ongeval met 
ingestorte steiger Amercentrale 28 september 2003. Evaluatie van de rampenbestrijding. Den 
Haag: COT Instituut voor Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement.
Helsloot, I., Oomes, E., Weewer, R. (2009). Eindrapport evaluatie van de brand in De Punt op 9 mei 
2008. Onderzoekscommissie ‘Brand met dodelijke afloop in De Punt op 9 mei 2008’.
Helsloot, I., Van Dorssen, M. (2011). Evaluatie aanpak Nieuwe Influenza A (H1N1). Berenschot.
Hendrikx, J.A.M., Berghuijs, J.D. (2005). Brand in het cellencomplex Schiphol Oost. Een 
evaluerende ‘quick scan’. Haarlemmermeer: Onafhankelijke Commissie gemeentelijke 
verantwoordelijkheden cellenbrand Schiphol. 
Inspectie Brandweerzorg en Rampenbestrijding (2001). Onderzoek vuurwerkramp Enschede. 
Onderzoek naar het brandweeroptreden tot en met de fatale explosie; van proactie tot en met 
repressie. Den Haag: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, IBR. 
Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid (2008). Incident Ooij. Ongeval met de snelle interventie boot 
van het korps Millingen aan de Rijn op Krib Waal 868 LO, donderdag 14 februari 2008. Den 
Haag: IOOV.
Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid. (2009). Koninginnedag 2009 Apeldoorn. Een onderzoek 
door de Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid. Den Haag: IOOV. 
186 | appendICeS | 187
Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid (2011). Brand Chemie-Pack Moerdijk. Een onderzoek naar 
de bestrijding van (de effecten van) het grootschalig incident. Den Haag: IOOV. 
Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid (2011). Brand Strabrechtse Heide. Deel 1: De hoofdstructuur 
van de rampenbestrijding. Den Haag: IOOV.
Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid (2011). Brand Strabrechtse Heide. Deel 2: De feitelijke 
bestrijding van de natuurbrand. Den Haag: IOOV.
Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid. Onderzoek ongeval Amercentrale 28 september 2003. 
Deelonderzoek: Communicatie tussen hulpverlening en slachtoffers. Den Haag: IOOV.
Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid (2011). Schietincident in ‘De Ridderhof ’ Alphen aan den 
Rijn. Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid november 2011. Den Haag: IOOV. 
Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid, Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg (2009). Poldercrash 25 
februari 2009. Een onderzoek door de Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid, in samenwerking 
met de Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg. Den Haag: IOOV. 
Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie. Evaluatie van de Rijkscrisisorganisatie tijdens de DigiNotar-crisis. 
Den Haag: IVenJ.
Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie (2012). Storing telecommunicatienetwerk. Waalhaven Rotterdam. 
Den Haag: IVenJ.
Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg (2001). Evaluatie Cafébrand Volendam. Den Haag: IGZ. 
Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg (2003). Evaluatie van de aanbevelingen uit de rapportage 
Geneeskundige hulpverlening getroffenen vuurwerkramp Enschede. Den Haag: IGZ. 
Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg (2008). Onderzoek naar aanleiding van de brand in operatiekamer 
8 van het Twenteborg Ziekenhuis te Almelo op 28 september 2006. Den Haag: IGZ.
Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg (2012). Falen infectiepreventie in het Maasstad Ziekenhuis 
verwijtbaar. Utrecht: IGZ.
Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg and Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid (2011). GHOR-
bureaus tijdens Mexicaanse griep onvoldoende zichtbaar voor de zorgpartners. Den Haag: IGZ, 
IOOV.
Jansen, G.J., Fernandes Mendes, H.K., Rook, M., Stordiau-van Egmond, A.M.E., Van Zanten, 
P.J. (2012). Onderzoek asbestvondst Kanaleneiland. Utrecht: De Commissie Onderzoek 
asbestvondst Kanaleneiland.
Joustra, T.H.J., Brouwer-Korf, A., Mertens, F.J.H., Muller, E.R., Visser, J.P. (2012). Brand bij Chemie-
Pack te Moerdijk. 5 januari 2011. Den Haag: Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid.
Joustra, T.H.J., Brouwer-Korf, A., Mertens, F.J.H., Muller, E.R., Visser, J.P. (2012). Brand in 
Rivierduinen: veronderstelde veiligheid. Den Haag: Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid.
Joustra, T.H.J., Brouwer-Korf, A., Mertens, F.J.H., Muller, E.R., Visser, J.P. (2012). Het 
DigiNotarincident. Waarom digitale veiligheid de bestuurstafel te weinig bereikt. Den Haag: 
Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid. 
Joustra, T.H.J., Brouwer-Korf, A., Mertens, F.J.H., Muller, E.R., Visser, J.P. (2011). Instorten van het 
dak van de aanbouw van het stadion van FC Twente, te Enschede. Den Haag: Onderzoeksraad 
voor Veiligheid. 
appendICeS | 187
Joustra, T.H.J., Brouwer-Korf, A., Mertens, F.J.H., Muller, E.R., Visser, J.P. (2012). Treinbotsing 
Amsterdam Westerpark. Den Haag: Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid. 
Joustra, T.H.J., Brouwer-Korf, A., Mertens, F.J.H., Visser, J.P. (2011). Vernieuwing op drift. Onderzoek 
naar aanleiding van berichtgeving in april 2009 over calamiteiten bij maagverkleiningsoperaties 
in het Scheper Ziekenhuis Emmen. Den Haag: Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid.
Joustra, T.H.J., Brouwer-Korf, A., Mertens, F.J.H., Visser, J.P. (2011). Wapenbezit door sportschutters. 
Onderzoek naar het stelsel ter beheersing van het legaal wapenbezit naar aanleiding van 
het schietincident in Alphen aan den Rijn op 9 april 2011. Den Haag: Onderzoeksraad voor 
Veiligheid.
Korps landelijke politiediensten (2009). Onderzoeksrapportage Koninginnedag 2009. Bevindingen 
van het rechercheonderzoek Dienst Nationale Recherche. Den Haag: KLPD. 
Meerenburgh, J.P., Mentink, L.M.A., Hanstede, L.M., Perrier, J.M. (2012). Paasvuur Espelo. 
Enschede: Veiligheidsregio Twente.
Meerenburgh, J.P., Spaling, G.H., Barrett, A., Bokdam, M. (2008). Evaluatie van de zeer grote 
brand / GRIP-3 bij Auba te Vroomshoop op 12 januari 2008. Quick-scan naar leermomenten 
naar aanleiding van de besluitvorming en inzet van de crisisorganisatie bij de zeer grote brand. 
Enschede: Hulpverleningsdienst Regio Twente. 
Ministerie Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, en Inspectie Milieuhygiëne 
(2001). Onderzoek vuurwerkramp Enschede Onderzoek naar de milieubelasting en de 
gezondheidsrisico’s tijdens en na de vuurwerkramp op 13 mei 2000 te Enschede. Den Haag: 
Ministerie van VROM, Inspectie Milieuhygiëne. 
Muller, E.R., Rosenthal, U., Zannoni, M., Ferwerda, H., Schaap, S.D. (2009). Strandrellen in Hoek 
van Holland. Dancefestival Veronica Sunset Grooves, 22 augustus 2009. Den Haag: COT 
Instituut voor Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement, Bureau Beke. 
Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding (2009). Onderzoek functioneren Stelsel Bewaken en 
Beveiligen Koninginnedag 2009. Den Haag: NCTV.
Otten, M.H.P., Van der Torre, E.J., Ruitenberg, A.G.W., Schilstra, M., Rosenthal, U. (2001). Bossche 
Avonden. Leiden: COT Universiteit Leiden.
Politie Brabant-Noord (2001). Ervaringen en lessen. Interne evaluatie van het politieoptreden rond de 
ongeregeldheden in ’s-Hertogenbosch op 16, 17 en 18 december 2000. Den Haag: Politie. 
Post, M. (2010). Q-koorts: Het waait je aan. Een evaluatie van de aanpak in Noord-Brabant. 
’s-Hertogenbosch: PRVMZ.
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2012). Feitenoverzicht. Besluitvorming en het crisismanagement op 
strategisch niveau binnen de veiligheidsregio’s Midden en West-Brabant en Zuid-Holland Zuid 
in verband met de brand bij Chemie-Pack in Moerdijk op 5 januari 2011. Amsterdam: PWC 
Advisory.
Productschap Pluimvee en Eieren (2003). Evaluatie van de AI-bestrijding in Nederland in de periode 
maart – augustus 2003. Zoetermeer: PPE. 
Rijksverkeersinspectie (2001). Onderzoek vuurwerkramp Enschede Rapport Rijksverkeersinspectie 
naar aanleiding van de vuurwerkramp te Enschede (RVI). Den Haag: RVI. 
188 | appendICeS | 189
Sanders, F.B.M., De Mol, B.A.J.M., Monteban, E., Ale, B.J.M. (2007). Verslag onderzoekscommissie 
brand OK Twenteborg Ziekenhuis. Hilversum: Onderzoekscommissie Brand OK Twenteborg 
Ziekenhuis.
Scholtens, A.C.J., Drent, P.B.G. (2004). Brand in de Koningkerk te Haarlem. Onderzoek naar het 
brandweeroptreden. Den Haag: Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid.
Scholtens, A., Helsloot, I. (2008). Stroomuitval in de Bommeler- en Tielerwaard in december 
2007. Een evaluatie van de hoofdstructuur van de rampenbestrijdingsorganisatie in de regio 
Gelderland Zuid in termen van effect. Arnhem: Nederlands Instituut Fysieke Veiligheid Nibra, 
Politieacademie, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. 
Scholtens, A., Helsloot, I., Roscam Abbing, M., Hazebroek, H., Teunis, J. (2002). Evaluatie brand De 
Bonte Wever. Arnhem: Nederlands Instituut voor Brandweer en Rampenbestrijding.
Van den Akker, B., Penders, K., Seelen, I., (2008). Multidisciplinaire evaluatie. Vechtpartij Lottum. 
d.d. 12 november 2007. 
Van de Leur, P.H.E. (2008). Brandverloop botenloods De Punt. Eindrapport. Den Haag: DGMR 
Bouw.
Van de Ven, R., De Vries, F., De Jong, T., Alves, T., Zijlstra, G., Van Breeden, A., De Vries, A. (2012). 
Evaluatie hoog boezemwater Fryslân. Leeuwarden: Veiligheidsregio Fryslân.
Van der Bijl, N., Van der Velden, Th.M.H. Govers, E.J.E., Van Dorst, P.C. (2012). “Het spijt mij”. 
Over Q-koorts en de menselijke maat. Den Haag: Nationale ombudsman.
Van den Broek, H., Koning, E., Overdiep, I., Verstrate, A. (2006). Feitenreconstructie gebeurtenissen 
Pijnacker. Gemeentelijk beleidskader waarbinnen openbare orde en handhaving en 
politieoptreden plaatsvond. Hoe is dit tot stand gekomen? Hoe is het uitgevoerd? Den Haag: 
B&A Groep.
Van Dijk, G., Van Dissel, J.T., Speelman, P., Stegeman, J.A., Vanthemsche, P., De Vries, J., Van 
Woerkum, C.M.J. (2010). Van verwerping tot verheffing. Q-koortsbeleid in Nederland 2005-
2010. Den Haag: Evaluatiecommissie Q-koorts.
Van Duin, M., Tops, P., Wijkhuijs, V., Adang, O., Kop, N. (2012). Lessen in crisisbeheersing. 
Dilemma’s uit het schietdrama in Alphen aan den Rijn. Den Haag: Boom Lemma uitgevers.
Van Duin, M.J., Zannoni, M. (2002). Na de brand…. Evaluatie van de gebeurtenissen in Roermond 
op, en na 12 juli 2002. Den Haag: COT Instituut voor Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement.
Van der Giessen, J., Van de Giessen, A., Braks, M. (2010). Emerging zoonoses: Early warning and 
surveillance in the Netherlands. Bilthoven: RIVM.
Van der Torre, E., Ferwerda, H., Bos, J., Van Ham, T., Keijzer, D., Van den Brink, E. (2012). 
Relminuten bij het Maasgebouw. Een onderzoek naar aanleiding van ongeregeldheden bij het 
Maasgebouw op 17 september 2011. Auditteam Voetbal & Veiligheid.
Van Leeuwen, J., Verbeek, H. (2011). Evaluatierapport. GRIP 2, zeer grote brand. 05-01-2011. 
Chemie-Pack, Moerdijk. Rotterdam: Veiligheidsregio Rotterdam-Rijnmond.
Van Vollenhoven, P., Hulsenbek, J.A., Brouwer-Korf, A., Mertens, F.J.H., Visser, J.P. (2008). 
Brand in een operatiekamer Twenteborgziekenhuis, Almelo, 28 september 2006. Den Haag: 
Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid.
appendICeS | 189
Van Vollenhoven, P., Hulsenbek, J.A., Brouwer-Korf, A., Mertens, F.J.H., Visser, J.P. (2008). Een 
onvolledig bestuurlijk proces: hartchirurgie in UMC St Radboud. Onderzoek naar aanleiding 
van berichtgeving op 28 september 2005 over te hoge mortaliteit. Den Haag: Onderzoeksraad 
voor Veiligheid.
Van Vollenhoven, P., Hulsenbek, J.A., Brouwer-Korf, A., Mertens, F.J.H., Visser, J.P. (2009). Brand, 
De Punt. Onderzoek naar het verongelukken van drie brandweerlieden bij het bestrijden van een 
brand in De Punt op 9 mei 2008. Den Haag: Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid.
Van Vollenhoven, P., Hulsenbek, J.A., Brouwer-Korf, A., Mertens, F.J.H., Visser, J.P. (2009). 
Draadaanvaring Apache helikopter. Bommelerwaard, 12 december 2007. Den Haag: 
Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid.
Van Vollenhoven, P., Hulsenbek, J.A., Brouwer-Korf, A., Mertens, F.J.H., Visser, J.P. (2010). 
Hulpverlening na vliegtuigongeval Turkish Airlines, Haarlemmermeer. 25 februari 2009. Den 
Haag: Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid.
Van Vollenhoven, P., Hulsenbek, J.A., Brouwer-Korf, A., Van den Berg, A., Mertens, F.J.H., Visser, 
J.P. (2006). Brand cellencomplex Schiphol-Oost. Eindrapport van het onderzoek naar de brand in 
het detentie- en uitzetcentrum Schiphol-Oost in de nacht van 26 op 27 oktober 2005. Den Haag: 
Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid.
Van Vollenhoven, P., Hulsenbek, Van den Berg, Ans., J.A., Brouwer-Korf, A., Mertens, F.J.H., Visser, 
J.P. (2007). Noodlanding van een Bristow AS332L2 search and rescue helikopter. Noordzee, nabij 
Den Helder, 21 november 2006. Den Haag: Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid.
Vervoort, J.P.G., Ramackers, J.H., Visser, H.M., Wimmenhove, H. (2011). Veilig werken 
door hulpverleningsdiensten. Onderzoek naar de werkwijze van brandweer, politie en 
ambulancediensten tijdens het (na)blussen van de brand bij Chemie-Pack in Moerdijk. Utrecht: 
Arbeidsinspectie.
VROM-Inspectie (2011). Chemie-Pack Moerdijk. Feitenrelaas inzake de vergunningsituatie en het 
toezicht. Den Haag: VROM-Inspectie. 
Waterschap Noorderzijlvest (2012). Hoogwater januari 2012. Evaluatie van de hoogwatercalamiteit 
in de eerste week van januari 2012. Groningen: Waterschap Noorderzijlvest.
Witte, R., Brassé, P., Schram, K. (2005). Moskeebrand in Helden. Evaluatie van de aanpak en lessen 
voor de toekomst. Utrecht: FORUM, Instituut voor Multiculturele Ontwikkeling.
Xaro Consult, Bestuursacademie Nederland (2012). Onderzoek VTH-proces. ‘Grolsch Veste’ 
Enschede. Xaro Consult, Bestuursacademie Nederland. 
Zannoni, M., Bos, J.G.H., Engel, K.E., Rosenthal, U. (2008). Brand bij Bouwkunde. Evaluatie van de 
crisisbeheersing en vergunningverlening rond de verwoestende brand bij de Faculteit Bouwkunde 
van de TU Delft. Den Haag: COT Instituut voor Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement.
Zanonni, M., Van Es, A.M.D., Muller, E.R., Van Beest, R.H.P., Van der Heijden, E., Ruhé, E. (2011). 
Brand bij Rivierduinen. Evaluatie van de gebeurtenissen en aanpak. Den Haag: COT Instituut 
voor Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement. 
Zannoni, M., Schaap, S., Matthijs, M., Jochmann, J., Muller, E.R. (2007). Evaluatie van de 




192 | dutCh Summary | 193
DUTCH SUMMARY
Wanneer herrijst de feniks? Factoren en mechanismen die het crisis-
geïnduceerd leren van publieke organisaties beïnvloeden
Crises vinden niet frequent plaats, maar hebben desalniettemin een enorme impact op de 
maatschappij en de mensen die daarin leven. Het garanderen van de veiligheid van burgers 
is van oudsher één van de kerntaken van de overheid. Door het proces van leren van een 
crisis stellen publieke organisatie zich in staat om (vergelijkbare) toekomstige crises te 
voorkomen, dan wel effectiever te reageren wanneer deze toch plaatsvinden. Leren draagt 
dus bij aan het creëren van een veerkrachtige organisatie en samenleving. We zien echter 
dat publieke organisaties doorgaans veel moeite ondervinden met het leren van crises. 
Tegelijkertijd nemen we een grote variatie in leren waar: waar leren vaak moeilijk gaat, leert 
een organisatie soms plotseling heel sterk. Deze variatie kan onvoldoende verklaard worden 
aan de hand van bestaande theorie, mede door een gebrek aan studies aangaande de factoren 
die leren van crises bepalen. Daarom poneerden we de onderzoeksvraag: “Hoe leren publieke 
organisaties van crises; en welke factoren en mechanismen verklaren dit proces van crisis-
geïnduceerd leren?”
Het huidige onderzoek betreft een exploratieve studie naar onderliggende factoren en 
mechanismen die werken in verschillende contexten. Naast het gebruik van theorie was 
de empirische data leidend in het onderzoek. Het doel was het genereren van inzichten 
in het crisis-geïnduceerd leerproces en het vormen van een aanzet tot systematische 
operationalisering en integraal theoretisch raamwerk voor bepalende factoren. Verdergaande 
inzichten in het complexe proces van leren zijn essentieel omdat het bijdraagt aan een 
effectievere crisisbeheersing, het verminderen van de consequenties van crises, en daarmee 
aan een veerkrachtiger maatschappij.
De literatuur geeft aan dat de relatie tussen crisis en leren ambivalent is. Aan de ene kant 
creëert crisis een plotselinge mogelijkheid voor het doorvoeren van structurele organisationele 
veranderingen. Aan de andere kant kunnen crisis-kenmerkende omstandigheden, zoals 
chaos, tijdsdruk, een tekort aan informatie, en sterke invloed van uiteenlopende belangen, 
leren belemmeren. Het concept organisationeel leren is onderhevig aan discussie aangaande 
definitiekwesties in de literatuur. Wij kiezen voor een integrale benadering van het concept 
en definiëren ‘organisationeel leren’ als het proces van het verkrijgen van nieuwe kennis en 
begrip (cognitieve dimensie) en het omzetten van deze nieuwe kennis en begrip in verbeterd 
organisationeel handelen (gedragsdimensie). Op basis van beschikbare wetenschappelijke 
literatuur stellen we een raamwerk op voor crisis-geïnduceerd leren waarin we ‘wie-wat-
waarom-wanneer’ distincties onderscheiden.
Dit onderzoek is gestructureerd in vier deelstudies, waarbij de eerste deelstudie als 
basis fungeert voor de drie aansluitende deelstudies. Er is een combinatie van kwalitatieve, 
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kwantitatieve en gemengde methoden gebruikt, waarbij de keuze gebaseerd is op het doel 
van elke deelstudie. Het onderzoek kenmerkt zich door de grote hoeveelheid empirische 
data, vergaard over een groot aantal crises.
De eerste deelstudie bestaat uit een exploratie van de factoren en mechanismen die crisis-
geïnduceerd leren beïnvloeden, middels een analyse van de reactie van de Nederlandse 
Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit (NVWA) op vier veterinaire crises (Varkenspest, 1997; 
Mond-en-klauwzeer, 2001; Vogelpest, 2003; Q-koorts, 2007). Data werd vergaard op basis 
van crisisdocumenten en 17 interviews met sleutelexperts van het NVWA Incident en 
Crisiscentrum. Op basis van deze studie onderscheiden wij zes cruciale factoren voor crisis-
geïnduceerd leren, die van uiteenlopende aard zijn en volgens verschillende mechanismen 
werken. 
In de tweede deelstudie is de specifieke de rol van politisering in het crisis-geïnduceerd 
leerproces onderzocht, middels een studie op issue-niveau naar de reactie van de Europese 
Unie op vier olierampen (Braer, 1993; Sea Empress, 1996; Erika, 1999; Prestige, 2002). 
Een ‘politieke claims-analyse’ van krantenartikelen, verslagen van debatten in nationale 
parlementen en het Europees Parlement, en een studie naar evaluatierapporten en nieuwe 
EU-wetgeving aangenomen op basis van deze rampen werd uitgevoerd. We concluderen 
dat politisering zowel een positieve als negatieve invloed kan hebben, afhankelijk van 
interveniërende variabelen. Wij vinden geen bewijs voor ‘quasi-leren’. 
In de derde deelstudie is de rol van externe experts in ‘in-crisisleren’ bestudeerd, 
waarbij de reguliere crisisorganisatie externe experts betrekt in de crisisbeheersing. Dit 
is uitgevoerd middels een researchsynthese van data uit 114 evaluatierapporten in reactie 
op 60 verschillende crises die tussen 2000 en 2013 in Nederland hebben plaatsvonden. 
We identificeren zes mechanismen van kansen en bedreigingen voor het betrekken van 
externe experts en tien condities waarin hun betrokkenheid bijdraagt aan een adequate 
crisisbeheersing. 
In de vierde en laatste deelstudie is de invloed van eigenschappen van publieke leiders 
op het crisis-geïnduceerd leerproces onderzocht middels een survey van alle burgemeesters 
in Nederland, aangaande hun prioriteiten voor leeraspecten direct na een hypothetische 
crisis in hun gemeente. We concluderen dat publiek leiders met een hogere ‘public service 
motivation’ (PSM) zowel meer op ‘instrumenteel leren’ als op ‘politiek leren’ georiënteerd 
zijn. Crisiservaring van leiders heeft een positieve en hun ambtstermijn een negatieve 
invloed. 
Op basis van de vier deelstudies gecombineerd doen we verschillende bevindingen. We 
concluderen dat crisis-geïnduceerd organisationeel leren een uitermate complex proces is: 
het kan verschillende vormen aannemen, factoren zijn deels onderling verweven, en leren is 
lastig omdat crises zich moeilijk laten voorspellen. Op basis van de resultaten vormen we een 
theoretisch conceptueel model, bestaande uit zeven cruciale factoren voor crisis-geïnduceerd 
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leren: politisering, politiek-economische context, (externe) expertise, organisatiestructuur, 
organisatiecultuur, publieke leider oriëntatie en organisationeel vergeten. Politisering lijkt 
een sleutelrol te spelen, door in samenhang met vijf andere kernfactoren het optreden van 
leren te beïnvloeden. Daarnaast onderscheiden we een aantal typerende verschillen tussen 
in-crisis leren en post-crisis leren, waarbij we een link leggen tussen de conditie en het type 
les die geleerd wordt.
Deze studie draagt in meerdere opzichten bij aan wetenschap en praktijk. Het laat het nut 
zien van sterke empirische fundering en een analyse van een groot aantal crises. De studie 
integreert de verschillende cruciale factoren en het geeft een aanzet tot een theoretisch 
raamwerk en systematischer operationalisering van crisis-geïnduceerd organisationeel 
leren. Het geeft de essentiële onderscheiden in crisis-geïnduceerd leren weer en laat 
de onderlinge samenhang tussen factoren zien. Zowel in onderzoek als praktijk is het 
onderscheid in organisationeel leren en organisationele verandering van belang. Een proces 
van ‘organisationeel vergeten’ speelt een essentiële rol in publieke organisaties en dient meer 
aandacht te krijgen. De rol van crisis evaluatierapporten in het crisis-geïnduceerd leerproces 
is niet eenduidig, hetgeen vraagt om nader onderzoek naar de vorm van rapporten en 
bepalende condities. De in dit onderzoek in kaart gebrachte typen lessen en factoren, en 
empirische voorbeelden, kunnen fungeren als ‘checklist’ voor crisismanagers. Deze studie 
geeft het belang aan voor publieke organisaties om voldoende aandacht te besteden aan het 
‘vasthouden’ en ‘verspreiden’ van lessen en, ondanks de moeilijkheid, reeds in de ‘koude 
fase’ aan de slag te gaan met het voorbereiden op leren na toekomstige crises. Wij raden 
vervolgstappen aan richting een meetinstrument voor crisis-geïnduceerd organisationeel 
leren. Tot slot adviseren wij vervolgonderzoek dat het model en de factoren daarin verder 
onderzoekt, in andere typen crises, publieke organisaties en institutionele contexten, om zo 
ons begrip van ‘wanneer de feniks herrijst’ verder te verbeteren. 
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Crises can disrupt entire societies and severely affect the lives of the 
people within them. If a crisis occurs, citizens and other societal actors 
expect governments to learn from it in order to prevent the terrible events 
from happening again in the future, or, at least to be able to respond more 
effectively to them the next time. 
However, government organizations generally seem to have major 
difficulties in learning from crises. Nevertheless, every now and then, 
they do manage to learn extensively, and change their protocols, 
implement new policies, open up the organization’s culture, establish new 
organizational units, introduce training and simulation exercises, or improve 
communication. Why is it that public organizations sometimes learn from a 
crisis, but other times do not? 
The work reported here reveals the major factors and mechanisms that 
explain crisis-induced learning by public organizations. The research 
draws on data from crisis management documents and interviews with 
employees of the Dutch food safety services (NVWA) related to four 
veterinary crises; EU legislation, evaluation reports, newspaper articles, 
and reports of national and EU parliamentary debates following four major 
oil spillages; 114 post-crisis evaluation reports in response to 60 crises in 
the Netherlands; and a survey of Dutch mayors.
This book will be relevant for scholars and students of safety, security and 
public administration, crisis management practitioners, public managers, 
and everyone interested in how a government organizes and manages its 
response to a crisis and prepares for a future one. 
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